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Summary 
All agricultural subdivisions in the Republic of South Africa are regulated by the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. The declared purpose of the Act is 
to prevent the creation of uneconomic farming units and this purpose is achieved 
through the requirement that the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(“Minister of Agriculture”) must consent to the proposed subdivision. The Act was 
promulgated in the 1970s when the South African landscape was racially divided. 
The government of the time used law to provide benefits for the white minority. At 
this time the rights of non-whites were restricted. This is the social and political 
background of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act. The Act formed part of a 
legislative scheme that provided benefits for white farmers. More than a decade after 
democratisation and the end of apartheid the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act is 
still in operation. The post-apartheid legislature drafted and enacted the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act 64 of 1998, but it has not yet been brought into 
operation. During 2003 the legislature tabled the Draft Sustainable Utilisation of 
Agricultural Resources Bill which contains subdivision provisions that are identical to 
the provisions contained in the Subdivision Act. These legislative actions have 
created some uncertainty about the state of agricultural subdivisions. In 2008 the 
Constitutional Court decided that the Act continues to apply to all agricultural 
subdivisions and that this would be the position until the legislature chooses a 
definitive course of action. 
 
This constitutional analysis of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act examines the 
effect of the Act beyond the pre-constitutional legislative intention and framework 
under which it was enacted. If the Act cannot be saved from its apartheid context, 
the Repeal Act should become operational. This thesis concludes that the necessary 
and legitimate purpose of the Act, namely the regulation of subdivision of agricultural 
land, can be removed from its pre-constitutional setting in the apartheid era and may 
continue to justify the legitimate regulation of subdivision of land. Comparative 
sources, namely the United States of America, specifically the states of Oregon and 
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Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of British Columbia, Canada indicate that 
the regulation of agricultural subdivisions is a valid means of protecting agricultural 
land. 
 
If the Act can continue to exist without its legacy of apartheid and still serves a 
legitimate and necessary purpose it will have to be constitutionally compliant. The 
purpose of the Act and the means used to realise it were tested against the Bill of 
Rights. The effect that the regulation has particularly on ownership entitlements was 
examined against section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. Similarly, the 
consequences of the regulation with regard to other rights in the Bill of Rights were 
investigated. The conclusion was that where the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
is used for its purpose of preventing the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land, 
in the national interest, it is a legitimate land-use regulation that can continue to 
justifiably operate in a constitutional dispensation. 
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Opsomming 
Alle onderverdelings van landbougrond in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika word 
gereguleer deur die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond 70 van 1970. Die 
verklaarde doel van die Wet is om die totstandkoming van onekonomiese landbou- 
eenhede te voorkom, en hierdie doel word bereik deurdat die Minister van Landbou, 
Bosbou en Visserye (“Minister van Landbou”) toestemming moet verleen vir die 
voorgestelde onderverdeling van landbougrond. Die Wet is in die 1970s 
gepromulgeer toe grond in Suid-Afrika in terme van ras verdeel was. Die destydse 
apartheidsregering het die regstelsel gebruik om voordele vir die blanke 
minderheidsgroep te bewerkstellig, terwyl die regte van nie-blankes ingeperk was. 
Dit is die sosiale en politieke agtergrond waarteen die Wet op die Onderverdeling 
van Landbougrond tot stand gekom het. Die Wet was deel van ‘n wetgewende 
raamwerk waarbinne voordele vir blanke boere geskep is. Meer as ‘n dekade na 
apartheid en die totstandkoming van ‘n demokratiese Suid-Afrika is die Wet op die 
Onderverdeling van Landbougrond steeds in werking. Die post-apartheid wetgewer 
het die Wet op die Herroepping van die Wet op die Onderverdeling van 
Landbougrond 64 van 1998 gepromulgeer, maar nog nie in werking gestel nie. 
Gedurende 2003 het die wetgewer die “Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural 
Resources Bill”, wat onderafdelings soortgelyk aan die bepalings in die Wet op die 
Onderverdeling van Landbougrond bevat, gepromulgeer. Bogenoemde stappe het 
onsekerheid geskep ten opsigte van die stand van onderverdeling van 
landbougrond. In 2008 het die Konstitusionele Hof beslis dat die Wet op die 
Onderverdeling van Landbougrond sal voortgaan om die onderverdeling van 
landbougrond te reguleer totdat die wetgewer uitsluitsel oor die aangeleentheid 
verskaf. 
 
Die doel van die tesis is om die uitwerking van die Wet op die Onderverdeling van 
Landbougrond te analiseer as deel van die huidige grondwetlike bedeling, aangesien 
dit geskep is tydens die apartheidsera. Indien die Wet nie van sy apartheidskonteks 
geskei of gered kan word nie sal die Herroepping Wet in werking gestel moet word. 
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Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die doel van die Wet, naamlik die regulering 
van die onderverdeling van landbougrond, van die voor-konstitusionele agtergrond in 
die apartheidsera geskei kan word en dat dit kan voortgaan om die wettige 
regulering van onderverdeling van landbougrond te regverdig. Regsvergelykende 
bronne, naamlik die Verenigde State van Amerika, veral die state van Oregon en 
Hawaii, Wes Australië en Brits-Columbië, ‘n provinsie van Kanada, dui aan dat die 
regulasie van die onderverdeling van landbougrond ‘n regsgeldige metode is om 
landbougrond te beskerm. Die doel van die Wet en die metodes wat gebruik word 
om hierdie doel te laat realiseer is getoets teen die Handves van Menseregte. Die 
uitwerking van die regulasie op die inhoudsbevoegdhede van die eienaar is spesifiek 
geëvalueer teen artikel 25(1) van die 1996 Grondwet, maar die gevolge van die 
regulasie is ook getoets teen ander regte in die Handves van Menseregte. Die 
gevolgtrekking was dat waar die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond 
gebruik word met die doel om onekonomiese onderverdeling van landbougrond te 
verhoed in die nasionale belang, dit ‘n legitieme regulasie van grondgebruik is 
waarvan die gebruik steeds regverdigbaar is in ‘n grondwetlike bedeling. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 1 Introduction 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (“Subdivision Act”)1 regulates the 
subdivision of all agricultural land in the Republic. The declared purpose of the Act is 
to prevent the creation of uneconomic farming units and this purpose is achieved 
through the requirement that the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(“Minister of Agriculture”) must consent to the proposed subdivision. This purpose is 
to prevent the degradation of prime agricultural land in the Republic. However, the 
Act was crafted with more than uneconomic farming units in mind. It was crafted and 
implemented at a time when white South African agricultural interests were being 
promoted and protected by the apartheid government. At this time black South 
Africans were limited to land that was released by the state. This is the social and 
political background of the Subdivision Act. The Act was arguably used to promote 
an apartheid agenda which preserved prime agricultural land for white farmers. If the 
Act was in fact used to promote this apartheid agenda, it will be necessary to 
distinguish and separate this agenda from the necessary regulation that prevents the 
creation of uneconomic farming units. The use of the Act to promote this apartheid 
agenda will be termed “the illegitimate aim of the Subdivision Act”. The regulation 
that serves to prevent agricultural degradation by preventing the creation of 
uneconomic units will be termed “the legitimate purpose of the Subdivision Act”. The 
legitimate purpose will have to be separated from the illegitimate aim. The severance 
of the illegitimate aim of the Act from the legitimate purpose is necessary to justify 
the continued operation of the Subdivision Act in a constitutional dispensation. 
However, this severance, if possible, will not mean that the Act is automatically 
constitutional. It will be necessary to further test the legitimate purpose for 
constitutional consonance. The legitimate purpose of the Act will have to be tested in 
terms of the Constitution of the Republic 1996. This constitutional analysis of the 
Subdivision Act will examine the effect of the Subdivision Act beyond the pre-
constitutional legislative intention and framework under which it was created. 
                                            
1
  70 of 1970. 
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The Subdivision Act’s declared purpose is “[t]o control the subdivision and, in 
connection therewith, the use of agricultural land”.2 This is what is termed the 
legitimate purpose of the Act. To achieve this purpose the Act regulates the 
subdivision and most of the actions that could result in the subdivision of agricultural 
land. These actions include the sale or long term lease, the registration of servitudes, 
subject to exceptions, and the disposition of a portion of agricultural land. These 
actions may not occur without written consent from the Minister of Agriculture. These 
limitations on the right of an owner to subdivide agricultural land and alienate or 
lease or to encumber it with servitudes are clearly acts of regulation. The regulation 
is aimed at preventing the subdivision of land into uneconomic portions. The Act 
exists to regulate the agricultural sector to prevent a loss of land specifically zoned 
for agricultural purposes.  
 
Apart from the declared purpose of the Act, it is clear that the Act also has the effect 
of determining who may obtain agricultural land. This relates to the history and 
context of the Act and the state of agricultural landholding because of the legacy of 
apartheid. It will be argued that the Act was used to preserve prime agricultural land 
for white ownership and occupation. This is the illegitimate aim of the Act. The 
limitation on the right of agricultural land owners to subdivide and dispose of their 
land is in effect a limitation on the free disposal of agricultural land which would 
promote access to this land. The operation of the Act would ensure that white 
farmers could retain agricultural holdings obtained during the apartheid period. The 
power the then Minister had to oversee agricultural subdivisions was used to further 
ensure that white farmers retained control of prime agricultural holdings. The power 
of the Minister in terms of the Act, the limitation on disposal because of the operation 
of the Act and the legislative scheme that created the Act will serve as evidence for 
the argument that the Subdivision Act serves and served racially segregated 
agricultural land holding. It served racially segregated agricultural land holding by 
                                            
2
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, long title. 
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preserving agricultural land for whites. It still serves racially segregated agricultural 
land holding because the Act limits the disposal of agricultural land. It allows whites 
who obtained this land under apartheid to maintain ownership of agricultural holdings 
and it is an obstacle to black access.  
 
During 1998 the post-apartheid legislature passed the Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act Repeal Act (“Repeal Act”).3 The Repeal Act has not has been brought into 
operation yet, but has created some uncertainty. The reasons for drafting this Repeal 
Act, as well as the reasons for not implementing it, will need to be considered. A 
decade after the still inoperative Repeal Act was promulgated the Constitutional 
Court handed down a judgment which effectively decided on the continued 
application of the Subdivision Act. In Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and 
Others (“Wary Holdings”)4 the Constitutional Court had to decide whether agricultural 
land still existed for the purposes of the Subdivision Act. The case was not decided 
on the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, but on the question whether the 
definition of “agricultural land” in the Act would continue to apply after municipal 
restructuring throughout the Republic. The Subdivision Act only affects agricultural 
land and the apartheid legislature defined this land in the Act as all the land not 
situated in the jurisdiction of a municipality or town council. This definition has 
become problematic because wall-to-wall municipalities have been established 
throughout the Republic.5 
 
This thesis will attempt to do four things. The first will be to identify the legitimate 
purpose of the Subdivision Act, namely the preservation of agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes. The second is to show that the Act was used for an illegitimate 
aim during apartheid, namely the preservation of agricultural land for whites. The 
                                            
3
  64 of 1998. 
4
  2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
5
  The Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 and the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, sec 
93(8) had in effect created wall-to-wall municipalities and would have excluded the Subdivision Act’s 
operation. 
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third is to distinguish the illegitimate aim and the legitimate purpose for the purpose 
of trying to effectively separate them. Here it will be necessary to determine what 
constitutes legitimate land-use regulations over property. This will set the standard 
that the Subdivision Act needs to be tested against to determine whether it is a 
regulation that can operate free from its illegitimate aim. If the Act cannot be saved 
from its apartheid context then the Repeal Act should be put into operation and new 
legislation should replaced it. After this process a legitimate and functional purpose 
of the Act should remain. The fourth will be to test the remaining legitimate regulation 
against constitutional provisions. If the Act can continue to exist without its legacy of 
apartheid it will have to be proved to be constitutionally compliant, especially where 
the continued application of the Act perpetuates the inequitable legacy of apartheid 
land allocation. This will show that the 1970s regulation is a valid and constitutionally 
sound regulation that can continue to justifiably regulate agricultural subdivisions in 
the current dispensation. 
 
1 2  Hypotheses and research aims 
The first assumption necessary for this constitutional analysis of the Subdivision Act 
is that that Act serves a legitimate purpose in a constitutional democracy despite its 
racialised apartheid past. The analysis of the Subdivision Act aims to show that the 
Act serves a legitimate purpose that is still valid in post-apartheid law, namely the 
prevention of the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. 
 
The Act appears to only regulate agricultural subdivision, but it may also have an 
illegitimate aim or motive because of the apartheid context within which it was 
created. The analysis of the Act will further identify that the Act was also used for an 
illegitimate goal during the apartheid era, namely the preservation of productive 
farmlands for whites. The history of the Act and policy reasons for its enactment will 
be used to identify this aim. 
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It is necessary to assume that the legitimate purpose of the Act can be separated 
from the illegitimate aim and that it still has a legitimate function, namely regulation of 
agricultural subdivision. The further assumption is that if separation is not possible 
the Act should be repealed and new legislation should replace it. It is necessary to 
argue that, if the legitimate purpose can be separated from the illegitimate apartheid 
goal, a functional purpose for the regulation will remain, namely to prevent the 
uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. It can be accepted that if the identified 
illegitimate aim cannot be separated from the legitimate purpose that the Act would 
be unconstitutional. It will be necessary to define what constitutes a rational and 
justifiable regulation over property to distinguish between the purpose and the aim. 
Testing the Act against the standard of a “rational and justifiable regulation” should 
indicate whether the legitimate purpose of the Act can continue to operate without 
the illegitimate aim. 
 
I further assume that a regulation, like the Subdivision Act, that poses excessive 
restrictions or burdens on certain ownership entitlements and may be in conflict with 
section 25 of the Constitution. Even though the regulatory purpose of the Subdivision 
Act may be found to be legitimate, it will nevertheless have a restricting effect on 
ownership entitlements, specifically on the right to subdivide and then to sell, lease 
or bequeath the portion of agricultural land and the right to register certain servitudes 
over the land without consent from the Minister of Agriculture. In the constitutional 
era, it is necessary to determine whether this restricting effect complies with section 
25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
The final assumption is that from the existing case law it should be possible to test 
the Subdivision Act for general constitutional compliance. The aim is to test the 
further constitutional implications of the Act against the Bill of Rights and existing 
case law. This would indicate the Act’s compliance in terms of the Constitution. This 
would focus on the limitation on access to prime agricultural land, the Minister’s 
powers in terms of the Act, the conflict of rights promoted by the Act’s purpose and 
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those restricted by this purpose and finally the issue of competences under the 
Constitution. 
 
1 3  Overview of substantive chapters 
1 3 1  Analysis of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
The analysis of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act chapter will serve as an 
analysis of the historical background of the Subdivision Act, the policy reasons for its 
enactment, the provisions that allow the Act to serve its purpose of preventing the 
uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural land and considerations for its future 
application. 
 
The context and policy from which the Act was crafted will serve as a historical 
background. This history will also identify the illegitimate aim of the Act, namely the 
preservation of prime agricultural land for white ownership and occupation. The 
legislative tools used to dispossess black South Africans and provide benefits for the 
white minority will contextualise the creation of the Act. This will serve as the premise 
for the argument that the Subdivision Act served and serves racially segregated 
agricultural land holding. The continued effect of the Subdivision Act on the right of 
an agricultural land owner to subdivide and dispose of their land could affect black 
access to agricultural land. It is a fact that the majority of prime agricultural in the 
Republic is held by white owners and they obtained this land under an apartheid 
system. Insofar as the Act prevents or is an obstacle to the disposal of this land, it 
could be seen as preserving a state of apartheid land allocation. If the Act continues 
to perpetuate this state it will need to be amended or abolished. The policy reasons 
for the regulation of subdivision will show that the concern for the creation of 
uneconomic farming units was in fact a concern for the wellbeing of the white farmer. 
The Select Committees on Subdivision of Agricultural Land6 were mandated to 
                                            
6
  Republic of South Africa Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-64 
(1964) 1-88; Republic of South Africa Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-65 
(1965) 1-51. 
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investigate the feasibility of state control over agricultural subdivisions in the 
Republic. The reports will indicate that the Committees were concerned that the rate 
of agricultural subdivisions would create a white peasant farming community. The 
policy analysis will clearly show the two elements of the Subdivision Act, the 
legitimate purpose of preserving agricultural land and the illegitimate aim of 
preserving this land for white use. 
 
In terms of the Subdivision Act landowners are compelled to apply for, and the 
Minister of Agriculture is empowered to approve or deny, applications for agricultural 
subdivision. This is to preserve prime agricultural land in the national interest. The 
interpretation of the Act’s provisions will identify the steps the legislature has taken in 
limiting the right of agricultural landowners to subdivide their land. It will also show 
that the Act restricts not only the act of subdivision, but most actions that may lead to 
the subdivision of agricultural land.7 These include the sale and advertising for sale 
of a portion of agricultural land, long-term lease of a portion of agricultural land, the 
disposition of a portion of agricultural land and the registration of certain servitudes. 
This section will emphasise the definition of agricultural land,8 as only agricultural 
land is affected by this regulation; actions related to agricultural land that are not 
affected by the Act’s operation;9 actions that are prohibited;10 the extent of the 
Minister’s consent;11 the restrictions placed on succession12 and servitudes;13 and 
the penalties and fines14 imposed when contravening the Act. The courts’ 
interpretation of these various provisions will also be considered in this section. The 
majority of the cases dealing with the Act will show that the regulation and 
                                            
7
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 3. 
8
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 1(a) – (f). 
9
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 2. 
10
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 3. 
11
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4.   
12
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 5(1). 
13
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 6A. 
14
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 11. 
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requirements have been used to escape contracts of sale of agricultural land. 
Contracting parties would use the technicalities of the Act, specifically the 
requirement of written ministerial consent, to escape contracts with unfavourable 
terms. This was the case in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(“Wary Holdings”).15 The Constitutional Court in Wary Holdings had to decide 
whether agricultural land still existed for the purposes of the Subdivision Act. This 
finding would have directly affected the contract of sale between the parties, but 
would also have had an effect on the status of agricultural land subdivisions over the 
entire country. The respondent argued that the Act had no application because of the 
limited definition of agricultural land in section 1,16 and that it no longer held any 
relevance because of municipal restructuring throughout the Republic.17 The main 
purpose of this contention was to enforce the contract which sold a subdivided 
portion of agricultural land, but did so without the necessary written consent. The 
court provided an interpretation of the definition of “agricultural land” in the Act and 
the proviso it was subject to. A discussion of the constitutional issues raised in the 
Wary Holdings decision is necessary. Although the decision does not deal with the 
effect of the regulation on rights in the Bill of Rights, it does raise issues with the 
competency of national government to regulate agricultural subdivision and provides 
an interpretation of the definition of “agricultural land” which is central to the 
operation of the Act. 
 
                                            
15
  2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
16
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 1 states that “[a]gricultural land means 
any land, except - (a) land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a municipal council, city council, town 
council, village council, village management board, village management council [...] Para (a) 
amended by s 1 (a) of Act No 33 of 1984, and by Act No 49 of 1996”. 
17
  The Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 and the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, sec 
93(8) had in effect created wall-to-wall municipalities and would have excluded the Subdivision Act’s 
operation. However, the inclusion of the proviso in GN R100 of 1995 GG 16785 which extended the 
operation of the Subdivision Act beyond the transitional period, during which the final municipalities 
were to be finalised, created uncertainty as to the continued application and operation after the end of 
the transitional period. 
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The current status of the Act since the promulgation of the Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act Repeal Act18 needs to be considered. The Repeal Act is still inoperative 
with a date of operation to be determined by the President. The reasons provided for 
the repeal were that the post-apartheid legislature no longer finds it appropriate for 
government to decide on the size of agricultural holdings. The legislature also stated 
that other legislation was already in place to protect and conserve agricultural land. It 
has been more than a decade since the Repeal Act was promulgated and it remains 
inoperative. A great deal of uncertainty was created after the promulgation of the 
Repeal Act. The status of agricultural subdivisions and the state’s intention of how 
this regulation will be dealt with in future are discussed in this section. The Draft 
Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003 was drafted, but never 
presented to Parliament. The Draft Bill was revisited in 2007, but there have been no 
developments since. The Bill contains provisions that are identical to the Subdivision 
Act. It will be necessary to question the existence of the Repeal Act in light of 
legislature’s intention with the Draft Bill. 
 
1 3 2 Identifying and separating the legitimate purpose from the illegitimate aim 
The Subdivision Act is legislation that was crafted during the apartheid period. It is a 
regulation that has a legitimate purpose, but also an inherently illegitimate aim. The 
Act’s legitimate purpose is the societal need to protect and preserve agricultural 
land, whereas the illegitimate aim was the apartheid aim to preserve prime 
agricultural land for white use and occupation. The state’s intervention in this regard 
was to prevent agricultural land from being subdivided into uneconomic units. This 
fostered white agricultural interests and through the requirement of ministerial 
consent prevented black South Africans from gaining access to agricultural land. The 
legitimate purpose and the illegitimate aim exist side-by-side in this legislative text. 
This is the situation in most of apartheid planning law and land-use management. To 
separate the purpose of the Act from the aim of the Act, if this is at all possible, will 
be the focus of the chapter on identifying and separating the legitimate purpose and 
                                            
18
  64 of 1998. 
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the illegitimate aim of the Act. The use of comparative examples will further indicate 
whether the subdivision regulation is a legitimate land-use regulation. 
 
An understanding of land-use regulations as legitimate limitations on the rights of the 
owner will aid in identifying a rational and legitimate purpose in the Subdivision Act. 
The justifications for imposing regulations over property often fall within the 
categories of public health, safety and the general welfare of the citizens. The state 
can exercise its police powers in terms of these justifications. The South African pre-
constitutional context will have to be considered and the distinction between what is 
perceived to be a legitimate and neutral land-use regulation and its creation under 
the apartheid order will be questioned. An understanding of what constitutes a 
legitimate regulation imposed by a state authority will be used to distinguish and 
separate the legitimate purpose from the illegitimate aim of the Act. If the Subdivision 
Act cannot satisfy the factors identified for a valid and justifiable land-use regulation 
it will be assumed to still serve the illegitimate aim. The foreign jurisdictions, 
specifically the United States of America, focussing on the states of Oregon and 
Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of British Columbia, Canada, will be 
used to identify legitimate land-use regulations that serve to protect agricultural land. 
This will provide further clarity when deciding whether a Subdivision Act is a 
legitimate land-use regulation over agricultural land. Indentifying and separating the 
illegitimate from the legitimate purpose will be able to justify the continued operation 
of the Act in a constitutional dispensation. 
 
1 3 3 Section 25 compliance 
Section 25 provides that a deprivation of property may not be arbitrary. In First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance (“FNB”)19 the Constitutional Court decided that a deprivation 
                                            
19
  2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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would be arbitrary if there was insufficient reason for it.20 Section 25(1) states that 
“[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”.21 This chapter on section 25 
compliance will consider whether the Subdivision Act, as a law of general 
application, arbitrarily deprives agricultural land owners of the right to dispose of their 
property. Testing the Subdivision Act for constitutional compliance will focus on the 
legitimate purpose of the instrument and whether the means used to achieve this 
purpose, namely the limitation on ownership entitlements, can be justified in terms of 
the standard of arbitrariness set by the court in FNB. This chapter will use the 
methodology of the FNB case to determine whether the Act’s legitimate effect and 
means of regulation amount to an arbitrary deprivation.  
 
The FNB methodology will be used to determine whether the limitation on the 
common law right of land owners to subdivide their land is a limitation on an interest 
in property and whether that limitation is a deprivation for the purposes of section 25. 
The test will then determine whether the deprivation complies with the requirements 
of section 25(1). The focus is on the arbitrariness standard set by court in the 
decision. This entails testing whether a sufficient reason for the deprivation exists 
based on the variable interplay of relationships considered by the court. Both 
procedural and substantive arbitrariness will need to be considered and tested. The 
Subdivision Act also makes provision for expropriation in certain instances. An 
expropriation in terms of the Subdivision Act will be tested in terms of the 
constitutional standard set in sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. 
 
1 3 4 General constitutional compliance 
The further constitutional implications of the Subdivision Act will be considered and 
tested in the chapter on the general constitutional compliance of the Act. The 
                                            
20
  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
21
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  
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necessary and legitimate purpose of the Subdivision Act, the preservation and 
protection of agricultural land from uneconomic subdivision, divorced from its pre-
constitutional apartheid aim, the preservation of prime agricultural land for white 
ownership and occupation, will have to be tested in terms of other rights in the Bill of 
Rights. The fact that the Act had the effect of determining who may have access to 
agricultural holdings requires examination. In instances where the Act’s legitimate 
purpose could maintain white ownership of prime agricultural land that was obtained 
because of apartheid regulation requires scrutiny. This effect of the Act will have to 
be tested against the equality provision in the Constitution for possible unfair 
discrimination.22 The limitation on disposal posed by the Subdivision Act is an 
obstacle to black access to agricultural resources and allows whites to hold 
agricultural land acquired under apartheid. It will be necessary to determine whether 
this effect is unfair discrimination because the Act restricts access to land that has a 
racialised history. The agricultural land that was subject to the Act was the prime 
agricultural land outside of the homelands. This land was white owned land and the 
operation of the Subdivision Act could ensure that this land remains in white 
occupation and prevents blacks from accessing this land. It is necessary to test this 
effect against the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(“PEPUDA”).23 PEPUDA was enacted to give effect to the section 9 right of equality 
and will be used to test this effect of the Subdivision Act.  
 
The administrative nature of the powers awarded to the Minister of Agriculture in 
terms of the Subdivision Act will also require due consideration. The Minister’s 
administrative powers to decide on applications for subdivision existed at a time 
when administrative powers were abused to serve an apartheid political agenda. 
Although these powers are necessary in achieving the legitimate purpose of the Act 
they will require testing in terms of the Constitution because of the history of the 
                                            
22
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, sec 9. 
23
  4 of 2000. 
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Act.24 To determine the validity of these administrative powers the Act will be tested 
against the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.25 
 
The socio-economic public purpose of the Subdivision Act, namely the preservation 
of prime agricultural land, also serves to promote and protect other rights in the Bill 
of Rights. The right to a safe and healthy environment26 and the right to food 
security27 are rights that can be promoted by the legitimate purpose of the Act. The 
preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes also has the effect of 
preventing the effective implementation of land reform goals and could be an 
obstacle to the realisation of the socio-economic right to housing. It is necessary to 
consider all these rights, the rights promoted by the effective implementation of the 
legitimate purpose of the Act and the rights restricted by this purpose. There is a 
conflict between these rights and case law dealing with the conflict of rights will be 
considered and applied to this situation. 
 
The issue raised in the minority decision in Wary Holdings also needs to be 
discussed. Yacoob J, for the minority, found that the national regulation of 
agricultural subdivision was in conflict with the Constitution. Here the issue of 
national, provincial and municipal competences comes into question. Deciding on 
whether it is appropriate for the Minister of Agriculture to continue overseeing 
agricultural subdivisions is necessary for the future and continued application of the 
Act. This is of particular relevance when considering the inoperative Repeal Act and 
the future of regulations over agricultural subdivision and whether new regulation 
should be left to provincial and municipal authorities.  
 
                                            
24
  Constitution of the Republic of South African 1996, sec 33. 
25
  3 of 2000. 
26
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, sec 24. 
27
  Constitution of the Republic of South African 1996, sec 27(1)(b). 
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1 4  Methodologies 
The following methodologies will be used to test the hypotheses and aims identified 
above: a historical survey of the development of the Act; a policy analysis of the 
regulation of agricultural subdivisions; a statutory analysis of the legislative tool and 
its purpose; a constitutional analysis of validity legislation and a brief comparative 
survey of the regulation of agricultural subdivision in foreign jurisdictions. The 
historical survey will examine agricultural landholding before the promulgation of the 
Subdivision Act. This will contextualise and identify the legislative scheme that 
promoted and protected white agricultural interests. This analysis will identify both 
the illegitimate apartheid aim and the legitimate purpose of the legislation. The policy 
analysis will focus on evidence led by the Select Committees on Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land.28 The two Committees investigated the feasibility of state 
regulation over the common law right of agricultural land owners to subdivide their 
land. The statutory analysis of the Act will examine specific provisions in the Act. 
Case law deciding on the operation of the Act’s provisions will aid the interpretation 
of the Act and identify the extent of the Act’s application. The analysis will further 
identify the steps the legislature has taken to limit the right of agricultural landowners 
to subdivide their land. 
 
A constitutional analysis will be used to determine the validity of the Act in terms of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. The constitutionality inquiry will 
be dealt with in two chapters. The first will test the Act against section 25 and the 
second will test the Act against other rights in the Bill of Rights. The comparative 
survey will be used to identify and distinguish the legitimate purpose from the 
illegitimate aim of the Subdivision Act. Zoning and land planning mechanisms have 
been successfully and legitimately employed in foreign jurisdictions to preserve 
agricultural land. Examining the policies and regulations relating to the preservation 
of agricultural land in the United States of America, specifically the states of Oregon 
                                            
28
  Republic of South Africa Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-64 
(1964) 1-88; Republic of South Africa Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-65 
(1965) 1-51. 
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and Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of British Columbia, Canada will aid 
in identifying the legitimate purpose in the Subdivision Act. The legitimate statutory 
regulations over agricultural land in these foreign jurisdictions will aid an 
interpretation of the Subdivision Act and will serve to justify the Act’s continued 
application.
16 
 
Chapter 2: Analysis of the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 
2 1  Introduction 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act1 (“Subdivision Act”) was enacted to prevent 
the uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural land in the Republic of South Africa. 
This is the declared purpose of the Act.2 To achieve this purpose, the legislature has 
limited the common law right of agricultural landowners to subdivide their land.3 This 
limitation exists in the form of executive regulation and oversight over the practice of 
subdivision. Landowners are compelled to apply for, and the Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (“Minister of Agriculture”) is empowered to approve or deny, 
applications for agricultural subdivision. This is to preserve prime agricultural land in 
the national interest. This chapter will serve as an analysis of the legislative tool. The 
historical context and policy from which the Act was crafted, the extent of the Act’s 
application and considerations for its future application will serve as the main 
categories in this analysis.  
 
The context, specifically the position of agricultural landholding before the Act, and 
the policy reasons for its enactment will serve as a historical background. This 
background will examine the legislative tools that were used to dispossess non-white 
South Africans of rural land entitlements in favour of white South Africans. Many of 
these tools did not expressly state an apartheid political aim, but this aim was a by 
product of the context that created these tools. The Subdivision Act serves to protect 
agricultural land from uneconomic subdivision but it also aimed to preserve prime 
agricultural land for white occupation. This section will map the creation of the Act. 
The Subdivision Act fell within a legislative scheme that promoted and protected 
                                            
1
  70 of 1970.  
2
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 0f 1970, the long title states that the purpose of the 
Act is “[t]o control the subdivision and, in connection therewith, the use of agricultural land”. 
3
  Mangion v Bernhardt 1977 (3) SA 901 (W) 915C-915D. 
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white agricultural interests.4 This will later serve as the premise for the argument that 
the Subdivision Act served and serves racially segregated agricultural land holding.5 
 
The interpretation of the Act’s provisions will identify the steps the legislature has 
taken in limiting the common law right of agricultural landowners to subdivide their 
land. It will also show that the Act does not only restrict the act of subdivision, but 
most of the actions that could result in uneconomic subdivision. The legislature has 
subjected most actions that may lead to the subdivision of agricultural land to the 
limitation, for example the sale of a portion of agricultural land. Emphasis will be 
placed on the definition of agricultural land,6 as only agricultural land is affected by 
this regulation; actions related to agricultural land that are not affected by the Act’s 
operation;7 actions that are prohibited;8 the extent of the Minister’s consent;9 the 
restrictions placed on succession10 and servitudes;11 and the penalties and fines 
imposed when contravening the Act.12  To further gauge the extent of the Act’s 
application the courts’ interpretation of the various provisions will be considered. 
 
The current status of the Act, the position of the Act since the promulgation of the still 
inoperative Repeal Act13 and the uncertainty created will also need to be considered. 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert refer to “the limbo” that the Repeal Act has 
                                            
4
  See 2 2 below.  
5
  See chaps 3 and 5 below.  
6
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 1(a) – (f).  
7
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 2. 
8
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 3. 
9
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4. 
10
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 5(1). 
11
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 6A. 
12
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 11. 
13
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act 64 of 1998. 
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created.14 The motivation behind the repeal, the possible implications it holds and 
the future legislative plans for agricultural subdivisions will be discussed. The Draft 
Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003 will have to be 
considered even though it has not been presented to Parliament. The Draft Bill 
serves an indication of future legislative plans for regulating agricultural subdivisions. 
 
2 2  Historical development of the Act 
2 2 1 Agricultural landholding before the Subdivision Act 
The relevance of a historical background lies in the fact that it sketches the context in 
which the Subdivision Act was later created. This background is a starting point to 
the formation of agricultural policy. This policy was heavily politicised. Legislation 
was used to directly limit black African entitlements to agricultural land. It was also 
important in fostering white economic agricultural interests. 
 
A good point of departure is the Glen Grey Act of 1894. This Act limited the areas 
where Africans could establish farming operations. The Act created the Glen Grey 
district15 and was aimed at confining black squatters16 to a reserve. The reserve land 
could not be sold, rented or subdivided. The Act was further designed to serve the 
labour needs of white commercial farmers.17 The Glen Grey Act was the 
predecessor to the later Land Acts of 1913 and 1936.18 The Glen Grey Act had the 
effect of limiting the size of land that could be held by Africans. It also restricted the 
                                            
14
  Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5th ed 2006) 109. 
15
  The Glen Grey District was situated in the Cape Colony. 
16
  The term “black squatters” is used to identify all Africans that lived and worked on European 
(white owned) farms. See Youé C “Black squatters on white farms: Segregation and agrarian change 
in Kenya, South Africa, and Rhodesia, 1902-1963” (2002) 24 International History Review 558-602. 
17
  White farmers were able to source black labour directly from the reserves. Vink N and Van Zyl 
J “Black disempowerment in South African agriculture: A historical perspective” in Kirsten J, Van Zyl J 
and Vink N (eds) The agricultural democratisation of South Africa (1998) 61-70 at 63. 
18
  Black Land Act 27 of 1913 and the South African Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 
1936. 
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sale of land by white owners to Africans and prohibited sharecropping19 and cash 
rentals.20 Mbongwa, Van den Brink and Van Zyl submit that the Act was intended to 
transform black African tenants into wage labourers destined for the mines.21 
 
The further disempowerment of black African farmers can be traced back to the 
formation of the Union in 1910. The four colonies were consolidated, bringing 
together the English and Afrikaner whites under the Union. This strengthened settler 
state further promoted the isolation and suppression of African farmers from 
mainstream agriculture. This was accomplished by closing off access to most of the 
markets22 needed for successful farming practices. Economic policy was used to 
force the African farmer off his farm and into the position of the farmhand. At the 
same time the white farmer was receiving support from a wide range of state 
implemented measures.23 Examples of these measures were the creation of the 
Land and Agricultural Bank from provincial institutions already in existence; the 
securing of market services under the Co-operative Societies Acts;24 and the 
regulation of produce markets under the Marketing Act.25 
 
                                            
19
  In a sharecropping system an agricultural landowner allows a tenant to use the land in return 
for a share of the crop produced on the land. It was used by the black farming communities to allow 
black families without resources to cultivate land and make it productive. Sharecropping 
arrangements were also entered into between rural blacks and white farmers. See Cross C “Informal 
tenures against the state: Landholding systems in African rural areas” in de Kerk M (ed) A harvest of 
discontent. The land question in South Africa (1991) 63-98 90. 
20
  This was where cash payments could be made by blacks to white farmers and owners to 
cultivate and farm the land.  
21
  Mbongwa M, Van den Brink R and Van Zyl J “Evolution of the agrarian structure in South 
Africa” in Van Zyl J, Kirsten J and Binswanger H P (eds) Agricultural land reform in South Africa: 
Policies, markets and mechanisms (1996) 36-63 at 43.  
22
  These markets included land sale, the rental markets, rural finance and markets for farm 
requisites and skilled labour.  
23
  Vink N and Van Zyl J “Black disempowerment in South African agriculture: A Historical 
perspective” in Kirsten J, Van Zyl J and Vink N (eds) The agricultural democratisation of South Africa 
(1998) 61-70 at 61. 
24
  The Co-operative Societies Act 28 of 1922 was later replaced by the Co-operative Societies 
Act 29 of 1939. 
25
  26 of 1937. 
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The position of white farmers settling on state owned land was regulated by the Land 
Settlement Act.26 This Act, and amendments to it, standardised the acquisition and 
disposal of state land for white settlement. The Act had an application procedure 
which allowed white settlers to apply for state or privately owned land. The Minister 
of Land was authorised in terms of the Act to allot state land, to use state funds to 
purchase private land and to subdivide land into appropriate agricultural holdings. 
This instrument and the others mentioned promoted virtually complete segregation of 
the agricultural sector and simultaneously created a system of support measures for 
white farmers. 
 
The farming structure at the beginning of 1913 largely consisted of settler-owned 
farms with hired black labourers or black squatters.27 The discrimination in access to 
rural land was further strengthened by the introduction of the Black Land Act.28 The 
Act outlawed other forms of access to land, such as sharecropping and labour 
tenancy. The Act deprived Africans of the land they traditionally occupied by creating 
scheduled areas that were exclusively created for black occupation. It was also 
aimed at curbing black farming practices at the time that white farms were 
prospering. This was in response to “black syndicates” that were purchasing land 
and operating farms successfully.29 Bundy argues that by preventing the successful 
black peasants from accumulating land within the reserves, potential competition 
with white farmers could be stopped.30 
 
The South African Development Trust and Land Act31 released more land to blacks 
and enabled further state control over these released areas. Carey Miller and Pope 
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  12 of 1912. 
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  See fn16 above. 
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  27 of 1913. 
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  Davenport TRH “Can sacred cows be culled? A historical review of land policy in South Africa 
with some questions about the future” (1987) 4 Development Southern Africa 388-399 at 398. 
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  Bundy C The rise and fall of South African peasantry (2nd ed 1988) 213. 
31
  18 of 1936. 
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indicate that there was a distinct shift from individual tenure to trust tenure in these 
released areas, the reserves.32 It should be noted that at this time white land holding 
was consistently individual.33 The Act in effect created two distinct classes in the 
population and this was reflected in the way land was occupied by black South 
Africans on the reserves and owned by white South Africans elsewhere. These 
reserves were where the TBVC states34 and Bantustans were later created as self-
governing territories. 
 
The long term effect of all these policies was to reduce African farming practices to 
subsistence farming. The 1948 election and victory of the National Party is also 
relevant for the further development of agricultural policy. The foundation for the 
National Party’s doctrine of separate racial development was already laid in the Land 
Acts of 1913 and 1936, and was further entrenched after the elections. This doctrine 
was realised through the enactment an implementation of legislation that promoted 
racial segregation. 
 
The Group Areas legislation35 in urban areas with the Land Acts was the realization 
of this doctrine. The Group Areas legislation divided urban spaces into separate race 
areas. The effect on rural land could be seen in the way the Group Areas legislation 
identified all other land, which would include agricultural land.36 These areas were 
controlled areas and were reserved for white owners. The implication was that only 
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  Carey Miller DL with Pope A Land title in South Africa (2007) 26. 
33
  An individual owner had control over the land he was farming.  
34
  The Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei accepted independence from the rest of 
the country. From the 1950s the reserves were gradually consolidated into homelands or Bantustans 
which were treated as the de jure states. The TBVC states accepted independence from South Africa, 
first the Transkei and then three others followed suit. 
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  Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; Group Areas Act 65 of 1952; Group Areas Act 77 of 1957; 
Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 and the seventeen amendments to these Acts comprised the Group 
Areas legislation.  
36
  The Group Areas Act of 1966 divided towns and cities into separate race areas. The Act also 
defined all other land, including agricultural land as “controlled areas” which was reserved for white 
owners. 
22 
 
white South Africans could own agricultural land and this was predominantly in the 
productive areas outside of the homelands. 
 
Numerous other Acts37 that directly affected the agricultural sector were promulgated 
during the period from 1948 to the late 1980s and were aimed at providing benefits 
for the white farming minority. Throughout this period agriculture and agricultural 
landholding was further compartmentalised along racial lines. Black farmers were 
restricted in the way agricultural land could be held and acquired. This position was 
further aggravated through the implementation of agricultural policy that allowed for 
the exclusion of black farmers from financial support and market services.38 White 
farmers were receiving these benefits. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
formed part of this legislative scheme. The policy reasons for its enactment reflect 
the state’s role in the promotion and preservation of white agricultural interests. 
 
2 2 2 Policy reasons for the enactment 
The development of the Act from policy to enactment is contained in two policy 
documents. These documents are the written records of evidence led by the Select 
Committees on Subdivision of Agricultural Land.39 The Committees were mandated 
to investigate the feasibility of state regulation over the common law right to 
subdivide with the aim of preventing the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. 
The focus was placed on the need for the regulation, what the consequences for 
failing to regulate would be, whether state regulation of the practice of subdivision 
was appropriate and how this regulation would work. 
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  The Agricultural Credit Act 28 of 1966, the Marketing Act 59 of 1968, the Designated Areas 
Development Act 87 of 1979 and the Co-operatives Act 91 of 1981 are examples of statutes 
promulgated during this period and that have remained on the statute book.  
38
  De Wet CJ, McAllister PA and Hart T “The land tenure and rural development workshop: an 
analytical overview” (1987) 4 Development South Africa 371-387 at 372.  
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  Republic of South Africa Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-64 
(1964) 1-88; Republic of South Africa Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-65 
(1965) 1-51. 
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Relating to the practical need for the regulation Dr PD Henning was questioned by 
the 1964 Committee. At the time of the hearing he was a member of the 
Development of Natural Resources Board. The Board had to deal with applications 
for subdivision in the controlled areas. During these application processes the board 
had found that 43 of the 68 applications they had received, if approved, would have 
resulted in uneconomic farming units. He stated that this was an indication of what 
could happen in the uncontrolled rural areas. The Board was also responsible for 
investigating the consolidation of certain portions of land. In this regard he had been 
made aware of 36 instances, out of 70 farms investigated, that were already 
uneconomic units. These findings and other reports available at the time indicated 
that between 50 and 60 percent of farms were already uneconomic units. The full 
extent of uneconomic farming units that were in existence at that time would have 
had to be researched and investigated further. He submitted that this estimation 
could not be applied across the entire country, but indicated that uneconomic units 
were a problem. Dr Henning stated that farmers had many difficulties to overcome, 
and that in building a strong farming community, the minimum requirement for any 
farmer would have to be that the unit on which he farms needs to be an economic 
unit.40 
 
Numerous publications had highlighted the problems experienced in the agricultural 
sector during the period preceding the Committee hearings.41 These included issues 
of the surface use of agricultural land as well as the occupation of agricultural land. 
The issue became pertinent during the 1962 meeting of the House of Assembly 
which later led to the appointment of the Interdepartmental Study Group on 
Uneconomic Subdivision of Agricultural Land. The findings of this Study Group led to 
the drafting of the concept Bill. The statistical extent of the problem of uneconomic 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
64 (1964) 1-88 at 1-4. 
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  The important publications were Grosskopf JFW Verslag van die Carnegie-kommissie: 
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units was not available at that time, but whenever uneconomic farming operations 
were discussed, uneconomic units were emphasised. Mr de Swardt, the Secretary of 
Agricultural Economics and Marketing, during his questioning by the 1964 
Committee submitted that had the issue not been addressed, it would have become 
a real threat to the future existence of independent farmers.42  
 
Mr de Swardt identified the predominant factors resulting in the injudicious 
subdivision of agricultural land as the traditional system of testate succession, the 
inherent urgency with which ownership of land was desired by the Afrikaner, land 
speculation, the high capital needs of modern farming, the inadequate knowledge of 
most land buyers about production potential and the lack of sufficient legislative tools 
to prevent detrimental and injudicious subdivision. These factors, if left unaddressed, 
would have had negative consequences for the economic, agricultural and social 
spheres. Economically, it would eventually have resulted in a peasant farming 
community. Agriculturally, it would have led to a system of over-cropping and the 
exhaustion of the land and socially, the economic aspect would have resulted in a 
decline in living standards. This economic impoverishment would have negatively 
impacted the spiritual wellbeing of the individual, which would be accompanied by 
cultural, educational and further social problems.43  
 
He further submitted that the size of the land may be one of many factors that may 
result in an uneconomic farming unit, but it remained one of the more important 
factors when determining whether a farming operation was economically effective. 
The physical, economic and sociological factors are all relevant in this regard.44 The 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
64 (1964) 1-88 at 59-60. 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
64 (1964) 1-88 at 60-61. 
44
  The factors identified in this regard were the climate, the quality and quantity of natural 
resources, the interaction of these resources, the management skills of the farmer, the business 
financing, the relationship between the prices of products and production means, price tendencies 
and the lifestyle of the farmer and his family. 
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interaction of these factors could allow one farmer to farm productively on a smaller 
unit, but another farmer would not be as successful under the same conditions. Land 
that has been injudiciously subdivided and is the cause of an uneconomic farming 
unit has very little chance of being rectified through consolidation, unless 
neighbouring land is available for consolidation. To prevent this situation it would be 
necessary to take steps to prevent the injudicious subdivision of agricultural land.45 
 
According to Mr de Swardt, determining an appropriate method of state control 
would require certain administrative powers to be conferred on an authorised body. 
These administrative powers should be necessary in achieving the aim of the 
proposed regulation and not receive unfavourable public response.46 The exercise of 
these administrative powers could only apply to new instances of subdivision. 
Farming units that were already uneconomic units would not be affected by the 
proposed legislation. The proposed legislation could only be preventative and would 
prevent the creation of further uneconomic units.47 
 
Determining whether the proposed subdivision would result in an uneconomic unit 
showed that the surface area of the land would not serve as a reliable measure of 
the economic potential. It was proposed that the actual measurement would be the 
net income that the average farmer, under normal circumstances, could earn on the 
hypothetically subdivided land.48 When deciding whether a farming unit is 
economically viable it becomes necessary to only use the characteristics and factors 
attached to the land. This would assist in determining whether the land has sufficient 
earning potential. The most important of these characteristics, as identified by the 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
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1965 Committee, were the nature of the soil, the provision of water, the specific 
climate, the amount of rainfall, the marketing prospects of the agricultural land and 
whether there is sufficient transport access.49 These characteristics would be used to 
determine the production potential and projected income of the farming endeavour. 
 
The 1965 Committee also indicated that it was doubtful whether the subdivision of 
land was the only factor that resulted in an uneconomic farming endeavour. It could 
be accepted that there were instances where subdivision supported the farmer with 
less capital, but that there were also other factors, like the necessary management 
skills and capabilities, sufficient capital and healthy creditor relationships that were 
needed to farm successfully. Without these factors no farmer would be able to farm 
successfully on land of any size. The Committee stated that these factors would 
need to be left out of a discussion on the regulation of economic farming units, as 
there was no way to regulate them.50  
 
Mr de Swardt identified the process that would be needed to enforce the regulation. 
The projected income would have to be used and applied by the concerned Minister. 
The policy considerations that would be applied in considering the proposed 
subdivision application would have been determined by the Minister. A full time 
Board would have to be employed to exercise the Minister’s policy. The Board’s 
functions would be quasi-judicial in nature because their decisions would affect the 
established rights of the landowner. It would be responsible for deciding whether 
subdivision applications should be rejected or accepted, based on the evidence led 
by the applicant. Each application would have to be dealt with on its own merits 
because the minimum size of agricultural land cannot be a fixed standard. In this 
                                            
49
  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 2. 
50
  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 2. 
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regard local committees would be necessary to evaluate these applications.51 It was 
submitted at an earlier stage of the hearing that a general norm or minimum 
standard could not be established even with farms in the same area. On this basis 
each farm would have be investigated on its own merits to determine whether it is an 
economic unit after taking all other factors into consideration.52 
 
The 1965 Committee illustrated two problems that needed to be distinguished and 
separated when evaluating an uneconomic farming unit. This would be relevant in 
the application of the regulation. The first problem was a bona fide farmer who had 
begun a farming endeavour and was struggling to keep it afloat. The second was 
where prime agricultural land was being spoiled through subdivision.53 
 
In dealing with the first problem the Committee identified certain measures that could 
be taken, namely that sufficient information should be made available; that the 
nature of the information should allow the new farmer to evaluate the potential of the 
farming unit and to make the most beneficial use of it; that unprofitable undertakings 
be discouraged, especially in the absence of state funding and funding from other 
sources; and to encourage the creation of profitable units through sensible financing. 
The remaining issues could be left to economic legislation.54 
 
The second problem would need to be regulated by the state. State control would be 
necessary where prime agricultural land was being spoiled through subdivision. The 
problem with the regulations that were in place at that time was that they were 
                                            
51
  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
64 (1964) 1-88 at 64-66. 
52
  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
64 (1964) 1-88 at 1. 
53
  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 4. 
54
  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 5. 
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varying and uncoordinated. These regulations were national and provincial but only 
affected certain areas. If the state was to prevent agricultural land being subdivided 
into uneconomic units it would be necessary to consolidate and centralise the 
controlling authority. This control would be imperative where actions relating to the 
resource would result in the inexpedience of the agricultural land. A prerequisite for 
this control over the utilisation of agricultural land was that agricultural land needs to 
be properly defined and demarcated. As the proposed regulation concerns 
agricultural land it was necessary to determine what land would be affected, and the 
way this land would be identified. The practical application of these measures and 
the measure of control to be exercised, after agricultural land had been identified, 
would be that, firstly, it was enforceable and, secondly, that it did not receive 
unfavourable public response when it came to its enforcement.55 
 
The arguments against state interference with the freedom of the farmer to use his 
land as he sees fit were not to be permitted to promote the fragmentation or abuse of 
good agricultural land. These evils needed to be argued against and prevented. In 
the process of regulating subdivision it should also not be necessary to apply semi-
socialist measures.56 To avoid this possibility focus should be placed on whether the 
envisioned subdivision or use of the agricultural land would make the land unsuitable 
for the farming endeavour. The 1965 Committee indicated that the resource, prime 
agricultural land within the Republic, was too scarce to allow other types of 
operations, or to allow farming operations that would be unsuccessful due to the 
proposed subdivision.57 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 4-5. 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 3. 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 3. 
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Both Committees stated that the failure to regulate the practice of subdivision would 
be detrimental and the 1964 Committee went as far as to state that it would be 
impossible to build a strong farming community without the regulation.58 The 1965 
Committee pointed out that by failing to draft and enforce a regulation it would later 
result in farmers becoming a financial burden on the state. Farmers would require 
financial support when their farming operations were in trouble and by not regulating 
the injudicious subdivision it would only be matter of time before this was a reality.59 
 
The Committee reports indicate that the proposed legislative limitation on the 
common law right to subdivide was necessary. It also revealed that the state was 
concerned that a white peasant farming community was being created. The need for 
the regulation was further highlighted in Mangion v Bernhardt60 where Viljoen J 
stated that: 
“Parliament has very wisely put a stop to unrestricted fragmentation of arable 
land. The Act, in the interests of national welfare, effects a drastic curtailment 
of previous common-law rights of land owners in a certain category to carve 
their properties into units as small as they choose, and it is indisputably one of 
the wisest pieces of legislation on the statute book.”61  
 
2 2 3 Promulgation  
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act was assented to in September of 1970 and 
was brought into operation on 2 January 1971. The Act was promulgated “to curb the 
increasing fragmentation of arable farming land”.62 According to Scholtens and 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 9-
64 (1964) para 1-88 at 1. 
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  Republic of South Africa Select Committee on Subdivision of Agricultural Land Report SC 4-
65 (1965) 1-51 at 15-16. 
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  1977 (3) SA 901 (W). 
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Peterson, the Act was aimed at preventing the injudicious subdivision by testators 
and property speculators creating uneconomic farming units that would eventually 
lead to a peasant farming community.63 The court in Van der Bijl and Others v 
Louw64 stated that “[t]he purpose of the Act is manifest: its object is to prevent the 
subdivision of economic units of farming land into non-viable sub-units or smaller 
units”.65 From the policy discussions it was clear that the Act would need to only 
regulate future acts of subdivision. The way in which the Act’s purpose is realised is 
by application procedure. The landowner wanting to subdivide and sell or register a 
long-term lease would apply to the Minister of Agriculture for consent to subdivide. 
The Act also affected succession, testate and intestate, and the registration of 
certain servitudes. In achieving the purpose, the Act has also been subjected to a 
number of amendments.66 The amendments have extended the scope of the Act’s 
application to actions that may result in the subdivision of agricultural land.67 The 
amendments were clearly attempts by the legislature to close off loopholes in the 
Act. 
 
2 3  Interpretation of the Act 
2 3 1 Land affected by the regulation 
The land affected by the regulation on subdivision is described in the definition of 
agricultural land in the Act. The definition of agricultural land identifies all land which 
is subject to the legislative limitation on the right to subdivide. The Act defines 
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agricultural land in terms of exceptions. Agricultural land is any land, except land that 
is excluded from the Act’s operation. These exceptions are identified in sections 1(a) 
to (f). Section 1(a) identifies agricultural land as all land not situated within the 
jurisdiction of a municipality. This would be land in areas identified as urban prior to 
the 1993 municipal restructuring68 and also peri-urban land that fell within the area of 
municipality or town council. 
 
This definition was further supplemented by the 31 October 1995 proviso.69 It was 
drafted in response to the Local Government Transition Act70 and declared all land 
classified as agricultural land prior to the transitional period to retain that 
classification. The effect of the proviso was that all agricultural land would continue 
to be subject to the provisions of the Subdivision Act. However, since the 
introduction of the Municipal Demarcation Act71 and the Municipal Structures Act72 
and the end of the transitional period this definition has become contentious. 
Whether the proviso was to surpass the transitional period has resulted in disputes73 
in which the courts have had to determine the continued application of the 
Subdivision Act. 
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  The Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 was the first step towards a nationwide 
restructuring of local government. The Act was implemented “to provide for revised interim measures 
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and Municipal Demarcation Acts.  
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The creation of wall-to-wall municipalities through the promulgation of the Municipal 
Structures and Municipal Demarcation Acts should have subjected all land to 
Subdivision Act’s exception in section 1(a). The end of the transitional period, if this 
view is accepted, would have excluded all agricultural land from the Act’s operation. 
The Subdivision Act would have been practically ineffective. This has resulted in 
litigation where parties have argued that the requirement of written ministerial 
consent for subdivision applications would no longer apply because the land is not 
affected by definition of “agricultural land” in the Act. The courts have had to interpret 
the proviso in the light of constitutional changes to local government, taking 
cognisance of the intention of the legislature that subdivision is to be regulated 
nationally through the ministerial consent requirement.  
  
Three judgments will be dealt with in this section. The first is Kotzé en 'n Ander v 
Minister van Landbou en Andere (“Kotzé”)74 in which the court had to decide whether 
agricultural land still exists for the purposes of the Act after the end of the transitional 
period. The other two judgments concerned litigants in a contractual dispute 
appealing to both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court 
respectively. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another (“Stalwo”)75 indicated that the Act’s applicability was 
now limited to land that the Minister declares as being agricultural land for the 
purposes of the Act.76 The Constitutional Court finding confirmed that the Kotzé 
judgment represented what the law was before the Stalwo decision was handed 
down.77 The majority of the court set aside the SCA finding.  
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In Kotzé v Minister van Landbou78 the applicants were co-owners of a farm. In July 
2001 they applied to have their farm subdivided. This application was made to the 
local authority. The applicants subsequently concluded a contract of sale with regard 
to three undivided parts of the farm. The contract was subject to a suspensive 
condition stipulating that the contract of sale was subject to the applicants obtaining 
the written subdivision consent from the involved authorities. Deposits were already 
paid by two of the buyers, and the applicants proceeded to make improvements to 
the land, in the form of erected fences. The consent was officially received from the 
local authority in November of that year. In January of 2002, the applicants 
discovered that they still required written consent from the Minister of Agriculture for 
the subdivision. The applicants contended that this consent was not necessary in the 
light of statutory and constitutional changes to local municipal structures. Their land 
was now situated within the jurisdiction of a local authority, the Lephalele 
municipality. Based on the definition of “agricultural land” in the Subdivision Act their 
farm was situated in the area of municipality and would not be agricultural land for 
the purposes of the Act. The negotiations between the parties to the dispute were 
unsuccessful and consequently the applicants approached the court for a declaratory 
order indicating that the land in question was no longer subject to the Subdivision 
Act. This contention was based on the definition of agricultural land in the Act and 
the exception to agricultural land within this definition.79 
 
Van der Westhuizen J approached this argument by examining the current status of 
the Act. He acknowledged the existence of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
Repeal Act80 and speculated on the reasoning for this contended repeal. He came to 
the conclusion that although the Repeal Act had been promulgated, it remained 
inoperative and the Subdivision Act and its requirements continued to apply. This 
was based on the steps taken by the legislature to keep the Act in operation until a 
time when appropriate measures could replace and regulate the practice of 
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subdivision.81 The Subdivision Act thus needed to be seen as being operational. The 
court continued to determine the scope of its operation in view of municipal 
restructuring.82  
 
Van der Westhuizen J considered whether agricultural land, for the purposes of the 
Act, still existed in view of constitutional changes to the system of local government. 
The Municipal Structures Act83 was enacted to establish wall-to-wall municipalities. 
The effect of this new system of local government would have subjected all land, 
previously classified as agricultural land, to the exception in the Act’s definition. This 
would have rendered the Subdivision Act practically ineffective. It was held that this 
could not have been the intended result and that section 1 of the Act should be 
interpreted to mean what it did at the time when it was promulgated. The fact that the 
Constitution created a new functionality for local government did not mean that the 
Act’s purpose fell away. The Act concerned agricultural policy that related to the 
control of agricultural land. An interpretation that would result in no agricultural land 
existing for the purposes of the Act would be unacceptable. The court considered 
that leaving this regulation up to local government would result in differing policies 
and decision processes. This would have made it impossible for the Minister to 
regulate agricultural policy and this would have a negative impact on issues of 
agricultural reform and access. In this particular instance this effect would not have 
been intended.84 Up until a time when the legislature creates new legislation to 
control the practice of subdivision, or finalises the repeal of the Act, the Subdivision 
Act would continue to apply. Van der Westhuizen J found that any land classified as 
agricultural land prior to the election of the first transitional councils would retain that 
classification. The agreement concluded by Kotzé was in fact subject to section 3 of 
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the Subdivision Act as the land was agricultural land in terms of the Act, and the 
application was consequently turned down.85  
 
In Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another86 the appellant and 
respondent concluded an agreement for the sale of land. The validity of this 
agreement was questioned by the respondent. The Port Elizabeth High Court 
dismissed appellant’s application to have the agreement declared binding, releasing 
the respondent from its obligation to transfer the land.87 The advertisement of sale 
identified the plots as light industrial, and the appellant had intended to use it for that 
purpose. However, the land was still zoned as agricultural land. The respondent had 
applied to have the land rezoned and subdivided, and as in Kotzé, applied to the 
local authority. The applicant was aware that these applications could be rejected, 
but proceeded to take occupation of the land. A lease agreement was entered into 
and the applicant started preparing the land for its use as light industrial. The local 
authority had granted the applications, but this was subject to certain conditions. The 
conditions required the respondent to effect substantial improvements on the land in 
the form of an access way, storm water drainage and other essential services. In 
response to the conditions and the financial costs involved in complying with the 
conditions, the respondent wanted an increase in the purchase price. The appellant 
was not amenable to the increase in the purchase price.88 
 
In the court a quo the appellant sought an application declaring the contract binding 
between the two parties. The respondent opposed this application on two grounds. 
The first was that a material term was omitted from the written contract. The term 
was that the agreement was subject to the suspensive condition that the land was to 
be subdivided. The contention was that this was in contravention of section 2(1) of 
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the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. The second was that the agreement was in 
contravention of sections 3(a)89 and 3(e)(i)90 of the Subdivision Act. These sections 
prohibit the subdivision and the sale of the portion of agricultural land without the 
written permission of the Minister of Agriculture. The basis of this contention was that 
the land was “agricultural land” within the meaning of section 1(i)(a) of the 
Subdivision Act. The only relevant ground for the purposes of this discussion is the 
second, that there was non-compliance with sections 3(a) and 3(e)(i) of the 
Subdivision Act.91  
 
The court a quo found that the land was to be defined as agricultural land and that 
the lack of ministerial consent rendered the agreement void.92 On this basis leave to 
appeal was granted. The Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether the 
agreement complied with provisions of the Subdivision Act. The judgment focuses on 
whether the land was “agricultural land” within the meaning of the Act when the 
agreement was concluded. The court had to determine whether the subject land fell 
within the definition of the Act.93  
 
A fact of common cause at the time of the agreement was that the land fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, which is a category A 
municipality in terms of section 2 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures 
Act.94 Before the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality was established the land 
fell under the Port Elizabeth Transitional Rural Council, as contemplated in section 1 
of the Local Government Transition Act.95 Deciding whether the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality fell within the meaning contemplated in the definition of 
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agricultural land in the Act was the central issue. The Subdivision Act fails to define 
the terms municipal council, city council or town council. In terms of section 93(8) of 
the Municipal Structures Act96 “any reference in a law referred to in item 2 of 
Schedule 6 to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa97 … to a municipal 
council, municipality, local authority or another applicable designation of a local 
government structure, must be construed as a reference to a municipal council or a 
municipality established in terms of this Act” (the Municipal Structures Act).98  Maya 
JA found that there could be no doubt that the Subdivision Act was old order 
legislation in terms of item 2 of schedule 6 of the Constitution and section 93(8) of 
the Municipal Structures Act. This meant that the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality would be a municipality as per the definition of “agricultural land” in the 
Subdivision Act.99 
   
Maya JA proceeded to determine whether the land retained its original status as 
agricultural land. The subject land was classified as agricultural land prior to the 
election of the transitional council. By virtue of the proviso100 in the definition of 
agricultural land the subject land would have retained this classification for the 
transitional period. Notwithstanding this fact the land now fell within the area of 
jurisdiction of a municipal council. The court a quo’s judgment traced the land back 
to a point in time where it would have been classified as agricultural land, during the 
transitional period. The court a quo judgment showed that the land would remain 
agricultural land, notwithstanding any changes to local government structures. The 
land was classified as agricultural land and would remain so. This conclusion was 
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based on the judgment in Kotzé.101 Counsel for the appellant challenged this 
conclusion, arguing that it would result in the status of agricultural land remaining 
“perpetually frozen” from the time the transitional councils were established and not 
on the basis of whether the land was situated within the area of jurisdiction of the 
local government structures as listed in the definition in section 1. A narrow 
interpretation would simply have preserved the status quo pending the demarcation 
and establishment of the final new order of local government structures. At that time 
the land fell within the jurisdiction of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
and had lost its historical character as agricultural land in terms of the Act.102 
 
Maya JA found that the framers of the Subdivision Act had contemplated the concept 
of “agricultural land” to be fluid rather than static. It would change with the expansion 
of local authorities and the creation of new ones. The purpose of the proviso needed 
to be determined in light of the legislative scheme which guided the restructuring 
process. This was the establishment of new categories of municipalities and to use 
existing statutory provisions until new ones could be enacted.  Maya JA’s literal 
interpretation of the proviso served as further evidence that the proviso was to 
operate only as long as the land envisaged remained situated in the jurisdiction of a 
transitional council. If the legislature had intended the land to retain the classification 
after the transitional councils ceased to exist, it would have said so expressly.103  
 
The court was persuaded that the legislature enacted the proviso as a stop gap 
measure. This was based on the realisation that the effect of the Transition Act,104 
which would establish municipalities for the first time in rural areas, would be to 
include transitional councils within the meaning of municipal council envisaged in the 
definition of agricultural land. To exclude certain agricultural land from the definition 
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would have created an untenable situation. When the transitional council was 
disestablished and the land fell under the jurisdiction of the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality. The subject land had ceased to be agricultural land within 
the meaning of the Subdivision Act. The court found that the Kotzé105 judgment could 
not be sustained.106 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal further found that the court a quo failed to 
acknowledge the “radically enhanced status and power” given to local government 
under the new constitutional order.107 These constitutional competences allowed 
local governments to administer and regulate land within their jurisdictions without 
executive oversight. It was also clear that allowing this competence to local 
government did not thwart the objective of the Act, to control the subdivision of 
agricultural land. In terms of the definition of “agricultural land” the Minister would still 
be able exclude land from the exceptions imposed and declare land “agricultural 
land” for the purposes of the Act. The court found that this point was overlooked in 
the Kotzé108 judgment. This was based on that court’s view in Kotzé that any other 
interpretation would result in the emasculation of the Subdivision Act. The court’s 
decision was further fortified by the fact that the land in dispute was no longer being 
used as agricultural land. Sections 3(a) and 3(e)(i) were not applicable and the 
Minister’s consent was not a prerequisite for validity of the contract of sale.109 The 
appeal was granted. 
 
Leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was granted in the judgment of Wary 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others.110 The Constitutional Court had to 
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decide, on the same facts, whether the property sold at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract was “agricultural land” as envisaged by the Subdivision Act. The 
resolution of this issue would also determine the validity of the contract of sale 
between the parties. The facts appear above as discussed in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s decision. 
 
The Constitutional Court had to decide whether a constitutional issue had been 
raised. The court acknowledged that the concept “a constitutional issue” in itself was 
broad, but was restricted to matters outlined in section 167(3)(b).111 Two main 
submissions were used by the majority of the court to decide that a constitutional 
issue had been raised. The applicant’s submission maintained that the meaning and 
effect of the definition of “agricultural land” in the Subdivision Act needed to be read 
and interpreted within the constitutional context of the development of local 
government structures. The impact this has on the constitutional functional areas of 
different organs of state was therefore relevant. In terms of section 167(4)(a)112 the 
court has the jurisdiction to decide on matters relating to disputes between specific 
organs of state. This contention emphasised the fact that the Minister retained the 
power to approve or reject a subdivision application, irrespective of the powers of 
present day municipalities. The effect of this decision would have effectively 
removed or confirmed the Minister’s power over agricultural subdivisions.113 
 
On behalf of the amici and the Minister the second submission that “section 39(2)114 
fashions a mandatory constitutional canon of statutory interpretation” was raised.115 
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From this submission the rights in sections 24(b)(iii),116 25(5)117 and 27(1)(b)118 were 
invoked. It was averred that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the Act’s 
proviso failed to give proper recognition to these rights. The Minister and amici 
averred further that the High Court’s decision gave better recognition of these rights. 
On this basis an interpretation of the proviso which continued to give the right of 
control over the issue of subdivision of agricultural land to the Minister would better 
serve the interpretive mandate in section 39(2).119  
 
Another factor identified by the court that granting leave to appeal would be in the 
interests of justice emphasised the impact the interpretation of the proviso would 
have on agricultural policy. The judgment would have far-reaching implications, 
greater than the resolution of the contractual dispute between the parties. The court 
indicated that “[l]and, agriculture, food production and environmental considerations 
are obviously important policy issues at national level”,120 and that whether or not 
municipalities should have a say in these matters is not in question. The court had to 
determine whether the legislature had intended to do away with the power of the 
Minister to preserve agricultural land or whether the Act recognises the need for 
national control and policy in decisions that affect the reduction of agricultural land 
and the need for a consistent national agricultural policy.121 
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  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, sec 24(b)(iii): “[e]veryone has the right to have 
the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
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resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development”. See 5 3 below. 
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The proviso was introduced into the Act in terms of the Local Government Transition 
Act.122 When the Local Government Transition Act was promulgated all existing 
agricultural land fell within the jurisdiction of a transitional council and became 
municipal land. The proviso was introduced to ensure that agricultural land continued 
to be classified as such for the purposes of the Act. The legislature’s intention was to 
keep the functional area of agricultural land with the Minister of Agriculture. This 
would include the administration of the Subdivision Act. The transitional phase could 
not have resulted in the eradication and destruction of agricultural land and its 
productive capacity. The legislature intervened to ensure this. This particular concern 
was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Appeal.123 
 
The Constitutional Court had to determine whether the land, which now fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, was still agricultural 
land. Kroon AJ for the majority posed the question: would the land have retained its 
classification as agricultural at the time the parties concluded their agreement?124 In 
answering this question, the court had to determine the intention of the legislature. 
Kroon AJ first looked at the plain meaning of the words and found that “a purely 
textual interpretation” could result in findings that suited both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgments.125 It could have meant that the classification 
should have persisted past the formation of the transitional councils or that the 
classification was only to survive the transitional period and would cease after that. 
Kroon AJ stated that “a further canon of statutory interpretation [is] that the ordinary 
meaning of the words in a statute must be determined in the context of the statute 
(including its purpose) read in its entirety”.126 The purpose of the Act included 
empowering the Minister as set out in the definition of “agricultural land” and section 
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4 of the Subdivision Act and that no compelling reason had been presented for this 
position to be changed after the period of the transitional councils had ended.127 
 
Kroon AJ interpreted the proviso to mean that “the classification of land as 
‘agricultural land’ was not tied to the life of the transitional councils”.128 However, the 
proviso remained ambiguous and other indicators of the legislature’s intention would 
be necessary to determine the continued application and effect of the proviso.129 The 
court determined the other indicators by addressing certain comments made in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment.130 
 
The literal interpretation employed by the SCA, as indicated above, could have 
reached either conclusion.131 The point raised in the SCA decision about the 
enhanced status of municipalities would have to be addressed. This enhanced status 
included the competence and capacity to administer land in their jurisdictions, and 
this would reaffirm the point that land classified as agricultural land had been 
removed from the Minister’s control. The Constitutional Court found that no reason 
existed for the Minster and the present day municipalities not to share this control 
and the argument in favour of the SCA’s interpretation was not as convincing.132 The 
fact that the land was no longer being used as agricultural land, but as an industrial 
space, also did not preclude the Act’s operation. The land was zoned as agricultural 
land, and the Act had to be applied.133  
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Kroon AJ found that the Kotzé134 judgment correctly represented the law up until the 
SCA decision was handed down.135 The majority decision was that the land situated 
in the jurisdiction of the transitional council and which was classified as agricultural 
land before the first election of the transitional council would remain classified as 
agricultural land.  Even though the land fell under the jurisdiction of the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality at the time when the agreement between the 
appellant and respondent was concluded the Subdivision Act had to be applied. The 
consent of the Minister of Agriculture was required to subdivide and sell the 
agricultural land. The court set aside the SCA finding and granted the appeal to 
Wary Holdings. 
 
The further exceptions in the definition of agricultural land relate to land subdivided in 
terms of the Agricultural Holdings (Transvaal) Registration Act 22 of 1919,136 land 
that forms part of a township as defined in the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937,137 
state owned land or land held in trust by the Minister or the state138 and land which 
has been excluded by the Minister of Agriculture.139 
 
2 3 2 Actions which are excluded from the Act’s application  
Actions specifically excluded by the Act can be placed into two categories, the first 
being transactions involving the state taking transfer of agricultural land or a right 
therein. Where a subdivided share, 140 an undivided share141 or a right to any portion 
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of agricultural land142 is transferred, sold or granted to the state the Subdivision Act 
does not apply. The second relates to the prohibited transfers, as identified in 
sections 3 and 5 of the Subdivision Act,143 occurring before the Act came into 
operation.  
 
The Subdivision Act makes provision for four instances where the Act does not apply 
in relation to transactions that occurred before the Act’s commencement. The first 
relates to succession. Where a testamentary disposition was made or an estate is 
subject to intestate succession; if this has resulted in a subdivided or undivided 
share of agricultural land; and if the testator has died before the commencement of 
the Act, the provisions of the Act do not apply.144 This was the case in Standard 
Bank of SA Bpk v Meester van die Hooggeregshof, Kimberly en Andere.145 Here an 
application to clarify the provisions of a will was brought. The will had the effect of 
subdividing agricultural land, but remained unaffected by the Subdivision Act 
because the testator died in 1962.146 The second instance is where a contract for the 
passing of an undivided share was entered into before the commencement of the 
Act.147 The third instance is where a surveyor has completed the relevant survey and 
has submitted a “subdivisional diagram” for examination and approval prior to the 
commencement of the Act.148 The inclusion of section 2(d) was aimed at protecting 
existing interests. Before the enactment of the Subdivision Act, agricultural land in 
uncontrolled areas could be freely subdivided, as far as it complied with the 
requirements of the Planning Act 88 of 1967. The owner of such land could have 
incurred the necessary costs in preparing the land for the subdivision and had the 
land surveyed with the necessary “subdivisional diagrams”. If the Act had 
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retrospective effect, requiring an application for consent, and if consent had been 
refused, all the costs incurred by the owner in terms of the old process would be lost. 
The legislature made an allowance for these subdivisions which are not subject to 
the Act. Where the land had been surveyed and the “subdivisional diagrams” have 
been submitted to the Surveyor General for approval, prior to the Act coming into 
operation, it is excluded from the Act’s operation.149 The fourth instance is any long-
term lease entered into prior to the commencement of the Act.150  
 
2 3 3  Prohibition of certain actions regarding agricultural land  
2 3 3 1 Subdivision of agricultural land 
Section 3(a) of the Subdivision Act states that “[a]gricultural land shall not be 
subdivided” without written consent from the Minister of Agriculture. This provision is 
a clear directive. Agricultural land is not to be subdivided. It identifies the purpose of 
the Act, namely to prevent the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. The act 
of subdivision needs to be accompanied by written consent from the Minister. The 
proceeding sections identify further actions that are also limited by the ministerial 
consent requirement. These deal with the transfer of agricultural land and actions 
that will result in the act of subdivision.  
 
2 3 3 2 Vesting of an undivided share 
Section 3(b) of the Subdivision Act states that “no undivided share in agricultural 
land not already held by any person, shall vest in any person … unless the Minister 
has consented in writing.” This section aims to prevent the sole owner of agricultural 
land, not held in undivided shares, from transferring any undivided share in the 
ownership of that land to another person without the Minister of Agriculture’s 
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consent.151 This section does not, however, preclude agricultural land from being 
registered as a partnership asset. The only qualification is that the agricultural land 
be registered in the name of one partner, but not the other partner or partners. The 
partner with the registered right has a real right, whereas the other(s) have a 
personal right against the partner to manage the agricultural land as a partnership 
asset. The case of Cussons and Others v Kroon152 illustrates this position.  
 
In the case of Cussons the second appellant had a farm registered in his name. He 
sold it to the first appellant, who was the nominee for a company to be incorporated. 
The first appellant then proceeded to transfer the farm to the newly incorporated 
company, the third appellant. The respondent alleged that the farm was a 
partnership asset that the second appellant transferred it without his consent, and 
that this was done with knowledge of the first and third appellants. The respondent 
brought an application to the Transvaal Local Division. The respondent wanted the 
contract of sale between the second and first appellants declared void. He also 
wanted the transfer of the farm from the third to the second appellant, the dissolution 
of the partnership and the appointment of a liquidator to realise the partnership 
assets. The court a quo found in favour of the respondent and gave an order to have 
the partnership dissolved.153  
 
The relevance of this case to the application of the Subdivision Act is that it was 
alleged on behalf of the appellants that the farm could never have been a 
partnership asset because of the application of section 3(b).154 The decision a quo 
that the partnership agreement was not void because of the provisions of the 
Subdivision Act was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The section states 
that no undivided share in agricultural land already held by any person shall vest in 
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any person. An undivided share in the farm was not transferred to the respondent 
and neither party intended this to happen. They were both aware that this could not 
be done and proceeded to have the farm registered only in the name of the second 
appellant. The respondent had no real right in the property. He only had a personal 
right against the second appellant in terms of which the second appellant had a duty 
to use the property as a partnership asset.155 The effect of the Act therefore does not 
preclude the asset from forming part of a partnership, but it does prevent the asset, 
the agricultural land, from vesting any real rights in anyone other than the registered 
owner.  
 
2 3 3 3 Vesting of a part of an undivided share 
Section 3(c) of the Subdivision Act states that “no part of any undivided share in 
agricultural land shall vest in any person, if such part is not already held by any 
person … unless the Minister has consented in writing.” The section aims to prevent 
the holder of an undivided share in the ownership of agricultural land from 
transferring a portion of his undivided share to another. It does not prohibit the holder 
of two or more shares of ownership in agricultural land from transferring one or more 
of these shares. The purpose of this section is to prevent the uncontrolled division of 
agricultural land into uneconomic units and the further division of agricultural land 
into smaller shares.156 
 
2 3 3 4 Long-term lease over a portion of agricultural land 
Section 3(d) of the Subdivision Act states that “no lease in respect of a portion of 
agricultural land of which the period is 10 years or longer, or is the natural life of the 
lessee or any other person mentioned in the lease, or which is renewable from time 
to time at the will of the lessee, either by the continuation of the original lease or by 
entering into a new lease, indefinitely or for periods which together with the first 
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period of the lease amount in all to not less than 10 years, shall be entered into … 
unless the Minister has consented in writing.” This provision invalidates any lease 
entered into which continues for any period over ten years. The option to renew after 
a period of nine years and eleven months is also invalidated. This was the case in 
Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk.157 
 
In Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk158 a contract of lease was 
concluded between the appellant and the respondent. In the contract a plantation 
was to be leased for a period of nine years and 11 months. The appellant was the 
lessee. The appellant had applied to the local division to have the contract declared 
valid and the respondent opposed it. They disputed the validity of a clause which 
contained an option to renew and extend the lease period. If the option was valid the 
entire contract would have been invalid in terms of section 3(d) of the Subdivision 
Act, which prohibits a lease period longer than 10 years without the consent of the 
Minister.159 It was argued by the appellant that the option to renew was severable 
from the contract. If the option was invalid the lease contract would still be valid. The 
appellant averred that the clause, which made provision for negotiations for a 
renewed rental period and arbitration where the negotiations failed, was invalid and 
unenforceable due to vagueness. The court a quo dismissed this application. The 
Appellate Court considered these positions and found that the option was not void 
for vagueness and was in fact in conflict with section 3(d) of the Act. The contract 
was invalid because of the existence of the option, because it had the potential effect 
of creating a long term lease, and this was done without the written consent of the 
Minister.160 
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2 3 3 5 Sale or advertising for sale of a portion of agricultural land 
Section 3(e)(i) of the Subdivision Act states that: “no portion of agricultural land, 
whether surveyed or not, and whether there is any building thereon or not, shall be 
sold or advertised for sale … unless the Minister has consented in writing.” This 
section expressly prohibits the sale of a portion of agricultural land or the 
advertisement for sale of a portion of agricultural land without the Minister’s consent. 
 
The majority of the cases dealing with this section of the Act are rooted in contractual 
disputes. A contract for the sale of agricultural land has been entered into and what 
is evident from the cases results in one of the contracting parties wishing to escape 
liability and performance. Failure to comply with the Act and the requirement of 
ministerial consent is then used to escape the contract because the formality 
requirements for the sale of agricultural land have not been complied with. The Act 
and its requirement of written ministerial consent in section 3 are reduced to an exit 
strategy for unhappy contracting parties. The cases here will be dealt with from the 
oldest to the more recent. This will illustrate the extensions and interpretations of the 
limitation to sell or advertise for sale a portion of agricultural land where the 
necessary ministerial consent has not been obtained. 
 
The following three cases all deal with the same party as the seller of agricultural 
land, Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd.161 All three cases were 
reported in the same year. In each of the cases the necessary ministerial consent 
was not obtained and this fact had been used as a defence against claims of specific 
performance by the seller. The judgments will be discussed in the order that they 
were delivered because the later judgments rely on the earlier ones. Tuckers Land 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Truter162  was an appeal against an order by 
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the magistrate’s court declaring the contract of sale between appellant and the 
respondent void and unenforceable. The contract was for the sale of an erf in a 
township. The appellant had approached the court and claimed payment of arrear 
instalments on the purchase price. Judgment was given in favour of the respondent 
in his counterclaim for the repayment of instalments already made. It was common 
cause at the time when the contract was concluded that the subject land was 
“agricultural land” as in the Act’s definition in section 1, and that the required consent 
was not obtained. This consent was, however, later obtained. 
 
The appellant instituted an action for the arrear instalments and the respondent 
raised the defence that the contract was void and unenforceable in terms of section 
3(e) of the Subdivision Act. This subsection was not originally included in the Act. 
The section was amended to include that “no erf or plot of agricultural land … or right 
to such an erf or plot, shall be sold or advertised for sale unless the Minister has 
consented in writing”.163 Berker AJ identified the amended section as well as the 
penalty provisions contained in section 11 of the Act.164 Section 11 included a 
sanction where there was contravention of section 3(e). He was left to consider 
whether or not the absence of the Minister’s consent to a contract of sale in 
contravention of section 3(e) was void, confirming the decision in the magistrate’s 
court.165 
 
Whether the contract of sale was void due to non-compliance had to be determined 
when the statutory provision, section 3(e), did not clearly state that effect. The court 
used and applied the principles from Swart v Smuts166 to determine the intention of 
the legislature. The court had to ascertain whether it was the intention of the 
legislature for the agreement to continue being valid even though there was non-
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compliance with the statutory provision.167 The principles set out in Swart v Smuts168 
indicated that the validity of the contract depended on the intention of the legislature, 
and that the general consequence of conflict between a contract and a statutory rule 
was nullity of the contract. The court also indicated that this was not an inflexible 
rule, and that a reading of the statute’s section may have indicated that the 
legislature did not intend invalidity. To determine the intention of the legislature in 
this regard, certain indiciae could be used. Three indiciae that point to the intention 
of the legislature being nullity of the contract were identified. The first is the use of 
the word “shall” in the relevant section. The second is that the provision is expressed 
in negative terms and the third is the inclusion of a penal sanction where there is 
contravention of the section.169 With the third indicia regard must be had to the 
intention of the legislature where the penal sanction was to serve as a sufficient 
sanction which would not also render the contract void.170  
 
The court in Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Truter171 found that 
all three indiciae were present. The provision was stated in negative terms; “no 
agricultural land … shall be sold … unless the Minister has consented in writing”. It 
also contained the word “shall”, which was considered to be a prima facie indication 
that an act in contravention of the provision would be void. However, these two 
factors remained a prima facie indication of a void action. The existence of the penal 
sanction in section 11 of the Act, where there was contravention of section 3(e), was 
the third indicium. The court considered the argument raised by the appellant, that 
the imposition of potentially severe penalties was sufficient to achieve the purposes 
of the Act and that, on this basis; the legislature did not intend contracts of sale 
entered into in contravention of section 3(e) to be void. The court rejected this 
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argument and perceived the existence of the penal sanction to be another indication 
in support of the nullity of the contract.172 
 
The court determined the legislature’s intention by examining the basic object and 
purpose of the Act, namely to prevent the subdivision of economic units of 
agricultural land into non-viable units. Apart from restricting the common law right to 
subdivide, the legislature had extended the prohibition to the use of uneconomic 
farming units.173 The introduction of section 3(e), as an extension of the Act, clearly 
acted to prevent the entering into of contracts of sale of land without the Minister’s 
consent. Berker AJ stated that “[t]he very introduction of s 3(e) into the Act, which 
was not necessary to prevent transfers of portions of agricultural land (which is one 
of the fundamental mischiefs the Act tries to prevent) … is a strong indication that 
contracts of sale of such land in contravention of s 3(e) are void”.174 The court 
concluded that it was the intention of the legislature that contracts of sale of portions 
of agricultural land in contravention of s 3(e) be void ab initio.175 The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
In Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Wasserman176 the 
appellant and the respondent concluded an agreement of sale. The appellant was to 
transfer a stand of unproclaimed township land to the respondent and the purchase 
price was to be paid in monthly instalments. The respondent fell behind on these 
instalments and the appellant consequently sued the defendant for the outstanding 
payments. The defendant pleaded that the agreement was invalid and of no force 
and counterclaimed for the instalments already paid. The basis of this plea was, 
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firstly, that the contract was in conflict with the provisions of the Township and Town 
Planning Ordinance,177 and secondly that the contract was in conflict with section 
3(e) of the Subdivision Act, which is the focus of this discussion.178 The magistrate’s 
court dismissed the appellant’s claim. 
 
The appellant relied on the argument that the effect of section 3(e) was not to render 
an agreement made contrary to it null and void. The section did not contain an 
express provision stating that an agreement made contrary to it is of no force and 
effect. As in Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Truter,179 the court 
applied the principles from Swart v Smuts180 and came to the same conclusion, 
namely that there are prima facie indications that the legislature intended contracts 
made in conflict with the section to be void.181 
 
McEwan J ascertained the intention of the legislature by examining the objectives of 
the Act. He discussed the original form of the Act that only contained sections 3(a), 
(b) and (c) and pointed out that these provisions were not enough to prevent the 
mischief of the division of agricultural land into uneconomic units. The fact that the 
Act did not prevent certain instances of subdivision led to the extension of the 
prohibition to long-term leases and the sale of erven. The primary purpose of the 
extension was to achieve the original purpose of the Act. On this basis the appellant 
argued that the sale of an erf in an unproclaimed township would not by itself lead to 
the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. The act of transfer would be needed, 
and transfer could not take place until the approval of the establishment of the 
township had been obtained. The appellant’s argument then assumed that the 
proclamation of the township would not take place until the Minister consented to the 
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inclusion of the land into the area of jurisdiction of a local authority, so that the land 
ceased to be agricultural land under the section 1 definition. In cases where the 
Minister did not consent to the proclamation of the township, transfer would not occur 
and the sale would fall away. No harm would come to the buyer if he had taken 
occupation of the erf, because the occupation would be similar to a short term lease, 
which was not prohibited by the Act.182 
 
The appellant argued that sufficient sanctions were provided for in the Act. There are 
penalties contained in section 11 and the Registrar of Deeds in terms of section 6(1) 
may not effect transfer where the Minister’s consent had not been submitted to him. 
The existence of these sanctions made the introduction of a further penalty, invalidity 
of the contract of sale, unnecessary. McEwan J approached the first argument by 
stating that the penalty imposed, a fine of R400 at that time, would not be a deterrent 
to a township developer. He stated that a developer would in particular 
circumstances pay the penalty and even possibly take it into consideration in the 
price of the erf. A further penalty of R10 a day for each day that the offence 
continues was introduced and served as a stronger deterrent, but this was not raised 
in the appellant’s argument. This penalty would have proved that the sale was a 
continuing offence and this would be the position until the sale was cancelled or until 
the Minster’s consent was obtained, which the court viewed as unlikely. On the 
second ground the court pointed out that both parties failed to note that the section 
6(1) provision did not exist at the time their agreement was entered into.183 
 
McEwan J found that the long title of the Act was amended to include “in connection 
therewith, the use of agricultural land” and this indicated that the legislature was not 
only concerned with the technical aspects of registration of rights to smaller units of 
agricultural land, but agreements that would give rights to use smaller units. Where a 
person obtained the right to use a small portion of agricultural land, the object of the 
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Act would still be defeated. The prohibition in section 3(d), relating to long-term 
leases, showed that a lease entered into in contravention of the Act would not 
remain valid and enforceable. The section read: “No lease … shall be entered into”. 
McEwan J found that there was no reason to distinguish between the two provisions, 
and that this was a clear indication that the legislature intended for both types of 
contracts to be invalid.184 
 
The court found that after all these considerations the respondent’s contention that 
the agreement was invalid should to be upheld. The court stated that its decision 
was fortified by the fact that a similar conclusion was reached in Tuckers Land 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Truter185 on similar facts.186 
 
In Smith v Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd; Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Smith187 two separate contracts of sale were 
concluded between Tuckers Land and Smith. In terms of the contracts Tuckers Land 
would sell two stands of unproclaimed township land to Smith. The land was 
agricultural land, as defined in the Subdivision Act, and required consent from the 
Minister of Agriculture. This consent was only obtained a number of years after the 
conclusion of the contracts. The first contract was concluded before the 1972 
amendment to section 3. In this amendment subsections (d), (e) and (f) were 
inserted. The second contract was concluded after the 1972 amendment. The 
magistrate’s court found that the first contract did not offend the provisions of the Act 
at the time that it was concluded, as the extended prohibition did not exist at the time 
of conclusion of the contract. The second contract was concluded after the 
amendment and was in conflict with section 3(e), and the lack of ministerial consent 
prior to the conclusion of the contract rendered the contract void. Both parties were 
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appealing the magistrate’s court finding on the two contracts respectively. Tuckers 
claimed that both contracts were valid and enforceable and wanted Smith to perform 
in terms of outstanding instalments. Smith claimed that both contracts were void.188 
Counsel for both parties acknowledged that the Act did not have retrospective effect 
and that further amendments to the Act were of no consequence in the appeal. 
 
The court referred to the judgment of Tuckers Land and Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd v Wasserman (“Wasserman”),189 as discussed above, and acknowledged 
that the facts were similar to the facts in the present case.190 The finding in 
Wasserman was that the contract was invalid and unenforceable for the reasons 
already mentioned above. The court agreed with this assessment of the effect of 
section 3 of the Act and found that Tuckers’ appeal had to be dismissed as the 
judgment in Wasserman was res judicata.191 
 
The grounds of the appeal by Smith could not be decided on the finding in 
Wasserman. The contract was concluded before the amendment to the section. This 
was the amendment that included section 3(e) and the criminal sanction in section 
11. Counsel for Smith therefore argued that the contract was in contravention of 
subsections 3(a) and 3(b). The court had to interpret the Act in its original form. 
Section 3(a) prohibited subdivision, but did not prohibit the sale of a specific portion, 
because it did not result in subdivision. Section 3(a) only prohibited the physical 
fragmentation of agricultural land so that ownership of the newly created fragments 
could be transferred. The subsection did not prohibit the conclusion of a contract 
which would require one of the contracting parties to realise the subdivision. Section 
3(b) prohibited an undivided share of agricultural land vesting in another person. The 
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subsection prohibited someone from acquiring the right to an undivided share in 
agricultural land. An agreement to acquire the right to an undivided share is not 
prohibited by the subsection. The court found that the obligation creating agreement 
that gives someone a right to acquire an undivided share in agricultural land was not 
prohibited.192 Neither of the subsections was contravened and the court concluded 
that the first contract remained valid and enforceable.193 
 
The following three cases are more recent. They also deal with the courts’ 
interpretation of section 3(e) and the scope of the sale of a portion of agricultural 
land. 
 
In Geue v Van der Lith and Another (“Geue”)194 the first respondent, an owner of a 
farm, entered into a written agreement with the first and second appellants, Geue 
and his wife, in terms of which he sold an undivided portion of his land. The farm was 
agricultural land as defined by the Subdivision Act and at the time of the agreement 
the farm was not divided into portions, nor had the required consent been obtained. 
The agreement was concluded without the consent from the Minister of Agriculture, 
as required under section 3(e)(i) of the Subdivision Act, but was subject to a 
suspensive condition that the consent be later obtained. The agreement required the 
appellant to transfer part of the purchase price to the attorneys responsible for the 
transfer, the second respondent, which they did. Subsequent to this transfer the 
appellants brought an application to the High Court declaring the agreement null and 
void and claimed back the amount transferred. The respondent brought a counter-
application seeking the order to be declared valid and enforceable as the suspensive 
condition had been fulfilled. The Minister had, during this period, consented to the 
proposed subdivision. The court a quo dismissed the applicants’ application and 
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granted the respondent’s counter application. The appeal was against that order. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether the agreement was rendered 
void by the lack of consent, where the parties had the common intention to have the 
land subdivided by subjecting the agreement to the condition that consent was to be 
obtained later.195 
 
Brand JA analysed section 3(e)(i) and the definition of “sale” in section 1 of the Act. 
Section 3(e)(i) prohibits the sale or advertising for sale of agricultural land unless the 
Minister has consented to it. The definition of sale was introduced as an amendment 
to the Act and reads: “sale includes a sale subject to a suspensive condition”. The 
court found that the meaning of Act was clear and succinct. The agreement 
concluded between the parties fell within its ambit. It was a sale, subject to a 
suspensive condition, of agricultural land concluded without the Minister’s consent. 
Van der Walt J for the court a quo had the same initial impression, but surprisingly 
reached a different conclusion. Van der Walt J proceeded to find that the agreement 
did not fall within the ambit of section 3(e)(i) as the legislature could not have 
intended to prohibit a suspensive condition like the one contained in the agreement. 
He claimed that it would be absurd to restrict a condition that intended to comply with 
the consent requirement of the Act as the main object of the Act is “to prevent the 
fragmentation of agricultural land into small uneconomic units”.196 On this basis the 
court a quo decided that the agreement of sale could never have been in conflict with 
the object of the Act. By subjecting their agreement to the condition the parties were 
promoting the very purpose of the Act.197 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal questioned the reason for the legislative extension of 
the definition of “sale” which now specifically included a sale subject to a suspensive 
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condition. The court a quo found that the extension was to prevent the use of 
suspensive conditions that managed to circumvent the requirement of ministerial 
consent, making the respective agreements subject to conditions other than the 
Minister’s consent. This would have the effect of making the agreement fall outside 
the ambit of the definition of sale in the Act. On this basis the legislature had a good 
reason to prevent avoidance of the Act’s requirement. It was contended that the 
suspensive condition contained in the parties’ agreement was not aimed at avoiding 
the requirement of ministerial consent as required under the Subdivision Act. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal rejected this contention. Brand JA indicated that 
presupposing that the legislature only wanted to prevent the transfer of an undivided 
portion of land without ministerial consent was incorrect. The Act does not only 
prohibit the alienation of an undivided portion of land. It also prohibits the advertising 
for sale of agricultural land without ministerial consent. This is an act that precedes 
sale and alienation. Brand JA stated that the absurdity claimed by the court a quo 
cannot be used to avoid the legislature’s clear intention and that speculating on the 
real purpose and intended result of the provision was dangerous. It served no 
purpose to speculate on the reason for this prohibition on agreements concluded by 
the parties. The court thus found that the agreement concluded by the parties was in 
contravention of section 3(e)(i).198  
 
The further contention raised by the respondent was that if the agreement was in fact 
in contravention of section 3(e)(i) it was not null and void. The basis for the 
contention was that the Act did not declare contracts concluded in contravention to 
be null and void and the fact that the Act contains a penalty provision should be the 
only sanction for the offence. The court indicated that an agreement that is in conflict 
with a statutory provision is not ipso iure void unless the intention for nullity can be 
imputed to the legislature. The court referred to the earlier High Court decisions199 on 
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this issue, which were acknowledged by the counsel for the respondent to be 
correct, but on their specific facts. The agreements in those cases were unlike the 
one concluded by the parties, which specifically rendered their contract subject to 
obtaining the Minister’s consent. On this basis an interpretation that would have 
permitted the nullity of a contract that aimed to fulfil the requirements of the Act 
would be untenable. The court rejected this contention as an agreement of this kind 
is exactly what the legislature intended to prohibit and there could be no argument 
that the agreement was not in conflict with this intention.200 The court found in favour 
of the appellant. 
 
In Guba v Odendaal201 the applicant wanted a declaratory order that the agreement 
of sale between him and the first respondent was void. The contract was for the sale 
of a portion of agricultural land and he further wanted the respondent to vacate the 
premises. The respondent’s counter application was for specific performance of the 
agreement. The sale entered into between the parties did not comply with the 
provisions of the Subdivision Act. The question left to the court was whether the 
agreement of sale was void as there was non-compliance with the statutory 
provision, and if this was affirmed, whether the agreement could be revived by the 
parties subsequent to the Minister granting the permission. The Minister’s consent 
was granted 18 months after the parties had signed the agreement, and left the court 
to answer whether the agreement could be revived after it was void ab initio.202 
 
Because of the use of a suspensive condition the court applied the judgment in 
Geue.203 The court in Geue found that a contract based on the eventuality that the 
Minister’s consent would become unnecessary was founded in illegality. If the 
consent was not obtained the contract of sale, subject to the suspensive condition, 
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would be null and void. The legislature found it necessary in the 1981 amendment to 
close off further loopholes in this regard. This was done by including the suspensive 
condition, especially where the contract of sale of undivided agricultural land could 
circumvent the Minister’s consent subject to some other suspensive condition 
unrelated to the Minster’s consent being obtained. When the condition was fulfilled 
the agreement would became a sale where consent would be required. Such an 
agreement could never be of force without the Minster’s consent. The 1981 
amendment existed to avoid this circumvention of the Act’s requirement.204  
 
The argument for the revival of the contract at the time when the Minister’s consent 
was received also failed. The court referred to section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land 
Act,205 which made it impossible to revive a contract of sale of immovable 
property.206 The court concluded that the agreement of sale was invalid and of no 
force and effect in law because of non-compliance with section 3(e)(i). The 
ministerial consent did not revive the agreement. A new agreement did not come into 
existence between the parties by their conduct.207  
 
In the case of Colchester Zoo SA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Weenan Safaris CC208 the 
respondent and the applicant had entered into a written agreement for the option to 
purchase a game fishing farming business. This included the immovable property as 
described in the contract. The agreement was subject to obtaining approval to 
subdivide the land. The respondent had lodged the application to subdivide with the 
Minister of Agriculture, but had failed to lodge the water certificate that was required 
for the application. The respondent then abandoned the application and informed the 
applicant that he no longer considered the option agreement to be of any force or 
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effect.209 The basis of this contention was that the option was void because it was in 
conflict with section 3(e)(i) of the Subdivision Act. The applicant wanted a declaratory 
order declaring the option contract valid, an order to have the respondent take 
reasonable steps to get the necessary approvals and an interdict to preserve the 
property.210  
 
The applicant claimed that an option to purchase was not covered by the statutory 
prohibition because it is not referred to in the subsection or the definition of sale in 
the Act. Counsel for the respondent referred to the legislative extensions on the Act, 
which initially only prohibited the act of subdivision, but now includes all acts that 
preceded the actual subdivision. It was clear that the definitions of “advertise” and 
“sale” had been extended, and even though an option or a right of pre-emption were 
not expressly mentioned in the Act, courts in other instances had read formalities 
legislation to apply to these transactions. These transactions are entered into to 
facilitate later agreements that would lead to the alienation of agricultural land. 
Counsel for the respondent argued “that judicial policy requires that an interpretation 
placed on section 3(e)(i) of the Act which would encompass an option; further that 
such interpretation will also resonate with the approach followed by the courts in 
interpreting the formalities legislation”.211 Moosa AJ concluded that a written option 
was covered by the definition of “sale” in the Subdivision Act and that the applicant 
was not entitled to the declarator.212 
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2 3 4  Application for the Minister’s consent 
In terms of section 4 of the Act the Minister has certain powers. The application for 
consent, in terms of section 3 must be made by the owner of the land;213 the 
application must also be lodged and accompanied by supporting documentation at a 
place as determined by the Minister.214 The Minister may in his or her discretion 
refuse the application.215 The effect of this refusal was illustrated in Bekker NO v 
Duvenhage.216 The defendant in the case was not permitted to transfer property to 
the estate of the plaintiff, and no damages were granted due to the impossibility 
created through the Minister’s refusal. The Minister’s refusal had rendered a notarial 
agreement concluded between the parties void due to impossibility. The court found 
that the provisions of the Act not only prevented the defendant from passing transfer 
of the property to the estate of the plaintiff, but that no action by either party would 
result in damages arising from non-performance.217 
 
In terms of the Act the Minister is empowered to attach further conditions to the 
subdivision application. These conditions may pertain to the proposed use of the 
agricultural land.218 The Minister may also, in instances where the land is no longer 
going to be used as agricultural land, consult with the relevant bodies to determine if 
the application should be granted.219 The section further empowers the Minister to 
enforce,220 vary or withdraw any condition.221 Where a condition has been registered 
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and the Minister varies or withdraws it, the Minister may have the condition on the 
title deed of the land varied or cancelled.222 
 
2 3 5  Succession 
Section 5(1) of the Act provides for the realisation and payment of the proceeds of 
agricultural land, subject to a testamentary disposition or intestate succession, where 
the Minister has, in terms of section 4,223 refused to grant consent to a subdivision. 
The Act directs the executor to realise the land or the undivided share and dispose of 
the proceeds in accordance with the testamentary disposition or the intestate 
succession. This is to be done in accordance with the compensation requirements in 
section 12 of the Expropriation Act.224 
 
2 3 6  Servitudes 
The Act further limits the entitlement of an owner of agricultural land to grant and 
register certain servitudes over his land. The section excludes certain servitudes 
from the requirement of ministerial consent. The excluded servitudes are a right of 
way, an aqueduct, a pipe line or conducting electricity of a width not exceeding 15 
metres;225 a servitude which is supplementary to a servitude identified above, and 
which has a servitude area not exceeding 225 square metres and which adjoins the 
area or the last-mentioned servitude;226 and a usufruct over the whole of agricultural 
land in favour of one person or in favour of such person and his spouse or the 
survivor of them if they are married in community of property.227 Sinclair submits that 
the inclusion of certain servitudes under the requirement of consent exists to prevent 
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the registration of servitudes that are in fact lease agreements. As long-term leases 
are prohibited in the Act the legislature has closed off the loophole which also has 
the potential to fragment agricultural land in this manner.228  
 
The applicants in Moll and Another v Nedcor Bank Ltd and Others229 were holders of 
a usufruct over land. The land had been sold in execution to satisfy a judgment 
obtained by the first respondent, Nedcor Bank. They sought an application 
prohibiting the transfer of the property free from the usufruct that was registered in 
their favour. The relevance for this discussion is based on the respondent’s 
contention that the usufruct was not registered in terms of section 3(e) of the 
Subdivision Act. On this basis the applicants lacked locus standi to bring the 
application.230  
  
The problem with the respondent’s contention was that the failure to register the 
usufruct was argued under the wrong section of the Act. Section 6A deals with 
servitudes and not section 3(e). The second point raised was that it was not common 
cause that the land subject to the usufruct was agricultural land. The respondent had 
failed to prove that the land in question was agricultural land in terms of the definition 
in the Act. The respondent also failed to show that the land was not within the 
jurisdiction of a local government council or board,231 which reverts back to the initial 
discussion on the definition of agricultural land in section 1. Although the case does 
not deal with the interpretation of the Act’s section on servitudes, it does show that it 
would be possible to argue that certain servitudes are invalid where the required 
ministerial consent was not obtained prior to their registration. 
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2 3 7  Offences and penalties 
The Act makes provision for penalties and offences. The conduct penalised varies 
from making false statements or failing to disclose information with the intention to 
deceive232 to contravening sections 3(d)233 and 3(e)234 of the Act. The sanction 
imposed by the Act is currently a fine not exceeding R1000, or a period of 
imprisonment that does not exceed 2 years. In the case of failing to comply with 
conditions set, or contravention of section 3(d) and 3(e) a fine of R50 a day for each 
day that the offence continues is imposed. 
 
2 4  Current status of the Act  
The Subdivision Act is old-order legislation. It served and still serves a specific 
regulatory purpose, namely to prevent the uneconomic fragmentation of prime 
agricultural land. However, in 1998 the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal 
Act235 was promulgated with a date of operation to be fixed by the President. The 
policy reasons for this repeal have been identified in the Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act Repeal Bill. The original aim of the Subdivision Act was to prevent the 
creation of new portions of agricultural land that were so small that farming would not 
be economically viable. The reason for the repeal, as stated in the Bill, is that it is not 
appropriate for government to interfere in the determination of the size of agricultural 
land and that the position should be regulated by the agricultural sector, land users 
and the market.236 The Bill identifies other appropriate zoning mechanisms that are 
in place to regulate and protect valuable and scarce agricultural land. These are in 
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the form of the Development Facilitation Act,237 local government bylaws, and the 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act.238 The Subdivision Act has also been 
expressly excluded in land reform legislation.239 The post-apartheid legislature has 
identified instances where the Act’s regulation prevents the effective implementation 
of land reform measures. This exclusion is based on the Act’s incompatibility with 
these land reform measures.240 Agricultural land that is subdivided for the purposes 
of land reform does not have to comply with the requirements of the Subdivision Act. 
 
The position of the Subdivision Act since the promulgation of the still inoperative 
Repeal Act has created some uncertainty. This was evident in the case of Thanolda 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Bouleigh 145 (Pty) Ltd.241 The court had erroneously concluded 
that although the land in question was described as agricultural land, there should be 
no impediment to an act of subdivision. No evidence was led to establish the fact 
that the land could not be subdivided and because the Subdivision Act had been 
repealed the application to the Minister was no longer required. Wunsh J stated that 
even if the Repeal Act had no effect, the land now fell within the jurisdiction of a town 
council and the Subdivision Act would not apply.242 It is clear from the earlier case 
discussion on the Act and the extent of its application that this is not the correct 
position.243 
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The decisions in Kotzé244 and Wary Holdings245 have been the courts’ attempt at 
clearing up this uncertainty. The Constitutional Court in Wary Holdings has 
speculated on the possibilities for the delay in the Repeal Act’s operation. These 
possibilities are that the legislature is seeking to put other provisions in place of the 
Act on a national level; that the position is temporary until a time where provincial 
governments acquire the required capacity to administer the functional area of 
agriculture; and finally and alternatively, that the administration is to fall within the 
functional area of the municipal authorities.246 These possibilities are all dependent 
on future developments and whichever route the legislature deems most appropriate. 
 
The Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003 indicates that 
national government has every intention of continuing to control agricultural 
subdivision. The Bill was never introduced to Parliament but was revisited during the 
first half of 2007 as a direct result of the National Land Summit.247 The Bill in its 
preamble indicates that it aims to address the “racially discriminatory practices and 
laws of the past and apartheid [that] deprived historically disadvantaged people of 
land, resulting in their exclusion from the agricultural sector”.248 It further aims to 
“promote sustainable utilisation and development of natural agricultural resources” 
and to “control the subdivision and change of agricultural land use”.249 The Bill 
expressly includes prime and unique agricultural land. The subdivision provisions in 
Chapter 8 of the Bill are identical to the provisions contained in the Subdivision Act. 
Based on this it is clear that government intends for the subdivision of agricultural 
land to continue being regulated nationally. It does raise questions as to the reason 
for the repeal of the Subdivision Act in the 1998 Repeal Act. 
                                            
244
  Kotzé en ‘n Ander v Minister van Landbou en Andere 2003 (1) SA 445 (T). 
245
  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
246
  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC) para 91. 
247
  Strydom HA and King ND (eds) Fuggle & Rabie’s Environmental management in South Africa 
(2nd ed 2009) 332. The Draft Bill is the only document currently available that deals with the issue of 
agricultural subdivisions since the promulgation of the still inoperative Repeal Act. 
248
  Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003, preamble. 
249
  Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003, preamble. 
70 
 
 
2 5  Concluding remarks 
It is clear from the Wary Holdings decision250 that the Subdivision Act in its present 
form continues to apply. All agricultural land in the Republic is subject to the Act 
even though wall-to-wall municipalities have now been established throughout the 
country. In terms of the definition of “agricultural land” in the Act the creation of wall-
to-wall municipalities would have effectively excluded the Act’s operation. However, 
the court’s decision in Wary Holdings means that the Act continues to apply to all the 
agricultural land that was defined as “agricultural land” before the transitional period 
which facilitated the process of establishing municipalities across the country. The 
Minister’s consent is still required for certain actions relating to the subdivision of 
agricultural land. 
 
This chapter has identified the context in which this legislative limitation was created 
and the policy justifications offered for the limitation. The extent of the statutory 
limitation was examined by analysing the primary sections of the Act and the courts’ 
interpretation of those sections. The current status of the Act was also considered. 
This showed that the still inoperative Repeal Act has created uncertainty. The reason 
for the repeal is stated to be that it is not appropriate for government to interfere in 
the determination of the size of agricultural land. The proposed Draft Sustainable 
Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003 contradicts this reasoning. The Bill 
contains identical provisions to the Subdivision Act. This means that agricultural 
subdivisions would continue to be regulated nationally by government. The operation 
of the Subdivision Act has also been excluded from certain legislation because of its 
incompatibility with land reform mechanisms. This will be relevant in the later chapter 
testing the general compliance of the Act.251 
 
                                            
250
  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
251
  See 5 2 1 and 5 3 below. 
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The survey above of the Act’s history, context and the policy reasons for its 
enactment and promulgation has shown that the Act was necessary for the 
preservation of agricultural land. However, the historical context also shows that the 
Act was not free from political efforts to promote white interests at the cost of 
restricted and limited black African interests. This will be important when discussing 
and differentiating between the legitimate purpose and the illegitimate aim of the 
Act.252 The history of the Act shows its creation in an apartheid context where 
agricultural policy was racialised. The focus was preserving prime agricultural land 
for the white minority. The policy reasons for the Act also identified the legitimate 
purpose and the illegitimate aim of the Act. The concern for the increasing number of 
uneconomic farming units was also a concern for the wellbeing of the white farmer. 
These two issues were not separated when the Act was drafted. 
 
It is clear from the discussion that the statutory limitation on the right to subdivide 
has numerous implications. In achieving the aim of the Act the legislature has 
extended the Act’s application to restrict certain actions relating to the use 
agricultural land. The restriction has an effect on the right to alienate through sale 
and succession and also to register long-term leases and certain servitudes. This 
limitation will be important when testing section 25 constitutional compliance of the 
Subdivision Act.253 The Act’s history and purpose will be important when testing the 
Act for general constitutional compliance.254 The cases used to analyse and interpret 
the Act’s provisions showed that the Act’s requirement of ministerial consent has 
been used to escape contracts for the sale of agricultural land. The Act and consent 
requirement in these instances has become an exit strategy for unhappy contracting 
parties. The case law also showed the extent of the Act’s regulation to prevent 
uneconomic farming units. Failure to comply with the formality requirements of the 
Act has consistently resulted in void contracts. 
                                            
252
  See 3 2 3 2 below.  
253
  See chap 4 below. 
254
  See chap 5 below. 
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The post-apartheid legislature that has indicated that it no longer finds it appropriate 
for the government to dictate the size of agricultural land and that it should be left to 
the agricultural sector and market to determine.255 However, the proposed inclusion 
of subdivision provisions in the Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources 
Bill of 2003 contradicts this reasoning. The fact that the Draft Bill makes use of 
identical provisions has one question the need for the repeal of the Subdivision Act.  
 
                                            
255
  See 2 4 above. See the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Bill. 
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Chapter 3: Identifying and separating the 
legitimate purpose from the illegitimate aim of 
the Act 
3 1  Introduction 
State regulations of private property are generally accepted. The needs of society 
affect the way in which individuals interact with their property. The state imposes 
laws that prevent owners and land users, in the instance of immovable property, 
from exercising their rights without any restriction.1 The state imposes regulations to 
give order to society. This is done in the public interest and should serve a vested 
and collective need for this order. The South African history and context indicates 
that there was a different use for regulations. The use and occupation of land by 
blacks and the land-use laws imposed on them were markedly different from whites.2 
The system of law was aimed at fostering and protecting white interests at the cost 
of other land users. This was the state of affairs for the largest part of the twentieth 
century; regulations imposed on land use had a racial motivation.3 The state 
imposed law that gave benefits to the minority and at the same time limited and 
restricted the rights of the non-white majority.4  
 
                                            
1
  Honoré states that “in practice … the owner’s privileges of using and powers of managing a 
thing as he wishes have been curtailed and that the social interest in the productive use of things has 
been affirmed by legislation”: Honoré A M “Ownership” in Oxford essays in jurisprudence (Guest A G 
ed) (1961) 107-147 at 145. 
2
  Van Wyk J Planning law: Principles and procedures of land-use management (1999) 99. 
3
  The system of differentiation and discrimination was introduced by the early settlers. It started 
with the introduction of restrictive covenants that prevented the use and occupation of land by 
persons of colour. Legislation was later introduced which allocated certain areas for black occupation. 
See chap 2 above. See also Van Wyk J Planning law: Principles and procedures of land-use 
management (1999) 99-100. 
4
  Apartheid legislation identified four distinct racial groups, black, Indian, coloured and white. 
The non-white majority consisted of black, Indian and coloured individuals. Certain areas were 
designated for each of the groups. 
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The racial discrimination and grossly unequal distribution of land was affected 
through a body of apartheid land law. All the land occupied and used was subject to 
these specific laws and regulations and many of these laws are still applicable, more 
than a decade after democratisation. Most of these laws are not facially 
discriminatory and have continued to apply in the new legal order, but the fact 
remains that they were created under a different order and had a different objective, 
even if only in part. This inherently discriminatory aim exists as a part of the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (“Subdivision Act”)5 and is one of the elements 
of this chapter. 
 
The Subdivision Act is legislation that was crafted during the apartheid period. It is a 
regulation that has a legitimate purpose, but also an inherently illegitimate aim. The 
Act’s legitimate purpose is the societal need to protect and preserve agricultural 
land, whereas the illegitimate aim was the apartheid aim to preserve prime 
agricultural land for white use and occupation. The state’s intervention in this regard 
was to prevent agricultural land from being subdivided into uneconomic units. This 
fostered white agricultural interests and through the requirement of ministerial 
consent prevented black South Africans from gaining access to agricultural land.6 
The legitimate purpose and the illegitimate aim exist side-by-side in this legislative 
text. This is the situation in most of apartheid planning law and land-use 
management.7 To separate the purpose of the Act from the aim of the Act, if this is at 
all possible, will be the focus of this chapter. 
 
                                            
5
  70 of 1970. 
6
  The power granted to the Minister of Agriculture could be seen as a means of ensuring that 
the disposal of agricultural land was only to whites. See 5 2 1 and 5 2 2 below.  
7
  The green paper development and planning explains this. In then Minister Derek Hanekom’s 
foreword he states that the country “has inherited incoherent, racially fragmented, inequitable and 
cumbersome planning laws and policies” and that urgent transformation is necessary. Republic of 
South Africa National Development and Planning Commission and the Department of Land Affairs 
Green paper development and planning: Development and Planning Commission document DPC 
4/99 (May 1999) ii. 
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To identify legitimate land use regulations, regulation needs to be defined. Defining 
and understanding land-use regulations as legitimate limitations on the rights of the 
owner is necessary to indentify a rational and legitimate regulation. The justifications 
for the imposition of regulations over property will also have to be considered. This 
will require an examination of the state’s exercise of its police powers. This will 
specifically examine the extent of the state’s authority to regulate property rights and 
interests. Here the South African pre-constitutional context will have to be 
considered. The distinction between what is perceived to be a legitimate and neutral 
land-use regulation and its creation under the apartheid order will be questioned. 
The Subdivision Act will be explained as an example of a legitimate land-use 
regulation created in this order. Other jurisdictions with similar policies will be used to 
explain and justify similar land-use regulations in their respective contexts. This will 
provide further clarity when determining legitimate land-use regulations over 
agricultural land. This section will examine the different policies and regulations 
relating to the preservation of agricultural land in the United States of America, 
specifically the states of Oregon and Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of 
British Columbia, Canada. 
 
3 2 Land-use regulations8 
3 2 1  Land-use regulation defined 
A regulation is defined as a directive, made and maintained by an authority.9 As a 
point of departure, this definition indicates that an authority would be in the position 
to create and enforce a particular rule. For the purposes of this discussion, the 
authority is the state and the rules or directives are those created to regulate the use 
of land. The implication is that the state has the authority to regulate the type of use 
permitted on land. This directly affects the individuals that have an interest in the 
land. Needham submits that individuals have collective ambitions for the use of their 
                                            
8
  I would like to acknowledge and thank Professor J van Wyk from the University of South 
Africa for the useful insights provided in seminars presented on Planning Law at the South African 
Research Chair in Property Law on the 1st of February 2010. 
9
  Soanes C and Stevenson A (eds) Concise Oxford English dictionary (11th ed 2006) 1212. 
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land and the state has been given the power to help them realise these ambitions.10 
At the same time the state wants to influence the ways in which land is used. This is 
done in the interest of the rest of society, including third parties who do not have a 
direct interest in the property but who will be affected by its use. Therefore, land-use 
regulation is the state’s attempt to influence and control, in the public interest, the 
way in which particular rights in land will be exercised.11 
 
State agencies take actions that influence the ways in which individuals use their 
land. This is common in all jurisdictions.12 These actions are taken to achieve a 
desired land use and to prevent undesired land uses in specific locations. The 
individual is restricted in his use by the state’s authority to impose rules. Limits to the 
way in which owners exercise their rights in relation to their properties exist.13 The 
state, through regulation, limits the rights of owners and the rights they have in 
relation to their properties. The restrictions in this context are regulations that affect 
the complete and unrestricted use and enjoyment of the immovable property. In Gien 
v Gien14 Spoelstra AJ acknowledged the susceptibility of ownership to legal 
limitations.15 These include the rights of others which can be seen in neighbour law 
rules and the rules of public law,16 the legislative limitations that are the focus here. 
These in effect deprive owners of certain entitlements in their property.17 
 
                                            
10
  Needham B Planning, law and economics: The rules we make for using land (2006) 18. 
11
  See Wadley JB “The emerging “social function” context for land use planning in the United 
States: A comparative introduction to recurring issues” (1989) 28 Washburn Law Journal 22-50 at 25. 
12
  Bonti-Ankomah S and Fox G “Property rights and land use regulation: A comparative 
evaluation” (2000) 39 Agrikon 244-268 at 258. 
13
 Hart W O “Control of the use of land in English Law” in Haar C M (ed) Law and land Anglo-
American planning practice (1964) 2-27at 3. 
14
  1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120C. 
15
  Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120C. 
16
  Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120C. 
17
  See 4 2 1 and 4 2 2 below. 
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The regulation of immovable property mostly adopts the form of land-use 
management rules. These are found in planning and zoning regulations and dictate 
what use and development may be exercised over the land. Zoning regulations in 
effect identify the types of use and development that will be permitted on the land. 
These will often identify which land is urban or rural land. These distinctions then 
allow for more specific uses, like residential and industrial use in urban areas and 
agricultural or conservation uses in rural areas and are not limited to these identified. 
For these spaces to operate for their intended aim, restrictions are placed on the 
type of use and development that would be permitted. 
 
Regulations determining land-use fall into one of four categories.18 The first is the 
type of use. This would be whether the land will have an agricultural, commercial, 
industrial or residential use. These are usually determined by the zoning 
requirements as determined by local authorities. The second is the density of use. 
This deals with the height, width and bulk of use on the land. These would include 
the physical impact on the land and the rules that will apply in building and 
developing the land.19 It also serves to prohibit the types of activities permitted on the 
land, for example the setting of minimum erf sizes and the maximum height of 
buildings.20 The third aspect is the aesthetic impact. Emphasis is placed on the 
design and placement of buildings for residential, commercial and industrial 
purposes. It is concerned with the overall look of the physical environment. The 
fourth is the effect of the use of the land on cultural and social values of the 
community. The societal interest is reflected in this aspect of land-use regulation. 
                                            
18
  Salsich P W and Tryniecki T J Land use regulation: A legal analysis and practical application 
of land use law (2nd ed 2003) 1. 
19
  Here the planning regulations in the form of building regulations are relevant. Building 
regulations would dictate what development is permitted on the land. The example in South African 
law is the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. The Act in its 
preamble “aims to provide for the promotion of uniformity in the law relating to the erection of 
buildings and the areas of jurisdiction of local authorities” and prescribes the minimum standards 
buildings must comply with. 
20
  Bonti-Ankomah S and Fox G “Property rights and land use regulation: A comparative 
evaluation” (2000) 39 Agrikon 244-268 at 244. 
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These aspects are reflected in all land-use planning and specific regulations will 
cover one or more of these aspects. 
 
Land-use planning can only be effective if the regulatory framework is enforced.21 
Regulations are enforced in one of two ways. The first is by prohibition and the 
second is by incentive.22 The prohibition is in the form of rules that have been 
specified in advance and prohibit a particular action. The incentive encourages 
compliance with the regulation. These could be in the form of financial incentives, 
which includes fines for non-compliance, subsidies and liability in the form of 
compensation.23 Authorities need to clearly identify the procedures to be followed 
and enforce them by penalising non-compliance. This would be the only way to 
ensure that a planning scheme is effective. 
 
Land-use regulations are not an arbitrary creation. They are crafted and imposed to 
serve specific societal needs. These are to ensure public health, safety and the 
welfare of the citizens.24 Regulations will vary according to these needs depending 
on location and context. These aspects will be dealt with in the justification of land-
use regulation below.25 
 
3 2 2  Justification for land-use regulation  
Land-use regulation restricts the way in which people exercise rights in immovable 
property. The regulatory restrictions on the entitlements individuals have in property 
                                            
21
  See Ingle M “What price developmental land-use in South Africa? Paying lip service to law” 
(2006) 41 Journal of Public Administration 750-760. The author identifies the problems experienced 
where there is a failure to enforce planning and building regulations. He finds that enforcement in 
South Africa is an issue. The failure of local governments to enforce regulations has delegitimized the 
efficacy of planning and building regulations. 
22
  Needham B Planning, law and economics: The rules we make for using land (2006) 22. 
23
  Needham B Planning, law and economics: The rules we make for using land (2006) 22. 
24
  Ingle M “What price developmental land-use in South Africa? Paying lip service to law” (2006) 
41 Journal of Public Administration 750-760 750. 
25
  See 3 2 2 
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are imposed in terms of the state’s inherent police power.26 This is the general 
governmental power to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the 
citizens.27 To protect and promote these interests legislation is created and imposed. 
The state’s exercise of its police powers usually affects all citizens without 
differentiation and it is accepted that affected owners must bear the resulting 
burdens and losses.28 As a general point of departure no regulation should be 
excessive to any individual owner and a reciprocal burden will need to be spread 
equally among all owners. The regulation should generally be imposed for a 
legitimate public purpose and should be fair. The imposed regulation is often 
discussed as a restriction on private interests in favour of the public interest. The 
effect is a limitation on the individual interests, but where it is necessary to protect 
the public, that would take precedence. The nature of the property and the 
relationships between the owner, the state and third parties to the property is also an 
important factor. Where there is a social relationship and the function of the property 
affects more than the owner, the wider the regulatory powers of the state would be. 
The converse is also true, where the property is typically individual, the smaller these 
powers would be. The social impact of the property is an important factor that has to 
be considered. Where the property does not only affect the holder but also the lives 
and interests of others the more susceptible it will be to regulation. 
 
Salsich and Tryniecki29 have identified useful criteria for determining when a land-
use regulation can be imposed legitimately. They indicate that, firstly, there should 
be a valid public purpose, secondly that the means must be reasonably tailored to 
the purpose of the regulation and thirdly that the regulation must be achieved in a 
                                            
26
  Paster E “Preservation of agricultural land through land use planning tools and techniques” 
(2004) 44 Natural Resources Journal 283-318 285. 
27
  Salsich P W and Tryniecki T J Land use regulation: A legal analysis and practical application 
of land use law (2nd ed 2003) 3. 
28
  Van der Walt A J Constitutional property law (2005) 132-137. The following section has been 
paraphrased from Van der Walt’s section on the police-power principle. 
29
  Salsich P W and Tryniecki T J Land use regulation: A legal analysis and practical application 
of land use law (2nd ed 2003) 3. 
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manner that does not unduly impose excessive costs on the individual.30 In South 
African law these criteria form part of the constitutional protection afforded to 
property holders. In terms of section 25(1) “[n]o one may be deprived of property 
except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property”.31 In terms of the section the law must be of general 
application,32 it has been submitted that an implicit public purpose requirement must 
be read into the section33 and in terms of the arbitrariness requirement and case law 
on its application shows that the interplay of various factors include the means being 
tailored to the purpose and that the means may not be excessive.34 In South African 
law, where a regulation is excessive it will need to comply with the requirements of 
section 25(1) to be constitutionally justifiable. This was not always the South African 
position. The country’s apartheid history, the grossly unequal distribution of land and 
the tools crafted and employed to realise this state will need to be considered with 
circumspection. 
 
The exercise of the state’s police powers in the South African context served an 
entirely different purpose. The fact that many land-use planning and building 
regulations were created in a pre-constitutional context makes their continued 
application problematic. The same criteria for the justification of land-use regulations 
will not suffice when dealing with pre-constitutional land-use law. It needs to be 
determined whether a public interest that existed during apartheid can operate in a 
constitutional setting as an interest that serves an open and democratic society. The 
pre-constitutional public interest was synonymous with the promotion of white 
interests and the restriction of non-whites. The complete repeal of all statutory law 
                                            
30
  The excessive costs criteria means that no individual owner should have to bear excessive 
burdens and losses. 
31
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See chap 4 below. 
32
  See 4 2 3 1 below. 
33
   Van der Walt A J Constitutional property law (2005) 138. 
34
  See chap 4 below. The application and interpretation of the section 25(1) arbitrariness 
requirement in First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100 encompasses a test that resembles this requirement. 
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dating pre-1994 is not the solution. Legislation, of this nature, that does not serve a 
core public purpose must be assessed with circumspection.35 Where it is clear that 
the consequences and continued effect of these laws perpetuate an apartheid aim 
they will need to be repealed or amended. 
 
Land-use regulation was one way in which apartheid doctrine could be realised.36 By 
zoning the South African landscape along racial lines, apartheid doctrine could be 
realised. This unequal and racialised distribution of land, including the protection and 
benefits provided to the white minority is the illegitimate object that needs to be dealt 
with. Many of the land-use regulations and planning mechanisms created before 
1994 continue to apply. A distinction needs to be drawn between planning and 
building mechanisms that serve a central public purpose, for example public health 
and safety, and those that serve a social and aesthetic purpose. Land-use 
mechanisms created during this period that have a central public purpose should 
continue to operate with a lower level of scrutiny, whereas the planning laws that do 
not directly serve a public health or safety purpose should be subjected to a higher 
level of scrutiny.37 Mechanisms that arguably serve borderline purposes would need 
to be scrutinised. Where it is clear that the mechanism’s sole purpose was to benefit 
and promote white interests then it should be repealed. It is necessary to determine 
whether the Subdivision Act serves a central or core public purpose or whether it 
predominantly serves an illegitimate apartheid aim.38 
 
                                            
35
  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 169. 
36
  Republic of South Africa National Development and Planning Commission and the 
Department of Land Affairs Green paper development and planning: Development and Planning 
Commission document DPC 4/99 (May 1999) 4-5. 
37
  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 169. 
38
  See 3 2 3 2 below.  
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3 2 3 Subdivision as land-use regulation 
3 2 3 1 Purpose of subdivision 
Regulating subdivision is a typical regulation of immovable property. Subdivision is 
the practice of dividing one parcel of land into two or more parts. State and local 
governments regulate this practice and it is a typical example of a regulatory 
limitation on the right of a property owner.39 In this instance it is a limitation on the 
immovable property owner’s common law right to subdivide his land into two or more 
parts.40 Subdivision regulation ensures that the subdivided land is useable and safe. 
The regulation compliments zoning regulations as the type of use, the zoned use, 
will often dictate the size of land that will need to be allocated for the intended use.41 
Subdivision further determines whether suitable or adequate access is available, 
whether municipal services can be provided and that certain cultural and natural 
features are protected.42 
 
Subdivision regulation predominantly forms part of a land-use planning scheme. In 
this context these regulations are usually relevant at the establishment of a township. 
This would involve changing the size of the land and would require practical 
procedures to be followed. The system in South Africa is varied. Numerous pre-1994 
ordinances still apply in urban areas and would have to be complied with when 
subdividing urban land for the purposes of township establishment.43 There is a 
difference when dealing with rural land. The Subdivision Act is applicable when 
subdividing land that is zoned as agricultural land. When dealing with agricultural 
land the Act applies nationally. The purpose would not be to establish a township by 
                                            
39
  Van Wyk J “Is subdivision of agricultural land part of municipal planning?” (2009) 24 SAPR/PL 
545-562 at 545. 
40
  Mangion v Bernhardt 1977 (3) SA 901 (W) 915C-915D. 
41
  Salsich P W and Tryniecki T J Land use regulation: A legal analysis and practical application 
of land use law (2nd ed 2003) 337-338. 
42
  Vermont land use education and training collaborative Implementation manual Subdivision 
Regulations (2007) 26-1 www.vpic.info/pubs/implementation/pdfs/26-Subdivision.pdf (accessed online 
on 25 August 2010). 
43
  See further van Wyk J Planning law: Principles and procedures of land-use management 
(1999) 182-184.  
83 
 
creating new plots of a land. The Subdivision Act’s purpose is to prevent the 
fragmentation of agricultural land and the creation of uneconomic farming units.44 It 
does, however, have an alternative aim. This aim exists because of the Act’s 
apartheid history. 45  
 
3 2 3 2 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act  
The Subdivision Act regulates a certain category of immovable property, namely 
prime agricultural land. The Subdivision Act regulates the right of agricultural land 
owners to subdivide their land. To prevent the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural 
land is the legitimate purpose of the Act. All subdivisions of rural land are subject to 
the Act and require an application process which is dependent on the Minister 
approving the application.46 The purpose of the Act is to prevent this land being 
subdivided into uneconomic units. This purpose was justified in terms of the national 
interest in preserving agricultural land and to ensure the welfare of white farmers.47 
The Act serves to regulate the practice of subdivision of agricultural land and the 
main policy reason is the preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes. 
This purpose, the conservation and protection of scarce and valuable agricultural 
land from uneconomic division, is in the public interest. The Act’s purpose is realised 
through the requirement of consent to the proposed subdivision from the Minister of 
Agriculture. This has implications for the sale,48 long-term lease,49 registration of 
certain servitudes over,50 and the testamentary disposition51 of the agricultural land 
which is to be subdivided.  
  
                                            
44
  See 2 2 2 and 2 2 3 above.  
45
  See 2 2 1 above. 
46
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4. See 2 3 4 above. 
47
  See 2 2 2 above.  
48
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 3(e). See 2 3 3 5 above.  
49
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 3(d). See 2 3 3 4 above. 
50
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 6A(1). See 2 3 6 above. 
51
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 5(1). See 2 3 5 above. 
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However, apart from this legitimate goal the Act is a pre-1994 statute. It was created 
with another objective, namely the preservation of agricultural land for the white 
minority. The Act has an apartheid aim that is embedded in doctrine that distributed 
land across racial lines. The apartheid system was a network of primary and 
subordinate legislation that was used to award rights to the white minority that 
encroached on the common law and indigenous law. It precluded blacks from 
accessing and holding the rights that were protected under the common law. Blacks 
had resort to forms of land control that were not recognised.52  
 
The legislative framework that created the Act used planning and regulatory laws to 
separate the races.53 The Subdivision Act falls within this legislative framework, it 
was part of the network of legislation that awarded rights to white South Africans. 
The Act’s illegitimate apartheid aim was achieved through the application of its 
provisions and ministerial consent requirement. Through the requirement of 
ministerial consent the Act ensured that prime agricultural land was transferred to 
white owners and occupants. The Act appears to be politically neutral insofar as its 
focus is the protection of agricultural land from uneconomic subdivision, but this 
apparent neutrality cannot just be assumed when the Act had the effect of nationally 
regulating the right of access to agricultural land through the ministerial consent 
requirement.  
 
Since democratisation in 1994 most of the legislation used to achieve apartheid 
goals has been abolished. The repeal of these laws was necessary to achieve a 
society founded on “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights”.54 The preservation of agricultural land is a legitimate 
regulation over agricultural land and it is in the national interest. This interest can no 
                                            
52
  Mostert H, Pope A, Badenhorst P, Freedman W, Pienaar J and Van Wyk J The principles of 
the law of property in South Africa (2010) 13-14. 
53
  See 2 2 1 above. 
54
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, founding provision sec 1(a). 
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longer be defined as a white apartheid interest. Race no longer dictates the South 
African landscape and this would mean that individuals of any race could have 
access to agricultural land. The inclusion of identical provisions in Chapter 8 of the 
Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill 2003 shows that 
subdivision regulations are needed “[t]o provide for the sustainable utilisation of 
natural agricultural resources”.55 The legitimate purpose of the Act, to prevent 
agricultural degradation, in terms of this Bill, has been identified as a national interest 
in our current dispensation. 
 
The purpose of the Subdivision Act, to preserve agricultural land for agricultural 
purposes now serves all South Africans. The Act is a regulation that serves to 
protect the health, safety and general welfare of the citizens.56 The protection of 
agricultural land does not only benefit the individual farmer, but benefits the greater 
society and is necessary to realise certain rights in the Constitution.57 These rights 
will be discussed in chapter five.58 In certain instances where the Act is an obstacle 
to access to agricultural land, is has been excluded from land reform legislation.59 
This is an indication that there are problems with the limitation the Subdivision Act 
poses to land reform initiatives. These problems will be explored in chapter five.60 
The fact that land is no longer allocated along racial lines would mean that the issue 
of access also fails to be a reason for the illegitimate aim to trump the legitimate 
purpose of the Act. The ministerial consent required under the Act can no longer be 
used to ensure white ownership and occupation of agricultural land. The 
                                            
55
  Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill 2003, long title.  
56
  See 3 2 2 above. 
57
  Here the right to a safe and healthy environment and the socio-economic right to food will be 
discussed as rights that can be realized through the effective implementation of the Subdivision Act. 
See 5 3 below. 
58
  See 5 3 below. 
59
 Development and Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, secs 33(2)(j)(vi) and 51(2)(d)(ii); Land Reform 
Labour Tenants Act 3 of 1996, sec 40; Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, sec 8(8); 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act  62 of 1997, sec 4(7); Land Restitution and Reform Laws 
Amendment Act 63 of 1997, sec 42B(1); Provision of Land Assistance Act 26 of 1998, sec 10(3). 
60
  See 5 3 below. 
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administrative powers of the minister still require testing under Constitution, but only 
as they pertain to the legitimate purpose of the Act.61   
 
The Subdivision Act, as it applies in a constitutional dispensation, affects all citizens 
without differentiation. It is imposed for a legitimate public purpose, namely to 
preserve agricultural land for agricultural purposes. The nature of the property, 
agricultural land, and the relationship between the owner, the state and third parties 
to this land would indicate that preserving agricultural land is necessary to ensure 
public health, safety and the welfare of all citizens.62 The regulation over the right to 
subdivide and the ministerial consent requirement are reasonably tailored to the 
purpose of the regulation to preserve agricultural land. Based on these 
considerations the Subdivision Act is a legitimate regulation that can operate free 
from the illegitimate apartheid aim. 
 
3 2 3 3 Comparative policy and legislation  
Regulating subdivision is not unique to South African rural land-use planning. In 
most foreign jurisdictions it forms part of a legislative framework aimed at the 
protection and preservation of agricultural land. The preservation of agricultural land 
in this context is in the public interest. This section is an examination of different 
policies and regulations relating to the preservation of agricultural land in the United 
States of America, specifically the states of Oregon and Hawaii, Western Australia 
and the province of British Columbia, Canada.  
 
In the United States of America the policies for the protection and preservation of 
agricultural land vary according to each state. The states of Oregon and Hawaii and 
their policies in relation to agricultural land preservation show two very different 
                                            
61
  See 5 2 2 below. 
62
  The Act serves to promote certain rights, specifically the right to a safe and healthy 
environment and the socio-economic right to food. These will be discussed in 5 3 below.  
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approaches. In the State of Oregon agriculture is very important to its economy. It is 
the second largest industry in the state and the implementation of sensible land-use 
planning policies is essential to the protection and preservation of agricultural land 
for production purposes.63 The approach followed to protect agricultural land is 
considered to be one of the most effective in the United States of America.64 The 
state has a set of ten goals for land-use policy and planning and the local authorities 
need to address each of these goals in their local planning policies. The state 
reviews these policies to ensure that the goals have been complied with. A uniform 
and consistent approach among all other local authorities is aimed for. The tools 
used to protect agricultural land include the required local plans which incorporate 
the state’s goals, zoning and urban growth boundaries.65 Zoning is the primary 
mechanism used for protecting agricultural land. The zoning laws include rules for 
the use of agricultural land and the conditions under which agricultural land can be 
converted into non-farm uses. Zoning has been used to identify exclusive farm use 
areas and to maintain them for this use. Bernasek submits that non-farm uses on 
prime agricultural land threatens agricultural infrastructure.66 This results in a loss of 
farmland and once this land had been lost it rarely reverts back to agricultural uses. 
The policy in Oregon focuses on strict zoning and co-ordination with the local 
government to preserve and protect agricultural land.  
 
Agricultural land in Hawaii is regulated on a state level. This has been problematic as 
the state has had to balance increasing housing needs with the need to preserve 
agricultural land. The state and county laws reflect the compromise between these 
                                            
63
  Bernasek T “Oregon agriculture and land-use planning” (2006) 36 Environmental Law 165-
175 166-167.  
64
  Jacobs H M “Agricultural land protection policy for Albania: Lessons from Western Europe, 
North America and Japan” (1997) Working paper No 6 Albania Series 1-24 18.  
minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/21939/37_wp6.pdf?sequence (accessed on 25 August 
2010). 
65
  Jacobs H M “Agricultural land protection policy for Albania: Lessons from Western Europe, 
North America and Japan” (1997) Working paper No 6 Albania series 1-24 19.  
minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/21939/37_wp6.pdf?sequence (accessed on 25 August 
2010). 
66
  Bernasek T “Oregon agriculture and land-use planning” (2006) 36 Environmental Law 165-
175 166-168. 
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two goals, but has resulted in agricultural subdivision as a means of striking the 
balance. This has been detrimental to the aim of preserving agricultural land. The 
way in which the state’s land-use law is structured allows for a loophole which 
permits subdivision of prime agricultural land to make up for the housing shortage.67 
Suarez68 identifies the loophole allowing for agricultural subdivision as one of the 
problems in this current system and argues that proactive steps will have to be taken 
to protect agricultural land in the state. The current approach to land-use and the 
extent to which agricultural land is being subdivided is going to affect prime 
agricultural land. This will result in non-agricultural uses on prime agricultural land, 
which is often irreversible. The state has not committed itself to realising agricultural 
preservation as part of its land-use framework, but according to Suarez this will have 
to change for the future of its economy and citizens.69 The ineffective measures that 
are currently in place and the failure to implement sound conservation measures are 
problematic. By eradicating the housing deficit the state has not considered the 
effect on agricultural land. The public need for housing has in this instance resulted 
in injudicious subdivision and this will have a negative impact on the Hawaiian 
economy in the future.  
 
In Western Australia the Town Planning and Development Act of 1928 applies to the 
subdivision of rural land alienated from the Crown. The process of subdividing rural 
land requires an application to be lodged with the Western Australian Planning 
Commission. A set of policy objectives have been drafted to aid the consideration of 
these applications. The policy objectives aim to discourage land uses that are 
unrelated to agriculture and to prevent the ad hoc fragmentation of agricultural 
                                            
67
  Suarez A I “Avoiding the next Hokuli’a: The debate over Hawaii’s agricultural subdivisions” 
(2005) 27 University of Hawaii Law Review 441-467 442.  
68
  Suarez A I “Avoiding the next Hokuli’a: The debate over Hawaii’s agricultural subdivisions” 
(2005) 27 University of Hawaii Law Review 441-467 461-462. 
69
  Suarez A I “Avoiding the next Hokuli’a: The debate over Hawaii’s agricultural subdivisions” 
(2005) 27 University of Hawaii Law Review 441-467 467. 
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land.70 The policy document states that this can be achieved through proper 
planning, by making provision for rural settlement and by minimising the potential for 
land-use conflict and the careful management of natural resources.71 The policy also 
states that there is a general presumption against the subdivision of agricultural land 
unless it has been provided for in the town planning scheme.72 What is clear about 
this policy is that the regulation of subdivision falls within a scheme of agricultural 
preservation. Provision is made for conflicting land-use needs and the need for a 
balance that does not result in the degradation of prime agricultural lands.  
 
British Columbia, a province of Canada, has limited agricultural land. The need for 
regulation that will preserve and protect agricultural land is of more importance 
because of the limited agricultural resources.73 The Agricultural Land Commission 
Act of 2002 regulates the use of agricultural land. The Act makes provision for a 
central enforcing body, the Agricultural Land Commission. The Agricultural Land 
Commission is responsible for administering the Act. In terms of section 6 of the Act 
the purpose of the Commission is to preserve agricultural land,74 to encourage 
farming on agricultural land75 and to encourage local government to accommodate 
farm use within their plans, by-laws and policies.76 In terms of section 21 of the Act a 
                                            
7070
  Western Australia Planning Commission Policy DC 3.4 Subdivision of rural land (2002) 4. 
devplan.kzntl.gov.za/General/Discussion/Aus_subdivision_agri_land.pdf (accessed on 25 August 
2010). 
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  Western Australia Planning Commission Policy DC 3.4 Subdivision of rural land (2002) 4. 
devplan.kzntl.gov.za/General/Discussion/Aus_subdivision_agri_land.pdf (accessed on 25 August 
2010). 
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  Western Australia Planning Commission Policy DC 3.4 Subdivision of rural land (2002) 4. 
devplan.kzntl.gov.za/General/Discussion/Aus_subdivision_agri_land.pdfau (accessed on 25 August 
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  Jacobs H M “Agricultural land protection policy for Albania: Lessons from Western Europe, 
North America and Japan” (1997) Working paper No 6 Albania series 1-24 9.  
minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/21939/37_wp6.pdf?sequence (accessed on 25 August 
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  Agricultural Commission Act 2002, sec 6(a) 
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  Agricultural Commission Act 2002, sec 6(b). 
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  Agricultural Commission Act 2002, sec 6(c).  
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person must not subdivide agricultural land unless it is permitted under the Act,77 and 
where an owner of agricultural land wants to subdivide agricultural land, he must 
apply to the Commission.78 The Act regulates subdivision through the application 
process to the Commission in a regulation that serves to preserve agricultural land. 
The subdivision provision in the Agricultural Commission Act is similar to the 
provisions in the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act.  
 
The comparative sources show that other jurisdictions also use land-use planning 
mechanisms when conserving agricultural land. These mechanisms are considered 
to be valid regulations in the scheme of rural land-use management. These systems 
are different in the type of regulation and the manner of enforcement, but they have 
the preservation of agricultural land as their goal. The prevention of agricultural land 
fragmentation is a concern and it falls within the scope of a valid land-use regulation. 
The ruin of prime agricultural land is topical in many other farming societies and the 
subdivision regulation is one mechanism that can be used effectively to prevent the 
creation of uneconomic farming units. The Hawaiian example shows how important 
the protection and preservation of agricultural land should be. It serves as an 
indication of what could happen where conflicting land needs and uses are not 
addressed appropriately.  
 
3 3  Concluding remarks 
The regulation of the right to subdivide is a legitimate land-use regulation. The fact 
that the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act was promulgated during apartheid does 
not outweigh the regulatory function it serves at present. It falls within a scheme of 
agricultural land preservation and protection that is important in many farming 
societies. The purpose of the Act is to prevent the uneconomic subdivision of prime 
agricultural land. Its illegitimate aim does not affect this purpose. The comparative 
discussion indicated that agricultural land is a finite resource that needs to be 
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  Agricultural Commission Act 2002, sec 21(1).  
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  Agricultural Commission Act 2002, sec 21(2).  
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preserved and protected. The regulation of agricultural land with the purpose of 
preserving it for agricultural purposes is, therefore, a legitimate land-use regulation. 
 
The illegitimate aim of the regulation did not focus on the limitation placed on 
agricultural land owners. This focus was the history and context in which the Act was 
crafted. The effects of the Act as a limitation on the rights of agricultural land owners 
will still need to be tested against constitutional requirements. The following chapter 
will examine and test the constitutional validity of this type of land-use regulation 
within the framework of section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. The Act may be legitimate, but it nevertheless has a restricting effect on 
ownership entitlements, namely the right to subdivide and then sell or lease the 
portion of agricultural land, to register certain servitudes and to bequeath agricultural 
land without consent from the Minister. In the constitutional era it is necessary to 
determine the constitutional compliance of these restrictions. 
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Chapter 4: Section 25 compliance 
4 1 Introduction 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (“the Subdivision Act”)1 forms part of a 
legislative framework that aims to preserve agricultural land. This is done by 
preventing acts that will result in the uneconomic subdivision of the land. It was 
evident from the previous chapters that this framework also served apartheid goals.2 
This was specific to the preservation of agricultural land for the white minority. It was 
shown in the previous chapter that this aim does not necessarily affect the legitimacy 
of the Act’s main purpose. To ensure that this land is preserved the state limits the 
rights of agricultural land owners to divide the land into newly formed plots and to 
have these newly formed plots registered. Comparative sources indicated that this 
type of regulation, a regulation on the right to subdivide and dispose, is not an 
unusual measure when preserving and protecting agricultural land.3 The regulation is 
imposed in the public interest and this justifies the state’s interference and exercise 
of its police power. It remains to consider whether this interference is also 
constitutionally compliant. 
 
In terms of the constitutional mandate in section 39(2) “[w]hen interpreting any 
legislation … every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights”.4 This makes testing the constitutional compliance of the 
Subdivision Act necessary. It needs to be established whether the Act can indeed be 
interpreted so as to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. In this 
chapter the effect of the Act on ownership entitlements will be considered.  
 
                                            
1
 70 of 1970.  
2
 See 2 2 1, 2 2 2 and 3 2 3 2 above. 
3
 See 3 2 3 3 above. 
4
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, sec 39(2). 
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Van Wyk submits that the Subdivision Act has always been a prime example of the 
extent to which the exercise of ownership can be limited by legislation.5 The Act has 
a restricting effect on the right of agricultural land owners to dispose of their property. 
This limitation on the exercise of ownership will have to be tested against section 
25(1) of the Constitution. Section 25(1) states that “[n]o one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property”.6 This chapter will consider whether the Subdivision 
Act, as a law of general application, arbitrarily deprives agricultural land owners of 
the right to dispose of their property. Constitutional case law will be used to test the 
Subdivision Act for constitutional compliance. In this instance the judgment in First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance (“FNB”)7 will be central to the discussion. The court in its 
interpretation of section 25 provides a useful test which will be used to determine 
whether the Subdivision Act is section 25(1) compliant. 
 
In terms of the FNB test this chapter will identify whether what is being taken away 
under the Subdivision Act constitutes property under section 25, whether there has 
been a deprivation of this property and whether this deprivation is consistent with 
section 25(1). It will also be necessary to determine whether the Act’s provisions 
comply with section 25(2) and (3) as the Act makes provision for expropriation in 
certain cases. 
 
                                            
5
 Van Wyk J “Is subdivision of agricultural land part of municipal planning?” (2009) 24 SAPR/PL 
545-562 545. See also Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
law of property (5th ed 2006) 108-109, Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 180, Carey Miller DL 
with Pope A Land title in South Africa (2000) 122. 
6
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
7
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
94 
 
4 2  The FNB methodology 
4 2 1 Is there an interest in the property?  
The property concept under the Constitution is different from the traditional private-
law concept.8 The meaning and scope of “property” has to be determined in every 
individual case.9 Van der Walt states that “the property question has to be argued 
and proven separately and concretely in each individual case”.10 Van der Walt also 
points out that some categories of property might be easier to prove; examples of 
these are land and movable corporeals.11 
 
The provisions contained in the Subdivision Act affect all agricultural land owners 
and all agricultural land in the Republic is subject to the Act. The Act prevents land 
from being subdivided and the newly created plots registered for sale or long-term 
lease, the registration of certain servitudes and the bequeathing of subdivided 
portions before written consent of the Minister of Agriculture is obtained.12 The 
Subdivision Act is a regulation over agricultural land. The object of the right affected 
by the regulation is land, immovable property. The court in FNB decided that 
ownership of land must “lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property”.13 
This is in terms of “both the nature of the right involved as well as the object of the 
right”.14 The object, land, is clearly covered by the section 25 right to property. The 
Subdivision Act specifically limits the rights of an owner.15 The nature of the right 
                                            
8
  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 113. 
9
   Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 113. 
10
  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 117.  
11
  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 115. 
12
  Sec 3(a)-(g), sec 5(1) and sec 6A(1).  
13
  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 para (CC) para 51. 
14
  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 para (CC) para 51. 
15
  The application to subdivide can only be made by the owner of the land. This is in terms of 
sec 4(1)(a)(i).  
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affected by the Act is a real right in land, namely ownership. According to Van der 
Walt this falls within the category of rights that will be the easiest to prove and where 
the existence of the right will suffice to establish an interest in property.16 However, 
the Subdivision Act only limits some of the ownership entitlements that the 
agricultural land owner would have in terms of his property. It will be necessary to 
determine whether the entitlement affected by the regulation is an interest in property 
in terms of section 25. The effect on the owner’s capacity to decide what to do with 
the property, in terms of sale, lease, the registration of servitudes and who will inherit 
the property is extensive. The interest affected is the entitlement of the owner to 
dispose of this property and this entitlement forms part of the ownership right. The 
right of disposal is one of the incidents of ownership. 
 
Honoré lists the standard incidents of ownership and includes the right to capital as 
one of these incidents.17 The right to capital or right of disposal consists of the right 
to alienate, consume or destroy a part or the whole object. Honoré states that the 
right to alienate is the most important within this category because the wilful 
destruction of permanent objects is uncommon.18 He then subdivides the power of 
alienation into the power of disposition and the power to transfer. These powers can 
be exercised by way of sale, mortgage, gift or other mode and can be exercised in 
relation to a part or the whole object.19 In terms of Honoré’s classification the 
limitation on the owner’s capacity to sell, lease, register servitudes and bequeath 
property in terms of the Subdivision Act is a limitation on the standard incident of the 
right to capital. Lewis uses these classifications and applies them to the South 
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  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 118. 
17
  Honoré A M “Ownership” in Oxford essays in jurisprudence (Guest A G ed) (1961) 107-147 
118. See also Lewis C “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 at 
250-253. 
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  Honoré A M “Ownership” in Oxford essays in jurisprudence (Guest A G ed) (1961) 107-147 
118. 
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  Honoré A M “Ownership” in Oxford essays in jurisprudence (Guest A G ed) (1961) 107-147 
118. 
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African context. She accepts that the right to capital, which includes the right to 
alienate, forms part of the standard incidents of ownership in South African law.20 
 
Roux states that the traditional incidents of ownership, which include the rights to 
consume and alienate, should enjoy protection under the property clause.21 He 
supports this statement with the judgment of Geyser v Msunduzi Municipality and 
others.22 Kondile J in the judgment states that “[t]he property that is protected by s 25 
of the Constitution includes property rights such as ownership and the bundle of 
rights that make up ownership”.23 The “bundle of rights that make up ownership” are 
the traditional incidents of ownership. Further support for Roux’s view is derived from 
the FNB decision. Roux explains how the factor in the substantive inquiry for 
arbitrariness, namely the affect on the incidents of ownership,24 either wholly or in 
part, allows for an inference to be drawn that constitutional property includes the 
recognised incidents of ownership.25 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (Kwazulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi 
Municipality as amici curiae) (“Mkontwana”)26 it was accepted that the right to 
alienate property is an interest in property for the purposes of section 25(1). Yacoob 
J states that “[t]he right to alienate property is an important incident of its use and 
                                            
20
  Lewis C “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 at 250-253. 
21
  Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) The constitutional law of South 
Africa (2nd ed 2009 original service 2003) 46.1-46.37 at 46.13.  
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  2003 (5) SA 18 (N).  
23
  Geyser v Msunduzi Municipality and others 2003 (5) SA 18 (N) 37A-37B. 
24
  See 4 2 3 2 below. First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
25
  Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) The constitutional law of South 
Africa (2nd ed 2009 original service 2003) 46.1-46.37 at 46.13. 
26
  2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
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enjoyment”.27 The limitation in that case affected the right to alienate and this was 
accepted to be an interest in property for the purposes of section 25(1).28 Based on 
Honoré’s classification, Roux’s view on the traditional incidents of ownership and the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in Mkontwana the right to capital, which is also the 
right of disposal, constitutes an interest in property for the purposes of section 25. 
 
4 2 2 Is there a deprivation?  
The state is authorised to deprive owners of some of the entitlements of ownership 
as far as it is constitutionally permissible.29 Roux states that deprivations after the 
FNB decision would be given a wide meaning.30 This would mean that a court would 
construe most interferences with the use and enjoyment of property as a 
deprivation.31 Ackermann J in the FNB decision succinctly states that “[i]n a certain 
sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property 
involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in the 
property concerned.”32 Based on the FNB decision and Roux’s argument, regulations 
that affect the use and enjoyment of property would be deprivations.33 In Mkontwana 
the court found that the right to alienate “is an important incident of its use and 
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  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng, and Others (Kwazulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi 
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(5th ed 2006) 96.  
30
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enjoyment”,34 as stated above, and that the impugned provision in the case was a 
“substantive obstacle to alienation and constitute[d] a deprivation of property within 
the meaning of s 25(1)”.35 The Mkontwana judgment requires a “substantial 
interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or 
enjoyment found in an open and democratic society” for it to amount to a 
deprivation.36 The limitation on the right of disposal in the Subdivision Act based on 
the standard set in Mkontwana would still constitute a deprivation of property. The 
limitations in the Subdivision Act are substantial.  
 
The fact that the Subdivision Act regulates and limits the entitlement of disposal by 
limiting the right to subdivide deprives the owner of his use of the property. The Act 
limits the right to alienate through sale and disposition. It also limits the rights to 
register long-term leases and certain servitudes. This clearly constitutes a 
deprivation of property. The Act requires an owner to lodge an application before he 
subdivides and sells, registers a long-term lease or bequeaths the property. It also 
affects the registration of certain servitudes. Section 3 of the Act lists prohibited 
actions and they are all subject to obtaining consent from the Minister.37 The 
regulation over succession and servitudes are contained in sections 5 and 6A of the 
Act respectively. The Act serves as a land-use regulation that preserves agricultural 
land by preventing the creation of uneconomic units, but to achieve this function the 
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  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local 
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entitlement of disposal is limited. This limitation on the disposal of the agricultural 
land constitutes a deprivation. It is a deprivation of the owner’s entitlement to 
subdivide the land and to perform a subsequent act that will give permanence to the 
subdivision. The subsequent act is the registration of the newly created parcels of 
land for transfer, through sale or testamentary disposition, or the creation of the 
limited real rights of long-term lease or servitude. The previous chapter identified the 
legitimate purpose of the regulation and showed that the exercise of the state’s 
police power is in the public interest.38 The limitation on the owner’s capacity to 
dispose will need to be justified. It now needs to be determined whether the 
deprivation of the entitlement of disposal complies with the requirements of section 
25(1).39  
 
4 2 3  Does the deprivation fulfil the requirements of sections 25(1)? 
4 2 3 1 Law of general application  
Law of general application is law that is published or accessible, precise or certain.40 
It refers to general and publicly accessible rules that affect the rights of individuals 
and do not target specific individuals.41 Ackermann J in the FNB decision found that 
the legislation tested in that case, namely the Customs and Excise Act,42 “clearly 
constitute[d] a law of general application” but provided no test for it.43 The nature of 
the Subdivision Act as original legislation that imposes burdens on an abstract class 
would classify as law of general application. It applies generally and does not single 
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 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5th ed 2006) 565-566. 
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 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5th ed 2006) 565-566. 
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 91 of 1964. 
43
 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61.  
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out an individual or group of individuals.44 The Customs and Excise Act was arguably 
accepted as a law of general application for the same reasons. 
 
4 2 3 2 Is the deprivation an arbitrary deprivation?  
The right to not be arbitrarily deprived of property encompasses a negative 
protection of property.45 Ackermann J states that “section 25 embodies a negative 
protection of property and does not expressly guarantee the right to acquire, hold 
and dispose of property.”46 The right does not confer an absolute right against any 
state interference which would constitute a deprivation.47 The section does not offer 
an absolute prohibition on interferences with the owner’s right to dispose of his 
property. The Subdivision Act limits the right of agricultural land owners to dispose of 
their property, but section 25(1) does not prohibit any interference that limits the right 
of disposal. It will be necessary to determine the nature and extent of the deprivation 
posed by the Subdivision Act. The nature and extent of the deprivation will indicate, 
depending on the circumstances, whether “no more than a rational connection 
between [the] means and ends would be required” or whether “the ends would have 
to be more compelling to prevent the deprivation from being arbitrary”.48 
 
Section 25(1) prohibits limitations that are arbitrary. The court in FNB interprets 
arbitrary deprivations as those that fail to give a sufficient reason for the deprivation 
and those that are procedurally unfair. Ackermann J states that “[h]aving regard to 
what has gone before, it is concluded that a deprivation of property is 'arbitrary' as 
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 Currie I and De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (5th ed 2005) 542. 
45
  Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5th ed 2006) 96.  
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  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 48. 
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  Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5th ed 2006) 96.  
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  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 66. 
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meant by s 25 when the 'law' referred to in s 25(1) does not provide sufficient 
reason, it is substantively arbitrary, for the particular deprivation in question or is 
procedurally unfair.”49 Both procedural fairness and substantive arbitrariness will 
have to be considered at this point. 
 
A deprivation that is procedurally unfair will be arbitrary. The court in FNB did not 
provide guidelines for how to test procedural fairness in the arbitrariness inquiry.50 
Where the court in FNB failed to provide an adequate assessment for the test of 
procedural fairness the judgments of Mkontwana and Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another51 (“Reflect-All”) can be used. The court in Mkontwana 
expanded on the concept of procedural fairness. The judgment identified procedural 
fairness as a flexible concept that is dependent on all relevant circumstances.52 In 
applying this standard the court in Reflect-All had to decide on whether a deprivation 
affecting the use, enjoyment and exploitation of private property would be 
procedurally unfair where it failed to consult individual owners on the proposed 
planning of provincial roads.53 The court found that the claim of procedural 
arbitrariness had to fail because it would be impractical, costly and not in the public 
interest to require consultation with each and every property owner. The costs 
involved would be exponentially high and it would be practically impossible.54 The 
flexible-circumstance based standard identified by the court in Mkontwana and the 
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 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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  The designs for the proposed roads had already been accepted.  
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  Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others V MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 46 and 47. 
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circumstances relevant in the Reflect-All decision would indicate that the Subdivision 
Act is not procedurally unfair. The Act limits the right to subdivide subject to the 
application process set out in section 4 of the Subdivision Act. There is not an 
absolute prohibition on subdivision and the application process serves as a 
procedural safeguard. The decision taken by the Minister cannot be challenged in 
terms of procedural fairness under section 25. An attack on the basis of procedural 
fairness applied to the Subdivision Act and as contained in section 25(1) would fail. 
However, it must be kept in mind that the requirements for procedural fairness in 
terms of an administrative action will still need to be complied with. This will be 
considered in the next chapter.55 Roux distinguishes between procedural fairness in 
terms of the FNB requirements and procedural fairness under the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”).56 Under administrative law and PAJA the focus 
is the decision or action taken and not the procedural fairness of the Act. 
 
To determine whether a sufficient reason for the deprivation exists will depend on the 
interplay of the factors and relationships identified by the court in FNB. These factors 
should result in a determination of whether the reason would need to be a mere 
rational relationship between means and ends or whether a more burdensome 
proportionate relationship should exist.57 Considering these factors requires a 
balancing of a “complexity of relationships”.58 These relationships will now be tested 
against the deprivation identified in 4 2 2 above. 
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  See 5 2 2 below.  
56
  Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) The constitutional law of South 
Africa (2nd ed 2009 original service 2003) 46.1-46.37 at 46.25. 
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  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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  The factors and interplay of the relationships provided by the court in paragraph 100 of the 
FNB decision will now be used to determine whether a sufficient reason for the deprivation in the 
Subdivision Act exists. First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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The first consideration is the relationship between the means employed and the end 
sought to be achieved.59 The Act serves to prevent the division of agricultural land 
into uneconomic portions. This function is to preserve prime agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes. When considering whether the means of achieving this 
function is justified, due consideration must be given to the way in which the Act is 
implemented. It limits the rights of agricultural land owners to subdivide their land 
and then dispose of it. The prohibition is not an absolute prohibition as it attaches an 
application process which would ensure that the proposed subdivision does not 
result in the uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural land. 
 
At this stage of the substantive arbitrariness inquiry it is necessary to ask whether 
the aim of the Act could be achieved in another way and whether the regulation of 
subdivision is the only way in which agricultural land can be preserved and 
conserved. From the comparative discussion in chapter three it was clear that this is 
not an unusual means of protecting and preserving prime agricultural land.60 It was 
also clear that by taking these steps other jurisdictions have been able to protect and 
preserve agricultural land as a valuable and scarce resource.61 On this basis it would 
be not be arbitrary to restrict agricultural land owners when exercising their 
entitlement of subdivision. There is a nexus between the application process to 
subdivide and preventing the creation of uneconomic farming units. 
 
The court in FNB considered the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation 
and the person whose property was affected.62 The purpose of the deprivation is to 
preserve agricultural land by preventing it from being divided into uneconomic units. 
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 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
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 See 3 2 3 3 above. 
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  See 3 2 3 3 above. 
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 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services and Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
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The owner of the land is limited by the application process attached to the act of 
subdivision. Here the purpose of the deprivation affects the owner of agricultural land 
directly. This is different from the FNB situation where the property of third parties 
was being attached to be executed for a debt they did not incur.63 This distinction is 
important. The limitation placed on agricultural land owners by the Subdivision Act 
affects them because of the nature of the property and its zoning. Changes to land 
for the purposes of subdivision in urban areas, building or rezoning are often subject 
to some form of application.64 These are usually done on a local government level 
where applications are made to the municipality in the area in which the property is 
situated. The application in terms of the Subdivision Act is different because it is 
done on a national level and sets one standard for all agricultural land over the entire 
country. The aim of the Act, as identified earlier, cannot be overlooked.65 There was 
an illegitimate aim, the preservation of agricultural land for white occupation. The Act 
served to maintain white ownership and occupation of the productive agricultural 
land outside of the homelands. In this context the purpose of the Act was still the 
preservation of agricultural land, but the individuals affected were only white owners. 
The conclusion in the previous chapter indicated that it is possible to separate the 
legitimate purpose of the Act from the illegitimate aim of the Act.66 
 
When considering the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
nature of the property it is clear that this instance deals with the preservation of 
scarce and valuable agricultural land.67 The nature of the property is immovable 
agricultural land. Ackermann J stated that if the property is the ownership of land “a 
more compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law to 
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constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation”.68 The fact that the deprivation affects 
land would move the relationship between the means and ends, in this instance, 
closer to proportionality. 
 
The effect of section 3 of the Act on the incidents of ownership is the next 
consideration.69 The Act limits the right of disposal, one of the core ownership 
entitlements. The rights specifically are the right to subdivide and then to sell, or to 
register a long-term lease, to register certain servitudes or to bequeath the property. 
The deprivation does not embrace all the incidents of ownership. It only affects the 
right of disposal and is done in a manner that does not completely exclude the right 
to dispose of the property. This factor will not require a more compelling reason as 
the deprivation only attaches an application process to the preceding acts of 
disposal. Based on this consideration the scale would move back towards mere 
rationality. 
 
Based on the discussion above and Ackermann J’s “interplay of variable means and 
ends”, this shows that even though the nature of the property is land, a mere rational 
relationship between the means and ends would establish a sufficient reason. When 
the “complexity of relationships” is considered the only conclusion to be drawn is that 
a rational connection will suffice when establishing a sufficient reason. To prevent 
the creation of uneconomic agricultural land units is a compelling purpose and would 
serve as a sufficient reason. There is a rational connection between the regulation of 
subdivision and the prevention of the uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural land. 
The provisions of sections 3, 5 and 6A of the Subdivision Act are not substantively 
arbitrary and the limitation on the right of disposal is not in conflict with the section 
25(1) right to property. The protection and preservation of agricultural land by 
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preventing the creation of uneconomic fragmentation is a constitutionally justifiable 
limitation on an agricultural landowner’s right of disposal. It will not be necessary to 
move to the next leg of the test, namely the section 36 justification, because the 
deprivation is not arbitrary. 
 
4 2 4 Does the Act comply with the requirements for a valid expropriation?  
In terms of the test provided in FNB if the deprivation is not arbitrary or it can be 
justified under section 36, it would have to be tested against the requirements of 
section 25(2) and (3).70 The limitations contained in the provisions of the Subdivision 
Act have been found to be compliant in terms of 25(1). In Nhlabathi v Fick 
(“Nhlabathi”)71 the court applied the test in FNB and moved on to apply the 
requirements in section 25(2). The court had considered whether the impugned 
provision (section 6(2)(dA) the Extension of Security of Tenure Act72) allowed for 
expropriation without compensation.73 The court moved on to the question of 
expropriation because the impugned provision did “not authorise an arbitrary 
deprivation”.74 
 
The Subdivision Act makes provision for expropriations where the land is to be 
subdivided for the purpose of succession, which is dealt with in a separate section of 
the Act.75 Section 5(2) of the Act makes compensation for expropriation possible 
where an application for subdivision has not been made in the case of testate 
succession. It is also possible where intestate succession will result in the 
uneconomic fragmentation of the land. The Subdivision Act states that “the 
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provisions of section 12 of the Expropriation Act of 1965 shall mutatis mutandis apply 
in respect of any such proceeds of land or an undivided share in any land”.76 The 
provision in section 12 of the Expropriation Act deals with the basis on which 
compensation is to be calculated.77 It lists the factors that may be taken into account 
when determining compensation. To determine whether this expropriation provision 
is constitutionally valid will require an analysis of section 25(2) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution. In terms of section 25(2) a valid expropriation must occur by a law of 
general application, for a public purpose or a public interest and subject to the 
payment of compensation.78 
 
It has been established earlier that the Subdivision Act is a law of general 
application.79 It has been submitted that it would be unlikely that the law of general 
application issue would be revisited where it has been dealt with conclusively in the 
deprivation analysis.80 Van der Walt states that the same considerations would apply 
to the law of general application requirement as in section 25(1) as well as section 
36(1), the limitations clause.81 It can be accepted that the section 25(2) requirement 
of property being expropriated in terms of law of general application has been met. 
 
From the previous chapter it was established that a valid public purpose for the Act 
exists.82 This purpose is the preservation of prime agricultural land and it is in the 
public’s interest. The public purpose requirement has been included to prevent the 
arbitrary use of the state’s power of eminent domain.83 Expropriations that serve 
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capricious improper purposes are always invalid. They should primarily serve a 
legitimate public purpose like land reform or the provision of public utilities and 
services.84 The preservation of agricultural land was shown to serve a public purpose 
and this should be sufficient for purposes of section 25(2). 
 
For the purposes of expropriation the Subdivision Act will authorise the realisation of 
the agricultural land to ensure that the land is not divided into uneconomic portions at 
succession. The Act also makes section 12 of the Expropriation Act applicable as far 
as compensation for the expropriation is concerned. The Expropriation Act is still 
valid but needs to be applied and interpreted within the constitutional framework.85 
The Expropriation Act gives precedence to the standard of market value and actual 
financial loss as a measure of compensation. In terms of section 25(3) the 
compensation awarded must be “just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected”.86 Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert submit that the standard where the market value serves as a 
starting point to calculate compensation is preferred by the courts and satisfies the 
constitutional norm.87 The majority of the court in Du Toit v Minister of Transport (“Du 
Toit”)88 confirmed this position.89 The majority found that the standard in section 12 
of the Expropriation Act will satisfy the requirement for just and equitable 
compensation in terms of section 25(3).90 The methodology the court used was to 
accept the market value and then to test the other factors listed in section 25(3) as 
far as they were relevant.91 
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109 
 
 
In terms of section 25(3) market value is listed as one of the factors that would reflect 
a just and equitable balance between private and public interests.92 The minority in 
the Du Toit decision rejected the use of market value as a point of departure when 
determining the amount of compensation for expropriation.93 Langa ACJ found that 
the standard in section 25(3) should “not serve as a second level ‘review’ test but as 
the test for the calculation of compensation”.94 The decision is relevant to the 
Subdivision Act because it makes use of the same provision in the Expropriation Act. 
According to the minority in Du Toit all the factors should be considered when 
determining just and equitable compensation in terms of the Constitution. The 
Subdivision Act makes use of the compensation provision in the Expropriation Act 
and this would mean that compensation would be determined at market value or on 
the actual financial loss, which according the majority in Du Toit would satisfy the 
constitutional norm. However, the history the Subdivision Act should require that the 
other factors in section 25(3) be taken into account and that they should weigh 
equally in relation to each other to determine just and equitable compensation. The 
current use of the agricultural land, the history of how this land was acquired and the 
purpose of the expropriation, which is to prevent uneconomic subdivision at 
succession, should all be relevant when compensation is calculated and should not 
only be considered when affected parties approach the court. These factors should 
not form part of a secondary review of the compensation amount calculated in terms 
of the Expropriation Act, but should be the standard. The majority decision serves as 
precedent and the conclusion, based on their finding, is that the provision in the 
Subdivision Act does fulfil the compensation requirement for a valid expropriation.  
 
                                            
92
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An expropriation in terms of section 5 of the Subdivision Act is done in terms of a law 
of general application; it is in the public interest and it is subject to the payment of 
compensation which satisfies the constitutional norm. Therefore, an expropriation in 
terms of the Subdivision Act will be a constitutional expropriation. 
 
4 3  Conclusion 
The discussion above has considered the constitutionality of the limitations imposed 
on the exercise of ownership by the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act. By testing 
the impugned provisions of the Act against the test created in the FNB decision it 
has become clear that the effect the Act has on the ownership entitlement of 
disposal is constitutionally permissible.  
 
The chapter has identified the entitlement of disposal as an interest in property for 
the purposes of section 25. The limitation on disposal by the operation of the 
Subdivision Act is a deprivation for the purposes of section 25. It was concluded that 
even the “substantial interference” requirement developed by the court in Mkontwana 
would also be met. The limitation on the right of disposal was tested against the 
section 25(1) requirements and complies with these. The Subdivision Act is a law of 
general application. When testing the arbitrariness requirement the focus on 
substantive arbitrariness showed that there was sufficient reason for the deprivation. 
The interplay of the factors provided in FNB applied to the deprivation in the 
Subdivision Act required a mere rational relationship between the means and the 
end sought to be achieved. To prevent the creation of uneconomic farming units for 
the purpose of preserving agricultural land for agricultural purposes is a sufficient 
reason based on the requirement of mere rationality. 
 
The Act makes provision for expropriation in section 5. This was tested against 
section 25(2) and (3) and was also shown to be compliant. An expropriation in terms 
of the Act would be in terms of a law of general application, in the public interest and 
would be subject to the payment of compensation. The calculation of compensation 
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is subject to the standard in the Expropriation Act. This standard was found to satisfy 
the constitutional norm, this was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, but should be 
questioned. In the next chapter the Act will be tested for general constitutional 
compliance. The further constitutional implications of the Act will be considered and 
tested. 
112 
 
Chapter 5: General constitutional compliance 
5 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the constitutionality of the limitations imposed on 
the exercise of ownership entitlements by the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
(“Subdivision Act”).1 Section 25 of the Constitution and the First National Bank of SA 
Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
(“FNB”)2 decision were central to the discussion. This chapter will consider the 
further constitutional implications of the Subdivision Act. Ackermann J in the FNB 
decision stated that section 25(1) “must not be construed in isolation, but in the 
context of the other provisions of section 25 and their historical context, and indeed 
in the context of the Constitution as a whole”.3 This was specific to the interpretation 
of the property clause in that case. Ackermann’s words indicate that a constitutional 
interpretation cannot only focus on one specific right interpreted in isolation, but the 
interplay of various rights in the Bill of Rights. Further constitutional implications can 
be developed from the discussion in chapter four as the court has previously 
indicated that rights within the Bill of Rights do not exist independently.4 The rights 
overlap, but they can also be in tension. This tension exists between rights in the Bill 
of Rights. The previous chapter indicated that the limitation posed by the legitimate 
regulation on agricultural land owners is constitutionally permissible.5 The regulation 
serves a socio-economic public interest, namely the preservation of agricultural land 
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for agricultural purposes.6 However, in order to give effect to this legitimate purpose, 
the rights of agricultural land owners have to be restricted in a constitutionally 
justifiable way. This was proved to be the case,7 but the further constitutional 
implications now need to be considered. 
 
This discussion will focus on the implications and interaction of the rights and 
interests that are affected by the means employed by, and the effect of the 
regulation. The right to equality and just administrative action are directly affected by 
the Act. In terms of the right to equality the continued effect of the legitimate 
regulation in the current dispensation will have to be considered. It was previously 
concluded that the Subdivision Act can be saved from its illegitimate apartheid goal, 
namely the preservation of prime agricultural land for white occupation. The Act now 
applies in a non-racialised context, but where the Act continues to hinder black 
access to agricultural resources and allows whites to hold agricultural land acquired 
under apartheid its further application requires critical examination. This continued 
effect of the Act needs to be tested for possible unfair discrimination. The right to just 
administrative action is an entrenched right in the Bill of Rights.8 The discretion and 
powers conferred on the Minister in terms of the Subdivision Act existed in a different 
context. This was a context where governmental powers were abused and where 
they were specific to the illegitimate aim of the Subdivision Act. The then Minister 
could use his administrative powers to ensure that whites retained ownership and 
occupation of agricultural resources. This power does not exist anymore. However, 
the power of the Minister of Agriculture to consider applications for subdivision in 
terms of the legitimate regulation will need to be tested. Here the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”)9 and section 33 of the Constitution will be central 
to the discussion. 
 
                                            
6
  See chap 3 above. 
7
  See chap 4 above. 
8
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, sec 33. 
9
  3 of 2000. 
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As mentioned, the rights in the Bill of Rights do not exist independently. There is a 
tension between these rights. This tension or conflict between rights requires 
examination. There is a socio-economic public interest in preserving agricultural land 
for agricultural purposes. This discussion will have to consider the right to an 
environment which is not harmful to one’s health and wellbeing and the right of 
access to sufficient food and the tension between these rights and the right of 
access to adequate housing and the land reform goals.10 Finally the chapter will 
consider the issue raised by the minority judgment in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Stalwo (Pty) Ltd (“Wary Holdings”)11 about national, provincial and municipal 
competencies. The dissenting judgment concluded that the regulation of agricultural 
subdivision was an exclusive provincial and municipal competency and that the 
continued national regulation was in conflict with the Constitution. 
 
5 2 The affected rights 
5 2 1 Equality 
Moseneke J in Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden12 stated that: 
“[t]he Constitution commands us to strive for a society built on the democratic 
values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of 
human rights and freedom. Thus the achievement of equality is not only a 
guaranteed and justiciable right in our Bill of Rights but also a core and 
foundational value; a standard which must inform all law and against which all 
law must be tested for constitutional consonance.”13 
 
Moseneke J’s judgment indicates that testing the Subdivision Act for constitutional 
compliance in terms of the equality clause is necessary. The equality standard 
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should inform the law and is the standard against which the Subdivision Act “must be 
tested for constitutional consonance”.14 The Subdivision Act was promulgated in the 
1970s. It formed part of a legislative scheme that protected white agricultural 
interests.15 The Act served to prevent the uneconomic division of all agricultural land 
situated outside of the homelands. Ownership of land was determined by race and to 
maintain this status quo it was submitted that the Act also served as a means to not 
only preserve agricultural land for whites, but also to ensure white occupation of all 
productive agricultural land.16 The requirement of ministerial consent was arguably 
another means to ensure that the agricultural land remained in white occupation. 
This was the illegitimate aim of the Act. If the Act continued to serve this illegitimate 
apartheid aim it would be struck down because it would be unconstitutional. It was 
shown that the legitimate purpose of the Act could be saved from this aim.17 
However, where the legitimate purpose of the Act continues to maintain white 
occupation of prime agricultural land in the Republic it will need to be considered in 
light of section 9 of the Constitution.18 Nothing in the Act is directly discriminatory, but 
the possibility that the legitimate regulation allows for indirect discrimination by 
maintaining the race based unequal distribution of land requires some consideration. 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution is structured to ensure firstly that everyone is equal 
before the law and secondly that no one may be unfairly discriminated against.19 The 
focus of this discussion is to investigate the possibility of discrimination because of 
the continued application of the legitimate regulation of the Subdivision Act.20 
Discrimination may either be direct or indirect. Direct discrimination is present when 
                                            
14
  Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para 22. 
15
  See 2 2 1 and 2 2 2 above. 
16
  See chap 3 above. 
17
  See 3 2 3 2 and 3 3 above. 
18
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
19
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, sec 9(1), sec 9(3) and sec 9(4). 
20
  See chaps 2 and 3 above. 
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there is an explicit link between the differentiation and the prohibited ground.21 The 
provision will specifically differentiate on the basis of a listed or unlisted ground.22 
Indirect discrimination is present where a provision appears to be neutral but it has 
an unequal effect on a particular group that is identified in the prohibited grounds.23 
The Subdivision Act, as a legitimate land use regulation, affects all agricultural land 
owners and does not directly discriminate on any of the listed grounds. However, the 
possibility exists that the Act had and has the effect of determining who may have 
access to agricultural land. In this regard there is a clear link between access to land 
and the land reform initiatives that will be discussed below.24 The history of the Act 
and the link between race and the possession of land in South Africa makes an 
inquiry into the possibility of indirect discrimination on the listed ground of race 
necessary. This is of particular relevance where it is clear that the Act continues to 
perpetuate a system where prime agricultural land is held by whites. 
 
The decision of Pretoria City Council v Walker (“Walker”)25 deals with urban land, but 
shows that the racially based apartheid division of land is still relevant when 
determining indirect discrimination on the basis of race. The court’s finding was that 
by using geographic distinctions that also happened to coincide with the old 
apartheid divisions, the differentiation in the case had an unequal racial impact and 
amounted to indirect discrimination.26 Langa J in his judgment stated that “[t]he effect 
of apartheid laws was that race and geography were inextricably linked and the 
                                            
21
  Albertyn C Summary of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African 
Statute Book for constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 at 9. 
22
  Albertyn C and Goldblatt B “Equality”  in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) The 
constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2009 original service 2003) 35.1–35.85 at 35.47. 
23
  Albertyn C Summary of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African 
Statute Book for constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 9. See also 
Albertyn C and Goldblatt B “Equality” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M (eds) The constitutional 
law of South Africa (2nd ed 2009 original service 2003) 35.1–35.85 at 35.47. 
24
  See 5 3 conflict of rights below. 
25
   1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
26
  Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 32. See also Albertyn C Summary 
of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African Statute Book for 
constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 at 9. 
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application of a geographical standard, although seemingly neutral, may in fact be 
racially discriminatory”.27 This same approach can be followed when testing the 
Subdivision Act. The agricultural land affected by the Act was the productive land 
situated outside of the homelands and was white owned. The extent to which the Act 
regulates the right to dispose of the land, as discussed above,28 could ensure that 
white owners keep control of productive farmlands. The express exclusion of the 
Subdivision Act from certain land reform legislation serves as evidence of this 
point.29 The Act is considered to be an obstacle to the reform process and black 
access to agricultural land. The Act does not directly discriminate on the basis of 
race, but the continued effect of the legitimate regulation may not be overlooked. The 
fact that the Act can maintain the position where prime agricultural land was acquired 
by whites before and during apartheid requires circumspection. It should be noted 
that most of the prime agricultural land in the Republic is still in white occupation.30 
 
When determining section 9 compliance, the application of the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (“PEPUDA”)31 is central. This has to be 
done in terms of the principle derived from South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence (“SANDU”).32 In terms of SANDU one cannot rely directly on the 
constitutional provision to protect a right where legislation was enacted to give effect 
to a right in the Constitution. To rely directly on the right in the Constitution would 
                                            
27
  Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 32. 
28
  See 4 2 2 above. 
29
  Development and Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, secs 33(2)(j)(vi) and 51(2)(d)(ii); Land Reform 
Labour Tenants Act 3 of 1996, sec 40; Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, sec 8(8); 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act  62 of 1997, sec 4(7); Land Restitution and Reform Laws 
Amendment Act 63 of 1997, sec 42B(1); Provision of Land Assistance Act 26 of 1998, sec 10(3). See 
also van Wyk J “Is subdivision of agricultural land part of municipal planning?” (2009) 24 SAPR/PL 
545-562 551. 
30
  Sources have shown that only 6 percent of all agricultural has been returned to individuals 
that lost this land during apartheid. The state’s aim of returning 30 percent by 2014 has also been 
claimed to be impossible. See Zigomo M “Minister says SA won’t meet land-reform target” Mail and 
Guardian online (26 Feb 2010). 
31
  4 of 2000. 
32
  2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52. 
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require the legislation to be challenged for being inconsistent with the Constitution.33 
This is the principle of subsidiarity. O’Regan states that “where legislation has been 
enacted to give effect to a right, a litigant should rely on that legislation in order to 
give effect to the right or alternatively challenge the legislation as being inconsistent 
with the Constitution”.34 The judgment that confirms the application of the subsidiarity 
principle in the case of PEPUDA is MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v 
Pillay (“Pillay”).35 Langa CJ found that a litigant could not and should not circumvent 
the legislation, in that case PEPUDA, enacted to give effect to a constitutional right 
by relying directly on the constitutional right.36 Failing to use the legislation would 
negate the task conferred upon the legislature to respect, protect, promote and fulfill 
the rights in the Bill of Rights. He finds that the principle of subsidiarity applies to 
PEPUDA and that courts must assume that the Act is consistent with the 
Constitution and claims must be decided within its margins.37 
 
PEPUDA was created to give effect to section 9 and “to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination and to promote the achievement of equality”.38 In terms of section 7(c) 
of PEPUDA, “no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground 
of race, including the exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule 
or practice that appears to be legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining 
exclusive control by a particular race group”.39 The argument that the Subdivision Act 
allows for indirect discrimination on the basis of race would have to be made in terms 
of this section. The section in PEPUDA clearly illustrates the problem of the 
continued effect of the legitimate regulation on subdivision. The Subdivision Act in 
effect maintains exclusive white control over prime agricultural land because of the 
                                            
33
  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) paras 51-
52. 
34
  Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 73. 
35
  2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40. 
36
  MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40. 
37
  MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40. 
38
  Preamble of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
39
  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, sec 7(c). 
119 
 
limitation on disposal.40 The fact that race and land are inextricably linked, as stated 
in Walker, means that whites who gained control of prime agricultural land during 
apartheid, and because of this system, continue to have control and possession in 
the current dispensation. The fact that the Subdivision Act is an impediment to the 
free disposal of agricultural land, which would facilitate black access to agricultural 
land, would justify a challenge in terms of section 7(c) of PEPUDA. 
 
In Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v City Manager, City of Cape Town41 where 
PEPUDA was applied, Moosa J stated: 
“[i]n terms of section 9 of the Constitution the onus is on the complainant to 
establish discrimination on the basis of race. Once the complainant has 
discharged such onus, section 9(5) creates a rebuttable presumption of unfair 
discrimination. In such event the burden of proof shifts to the respondents 
who must show, on a balance of probabilities, that the discrimination is fair. In 
terms of section 13 of PEPUDA all complainant is required to do in order to 
discharge its onus, is to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based 
on race”.42 
 
As stated by Moosa J, to discharge an onus for discrimination on the basis of race 
requires the complainant to make a prima facie case. The Walker case may provide 
evidence that supports the argument that the legitimate regulation in the Subdivision 
Act is indirectly discriminatory on the ground of race. The apartheid race-based land 
allocation which allows for most of the prime agricultural land to remain in white 
occupation, coupled with the limiting effect the Act has on black access to this land, 
would serve as a prima facie case for discrimination based on race. The legitimate 
regulation has the effect of maintaining white agricultural land holding and restricting 
                                            
40
  See chap 4 above. 
41
  2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC). 
42
  Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v City Manager, City of Cape Town 2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC) 
para 12. 
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black access. The legislature has taken steps to address the Act’s effect on black 
access to agricultural holdings. This only applies to certain instances.43 The 
legislation excludes the Act’s operation so that certain land reform goals can be 
achieved. However, this legislation only applies to these instances and it needs to be 
asked whether these exclusions are sufficient. 
 
Race is a listed ground in section 9(5) of the Constitution.44 The section creates the 
presumption that the discrimination on a listed ground is unfair. What now needs to 
be determined is whether the presumption of unfair discrimination can be rebutted. 
Albertyn provides guidelines for determining this question.45 These guidelines have 
been adapted from the unfairness test developed in Harksen v Lane NO and Others 
(“Harksen”).46 They are stated as factors that can be practically applied to this 
situation. 
 
The first factor is the history, social and economic context of the Act and its practical 
operation.47 The Subdivision Act was promulgated in the 1970s to regulate the 
common law right of agricultural land owners to subdivide their land. The legitimate 
purpose of the regulation is to prevent the uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural 
land. It was submitted earlier that the Act also had an illegitimate aim, namely the 
                                            
43
  Development and Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, secs 33(2)(j)(vi) and 51(2)(d)(ii); Land Reform 
Labour Tenants Act 3 of 1996, sec 40; Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, sec 8(8); 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act  62 of 1997, sec 4(7); Land Restitution and Reform Laws 
Amendment Act 63 of 1997, sec 42B(1); Provision of Land Assistance Act 26 of 1998, sec 10(3). 
44
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 9(5) states that “[d]iscrimination on one or 
more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is 
fair”. 
45
  Albertyn C Summary of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African 
Statute Book for constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 at 34-35. The 
following section is paraphrased from Albertyn’s guidelines and applied to the Subdivision Act. 
46
  1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) paras 64-66. 
47
  Albertyn C Summary of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African 
Statute Book for constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 35. See also 
Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 64. 
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preservation of agricultural land for whites.48 The history of the Act showed that it 
was created in an apartheid context where agricultural policy was racialised.49 The 
focus was preserving agricultural land for the white minority. It was argued earlier 
that the application process was a means of ensuring white occupation of agricultural 
land.50 The practical operation of the legitimate purpose of the Act, saved from this 
illegitimate aim, still has the effect of preventing black access to prime agricultural 
land. This purpose also allows white farmers to continue occupying prime agricultural 
land because of the effect the Act has on disposal of the subject land. 
 
The second factor considers the position of the affected group or person in society 
and whether this group has suffered from a pattern of disadvantage in the past.51 
The group that will be affected are black South Africans. The country’s history of 
gross inequality has affected this group the most. Land reform initiatives have been 
put in place to address this situation.52 The apartheid land division left eighty seven 
percent of land in the Republic for white occupation and thirteen percent remained 
for black occupation. To date only six percent of agricultural land has been “returned” 
to blacks who were dispossessed of their land during apartheid.53 The Minister of 
Rural Development and Land Reform has stated that the target of acquiring thirty 
percent of agricultural land for handing to the black majority by 2014 is practically 
impossible.54 A vast majority of this group still suffers landlessness and it is clear that 
the process of addressing this situation is complex and requires time. 
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  See chaps 2 and 3 above. 
49
  See 2 2 1 above. 
50
  See 3 2 3 2 above. 
51
  Albertyn C Summary of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African 
Statute Book for constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 at 35. See 
also Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 65. 
52
  See 5 3 below. 
53
  Zigomo M “Minister says SA won’t meet land-reform target” Mail and Guardian online (26 Feb 
2010). 
54
  Duvenhage H “Minister sit swart grondbesit op ys” Rapport (28 Feb 2010) (no page numbers 
on server). 
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The third factor considers the nature of the provision and its purpose. Albertyn 
submits that if the purpose is to achieve an important societal goal and if the 
discrimination is not aimed at impairing the dignity of the group it might not be 
unfair.55 The preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes is in the 
national interest. This is the legitimate purpose of the Act. The illegitimate goal, 
which preserved agricultural land for whites does not have continued application in 
the current dispensation. The legitimate purpose of the Act was not to impair the 
dignity of black South Africans. This legitimate purpose was shown to be in the 
public interest and comparative sources indicated that subdivision regulations are 
necessary when preserving prime agricultural land.56 
 
The fourth factor examines the rights and interests that are impaired. The 
Subdivision Act, in this context, can only affect the rights of blacks to access prime 
agricultural land in the Republic. It was stated earlier that the Subdivision Act has 
been excluded from certain land reform legislation.57 Where the effect of the 
Subdivision Act allows white farmers to hold on to agricultural land acquired during 
apartheid, and prevents black access to this land in the current dispensation it has 
been expressly excluded. The legislature has identified certain instances where the 
operation of Subdivision Act prevents black access to agricultural land. It has 
neutralised the Act’s effect by excluding it. In other instances where the Act remains 
to be an obstacle to land reform, a similar approach can be adopted. The legislature 
would identify the instance and could include similar provisions as in the legislation 
identified. 
 
Based on these factors it is safe to assume that the presumption of unfair 
discrimination can be rebutted. The Subdivision Act limits the right of black South 
Africans to access agricultural land and on this basis it appears to be indirectly 
                                            
55
  Albertyn C Summary of equality jurisprudence and guidelines for assessing the South African 
Statute Book for constitutionality against section 9 of the 1996 Constitution (2006) 1-39 at 35. 
56
  See 3 2 3 2 and 3 2 3 3 above. 
57
  See fn 43 above. 
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discriminatory. The presumption in section 9(5) would mean that this discrimination 
is unfair, but the factors Albertyn derived from the Harksen decision would indicate 
that the presumption of unfair discrimination is rebutted. The legitimate operation of 
the Act serves an important purpose, the preservation of agricultural land. Where the 
Subdivision Act limits the right of blacks to access agricultural land it has been 
expressly excluded. The legitimate purpose of the Subdivision Act tested against the 
standard of equality shows that the Act may allow for indirect discrimination, but that 
this discrimination is not unfair. 
 
5 2 2 Just administrative action 
The right to just administrative action is entrenched in the Bill of Rights.58 The 
discretion and powers conferred on the Minister in terms of the Subdivision Act 
existed in a different context, and in this context governmental powers were abused. 
The powers and discretions given to government officials allowed for this abuse. 
Currie and De Waal state that the apartheid regime was characterised by an 
“executive autocracy”.59 It was submitted earlier that the illegitimate aim of the Act, to 
preserve prime agricultural land for whites could be ensured by the requirement that 
the Minister consent to the subdivision and disposal of agricultural land.60 The history 
of administrative conduct that allowed for the perpetuation of apartheid rules could 
be seen in the powers awarded to the then Minister of Agriculture. The Act’s 
legitimate purpose, to preserve agricultural land for agricultural purposes, is still 
subject to ministerial oversight, but these powers are now subject to constitutional 
scrutiny. The power conferred on the Minister, in terms of the Act, to decide on 
agricultural subdivision needs to be tested in terms of administrative law. Firstly, it 
needs to be determined whether the Minister’s conduct is administrative action. If it is 
administrative action it can be subject to judicial review and this would already be a 
marked difference to the way in which the Minister’s powers were exercised prior to 
                                            
58
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, sec 33. 
59
  Currie I and De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (5th ed 2005) 642. 
60
  See chap 3 above. 
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1994. This would neutralise the powers that were necessary for achieving both the 
illegitimate aim and the legitimate purpose. Secondly, the grounds for review 
applicable to the Subdivision Act would have to be considered as well as the rights 
the individual is entitled to in terms of the right to just administrative action. 
 
The Constitution now entrenches the right to just administrative action.61 This serves 
to protect the institution of judicial review of administrative power from legislative 
interference.62 This also protects the individual and provides remedies for the effect 
of unlawful administrative action. The function of administrative law is to describe the 
powers of the administration, to determine the way these powers can be exercised 
and to provide for remedies in the case of maladministration.63 Central to the right of 
just administrative action is the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”).64 
PAJA was enacted to give effect to the right in section 33 of the Constitution.65 The 
right in section 33 may not be relied on directly because of the SANDU principle, the 
principle of subsidiarity.66 PAJA was enacted to give effect to the right in section 33. 
In terms of the principle a litigant must rely on the legislation enacted to give effect to 
the right, or he must challenge the constitutionality of the legislation to rely directly on 
the right.67 The standard set in PAJA will firstly be used to determine whether the 
Minister considering an application for subdivision in terms of the Subdivision Act is 
administrative action. PAJA will then have to be used to determine the validity of 
administrative action taken in terms of the Subdivision Act. 
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  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, sec 33. 
62
  Currie I and De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (5th ed 2005) 642. See also Hoexter C 
Administrative law in South Africa (2007) 62. 
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  Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2007) 8. 
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  3 of 2000. 
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  Constitution of the Republic of Africa.  
66
  See discussion in 5 2 1 and fn 32 above. 
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  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-
52; MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40; Mazibuko 
and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 73. 
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Administrative action is defined in PAJA as “any decision taken, or any failure to take 
a decision, by an organ of state, when (i) exercising a power in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation … which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect.”68 The Subdivision 
Act requires all agricultural land owners to apply to the Minister of Agriculture to gain 
approval for the proposed subdivision. Section 4 of the Subdivision Act sets out the 
application procedure owners must follow to obtain the Minister’s consent.69 The 
Minister is granted the discretion to refuse the application and may attach conditions 
to the proposed subdivision application.70 The application process involves a 
decision by the Minister, a member of the executive and an organ of state, exercising 
a public power authorised by legislation. In terms of President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 
(“SARFU”),71 “one of the constitutional responsibilities of the President and Cabinet 
Members in the national sphere … is to ensure the implementation of legislation. 
This responsibility is an administrative one, which is justiciable, and will ordinarily 
constitute 'administrative action' within the meaning of section 33”.72 The Minister of 
Agriculture does ensure the implementation of the Subdivision Act. The decision 
taken by the Minister on an application to subdivide agricultural land is administrative 
action. In terms of the Constitution, administrative action will be just if it is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.73 PAJA gives effect to these rights and in terms of 
section 6 of the Act certain grounds could subject the administrative action to judicial 
review. These grounds will be considered in relation to the application of the 
Subdivision Act. 
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  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, sec 1. 
69
  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
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  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4. 
71
  2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
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  President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union 
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For administrative action to be lawful it must be authorised by law and every 
requirement set out in the empowering provision needs to be complied with. Under 
section 6 of PAJA administrative action is reviewable if the administrator who took it 
was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision or the action was taken for 
a reason not authorised by the empowering provision.74 Administrators do not have 
inherent powers and can only derive powers from a lawful empowering source, 
usually legislation.75 In this case the Subdivision Act is the empowering source. The 
Minister may, in his discretion, refuse the application to subdivide. The Minister may 
attach conditions that pertain to the proposed use of the agricultural land.76 The 
Minister may also, in instances where the land is no longer going to be used as 
agricultural land, consult with the Premier of the province to determine if the 
application should be granted.77 The section further empowers the Minister to 
enforce,78 vary or withdraw any condition.79 Where a condition has been registered 
and the Minister varies or withdraws it the Minister may direct to have the condition 
on the title deed of the land varied or cancelled.80 The Minister may also delegate his 
powers in terms of section 8 of the Act and may make regulations where it is 
necessary for achieving the objects of the Act in terms of section 10.81 This is the 
extent of the powers the Minister may exercise when considering an application in 
terms of the Subdivision Act. Any conduct that goes beyond this will be unlawful 
administrative action.82 In Farjas (Pty) Ltd and Another v Regional Land Claims 
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  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, sec 6(2)(a)(i) and sec 6(2)(e)(i). 
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  Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2007) 227. 
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  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4(2)(a). 
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  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4(2)(b). 
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  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, sec 4(3). 
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Commissioner, Kwazulu-Natal83 Dodson J stated that there should be “a duty on 
reviewing Courts to be all the more astute to ensure that public officials confine 
themselves strictly to the law which confers powers on them”.84 Any action taken by 
the Minister will have to be within the parameters of the Subdivision Act for it to be 
lawful administrative action. The Subdivision Act clearly defines these parameters in 
section 4. 
 
Section 6(2)(c) of PAJA states that administrative action is reviewable by a court if it 
was procedurally unfair.85 Section of 3(1) of PAJA requires that any administrative 
action that materially and adversely affects the rights of any person be procedurally 
fair.86 The application for subdivision in terms of the Subdivision Act affects the right 
of an agricultural land owner to subdivide his land. This was clear from the previous 
chapter.87 The right of an agricultural land owner to exercise his entitlement of 
disposal is affected by the Subdivision Act and the requirement of ministerial 
consent. The Minister deciding on an application for subdivision materially affects the 
right of an agricultural land owner to dispose of this property. PAJA states that a fair 
administrative procedure will depend on the circumstances in each case.88 This 
standard is flexible and will vary with different administrative actions. To give effect to 
the right to procedurally fair administrative action the administrator must give 
adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the administrative action;89 a 
reasonable opportunity to make representations;90 a clear statement of the 
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administrative action;91 adequate notice of any right to review or internal appeal 
when it is applicable92 and notice of the right to reasons.93 To give effect to the right 
to procedurally fair administrative action these requirements must be present in the 
Minister’s decision. These requirements can be departed from and PAJA identifies 
the circumstances in section 3(4).94 
 
Section 6(2)(h) makes administrative action reviewable where “the exercise of the 
power or the performance of the function authorised by the empowering provision … 
is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or 
performed function”.95 The Constitution requires that administrative action be 
reasonable.96 This requirement means that the Minister when acting in terms of the 
Subdivision Act must act reasonably.97 Hoexter uses standard dictionary definitions 
of “reasonable” to show that an action need only be “within the limits of reason”.98 
This is the standard that should be demanded of discretionary administrative action. 
It will not always ensure the perfect or correct decision, but would serve as a 
sufficient safeguard against capricious decision making.99 O’Regan J in Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others (“Bato Star”)100 
found that section 6(2)(h) needs to, firstly, be construed consistently with the 
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Constitution, which requires that administrative action be “reasonable”, and 
secondly, requires a simple test which makes an administrative decision reviewable 
where the reasonable decision maker would not have reached that conclusion.101 
She also provides a useful list of factors that would indicate whether an 
administrative decision would be reasonable.102 The right to reasonable 
administrative action when applied to the Minister’s decision in terms of the 
Subdivision Act would only require that the Minister act reasonably. The factors 
provided by O’Regan in the Bato Star decision would serve as a useful tool to 
determine this reasonableness. 
 
The Minister’s decision on an application for subdivision would be administrative 
action under PAJA and the Constitution. This is important because these powers 
were used to serve the illegitimate aim of the Subdivision Act, namely the 
preservation of agricultural land for whites. The fact that these powers are now 
subject to judicial review under PAJA ensures that the Minister’s powers can only be 
used to serve the legitimate function of the Subdivision Act. Certain of the review 
grounds in PAJA were considered and these identified where and in which 
circumstances the Minister’s conduct could be judicially scrutinised. An 
administrative action taken under the Subdivision Act may still be found to be 
unreasonable and invalid, but it cannot be used for an illegitimate aim as it was 
under the apartheid government. The action, if unlawful or unreasonable or 
procedurally unfair, will be reviewable in terms of section 6 of PAJA and this will 
satisfy the section 33 requirement of just administrative action. 
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5 3  Conflicting rights 
The preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes was argued to be in 
the national interest.103 Preserving this land for the purpose of agriculture is not free 
from contention. In giving effect to this purpose certain rights in the Bill of Rights are 
promoted whilst others are limited. There is a conflict between these rights, and 
through the proper implementation of the Subdivision Act certain rights are 
promoted, namely the right to an environment which is not harmful to one’s health 
and wellbeing and the socio-economic right of access to sufficient food, and other 
rights are restricted, namely the land reform goal of access to land and the right of 
access to adequate housing. An appropriate constitutional relationship needs to be 
established between these conflicting rights and interests.104 In Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers105 the court decided that when resolving a conflict 
between rights in the Bill of Rights its function is not to establish a hierarchy, 
preferring certain rights over others, but to seek an appropriate balance between the 
rights.106 It is necessary to balance and reconcile the opposed rights in a manner 
that is just, taking into account all the interests involved and factors that are relevant 
in each case. It will be necessary to identify the interests involved and the factors 
that are relevant in this instance. 
 
Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd107 found that conflicting rights 
needs to be balanced and that the Constitution provides no solution as to which 
right(s) should prevail.108 In terms of Cameron J’s judgment, it is necessary to 
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determine “the meaning and content of the right sought to be asserted” and “then 
assess whether … rules which protect the one right, curtail or infringe upon the 
enjoyment of the other”.109 It is essential to give content to the rights in conflict, in 
this case the rights that are protected by preserving agricultural land and the rights 
infringed upon by preserving agricultural land. It will then be necessary to ask 
whether an appropriate balance can be struck between these rights.110 The right to 
an environment which is not harmful to one’s health and wellbeing, the right to 
access sufficient food, the land reform goals and right of access to adequate housing 
will be discussed below. 
 
The right to an environment that is not harmful to one’s health and wellbeing is 
contained in section 24 of the Constitution. It has been submitted that the prevention 
of uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land forms part of agricultural conservation. 
Agricultural resources should arguably also be conserved through environmental 
measures.111 Section 24(b)(i) to (iii) of the Constitution places a positive duty on the 
state to protect the environment. The state, through legislative and administrative 
measures,112 needs to ensure that pollution and ecological degradation are 
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prevented,113 that conservation is promoted114 and that ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources are secured while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.115 The state’s failure to secure these “goals” 
would amount to a violation of the individual’s right.116 Earlier in this thesis, it was 
argued that the Subdivision Act forms part of a framework intended to preserve and 
protect agricultural land.117 The Act serves to prevent agricultural degradation, to 
promote the conservation of agricultural land and to secure the development and use 
of agricultural land which is economically and socially justifiable. Prime agricultural 
land in the Republic should be viewed not only as a commodity but as an 
environmental resource that should be protected under the Constitution. The state’s 
role in its preservation is pivotal. De Waal and Currie submit that section 24(b) of the 
Constitution constitutionalises the notion of inter-generational equity.118 The duty 
created by the right in this context means that future generations should also benefit 
from this valuable and scarce resource. The Subdivision Act forms part of the 
scheme which enables the state to realise the duty created in section 24. 
 
The right to food is also guaranteed in the Constitution. The central provision is 
section 27(1)(b) that reads: “[e]veryone has the right to have access to … (b) 
sufficient food ”.119 This section is the focus of this discussion.120 There is a duty on 
the state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil”121 this right. The state must take 
reasonable steps, within its available resources, to realise the right. The duty to 
protect the right to food requires that the state protects the existing right; enhances 
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the enjoyment of the right where it already exists and to give access to the right 
where there was no access.122 To give effect to this duty the state will have to 
regulate through legislation or executive or administrative decisions.123 Brand 
proposes three ways of regulating this right.124 He submits that price regulation,125 
standard setting in respect of the safety and nutritional value126 and giving effect to 
the duty by protecting informal tenure rights127 are the measures that need to be 
taken.128 I am submitting that another measure already exists. By preserving 
productive agricultural land, and ensuring the proper management and use of the 
resource the right can be further realised. 
 
The Department of Agriculture has already taken steps to realise the right to food. 
The Food Security and Rural Development Programme provides agricultural starter 
packs and food production information packs to food insecure households.129 The 
Land Redistribution and Development Programme provides financial assistance to 
small farmers. These programmes focus on the individual or community that is food 
insecure. Vink and Kirsten state that “agriculture forms a small but important buffer 
against poverty for some households”, but that this is not the most important 
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determinate of food security.130 A shift from subsistence to commercialisation will 
need to occur. The Subdivision Act’s purpose to prevent the creation of uneconomic 
units is central to realising this shift. By preserving agricultural land by preventing the 
creation of uneconomic farming units, as aimed with the Subdivision Act, the state 
can further realise the aim of eradicating food insecurity. 
 
Ackerman’s judgment in First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and Another; First National 
Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance131 stated that “[s]ubsections 
(4) to (9) all, in one way or another, underline the need for and aim at redressing one 
of the most enduring legacies of racial discrimination in the past, namely the grossly 
unequal distribution of land in South Africa.”132 The three land reform programmes 
authorised in sections 25(4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) are land redistribution, land 
restitution and tenure reform. In each of the programmes legislation has been 
passed to address the legacy of unequal distribution of land. The Subdivision Act 
has been excluded from land reform legislation as mentioned above.133 The Act 
prevents the effective implementation of the land reform goals and for this reason 
has been excluded.134 There is a conflict between the goal of preserving agricultural 
land and the realisation of the land reform goals. 
 
The comparative example in the American state of Hawaii indicated a conflict 
between increasing housing needs and the need to preserve prime agricultural 
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land.135 The Hawaiian example showed that the state was subdividing prime 
agricultural land for the purpose of housing development. Instead of striking a 
balance between the goal of realising the right to housing and the goal of preserving 
prime agricultural land for agricultural purposes the state created a hierarchy 
preferring the right to housing. The negative economic impact of this preference for 
the right to housing was identified.136 In terms of section 26(1) “[e]veryone has the 
right to have access to adequate housing” and in terms of section 26(2) “[t]he state 
must take reasonable legislative or other measures within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the right”. The right has been interpreted in 
case law,137 but the focus in this discussion will be on the available resources 
needed to realise the right. The country has an acute housing shortage. However, it 
is important that this should not allow for the development of prime agricultural land 
for housing purposes. The Act “protects agriculture as an important economic activity 
in the national interest by preventing the fragmentation of agricultural land into small, 
non-viable uneconomic units and by preventing uncontrolled urban sprawl which 
would serve to decrease the extent of available agricultural land”.138 To prevent the 
decrease of available agricultural land threatened by “uncontrolled urban sprawl” is 
an important function of the Subdivision Act. 
 
The court in Government of The Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom 
and Others139 found that there is an obligation on the state to take positive action to 
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eradicate homelessness, intolerable housing and extreme conditions of poverty.140 
Yacoob J stated that the realisation of the right “requires available land, appropriate 
services such as the provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing 
of all of these, including the building of the house itself”.141 For the right of access to 
adequate housing to be realised all of these conditions need to be met.142 The 
relevance of the judgment is the obvious need for available land to realise the right. 
As stated the Subdivision Act also prevents uncontrolled urban sprawl which would 
decrease the extent of available agricultural land,143 and for this reason the problem 
illustrated in the Hawaiian position bears relevance. The conflict between two very 
important goals, the eradication of homelessness and the preservation of agricultural 
land, requires balancing. The Act prevents the development of prime agricultural 
land for the purpose of providing housing. The Act balances these two conflicting 
goals by preventing the subdivision of agricultural land, in this instance, for the 
purpose of housing development. 
 
The decision in PE Municipality indicates that an appropriate balance needs to be 
established between conflicting rights. The preservation of agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes creates a conflict between the rights to a safe and healthy 
environment and food on the one hand and the right to housing and the land reform 
goal of access on the other. To find an appropriate balance between these 
conflicting rights would, based on the discussion above, be found in the application 
of the Subdivision Act. The Act’s ministerial consent requirement and the exclusion 
of the Act’s operation in certain legislation can ensure that certain rights and 
interests are optimised. Government policy decisions will dictate which rights and 
interests will be optimised. The earlier court decisions indicate that courts will 
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intervene where there is a conflict between rights and interests, but that sufficient 
deference will be applied when it comes to policy decisions of government. The 
Subdivision Act preserves agricultural land for agricultural purposes, which is 
important for realising the right to an environment which is not harmful to one’s 
health and wellbeing and the right to sufficient food. Where the Act prevents the 
realisation of land reform goals it has been specifically excluded. The Act balances 
the conflict with the right to housing and the preservation of agricultural land by 
preventing uncontrolled urban sprawl. This prevents the situation experienced in 
Hawaii, where agricultural land is being subdivided for the purposes of eradicating 
the housing shortage. Where it would become necessary to develop agricultural land 
for purposes of housing development a similar approach adopted in the land reform 
policies could be followed. It would be necessary to identify specific situations where 
the development of agricultural land for the purpose of realising the right to housing 
is warranted and necessary. The conflict between the right of an agricultural land 
owner to subdivide and dispose of his property and socio-economic purpose of 
preserving agricultural land for agricultural purposes has not been discussed here. 
The discussion in the previous chapter on the limitation placed on the right of 
agricultural land owners to subdivide their land was identified and found to be 
constitutional in terms of section 25(1).144 The Act in this context also serves to 
balance the right of agricultural land owners to subdivide and dispose their land and 
the socio-economic purpose of preserving agricultural land for agricultural purposes. 
 
5 4  National, provincial or municipal competency? 
Subdivision regulations as a planning mechanism traditionally form part of planning, 
as was pointed out previously,145 but in the context of the Subdivision Act the 
regulation is a means of agricultural preservation. The object of the Subdivision Act 
is the preservation of agricultural land by preventing the uneconomic subdivision of 
agricultural land. It has also been submitted that prime agricultural land should be 
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protected under the section 24 right to an environment which is not harmful to one’s 
health and wellbeing.146 Schedule 4 part A of the Constitution lists agriculture, 
environment, and soil conservation as a concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence.147 This means that the national and provincial legislature can and must 
regulate these areas. Both environmental and agricultural issues fall within the 
concurrent national and provincial competences. 
 
The dissenting judgment of Yacoob J in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 
(“Wary Holdings”)148 identifies the regulation of subdivision under the Subdivision Act 
as a part of planning which is exclusive to provincial and municipal competencies.149 
He contends that the Subdivision Act “is concerned with zoning, subdivision and sale 
of land [which] is not concerned with agriculture but with the functional area of 
planning”.150 He finds that the authority the Minister has to decide on agricultural 
subdivision is in conflict with the Constitution in two respects. Firstly, the power 
negates municipal planning and secondly, it trespasses into the sphere of exclusive 
provincial competence of provincial planning.151 Van Wyk agrees with Yacoob J’s 
finding that subdivision regulation forms part of the functional area of planning.152 
She states that his view is not new and was expounded by the 1997 White Paper on 
South African Land Policy. The policy stated that the principal role of the Act was to 
operate as zoning regulation.153 Van Wyk’s article on the issue examines the new 
local government dispensation, land use planning and the role of municipal and 
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provincial government in the constitutional framework.154 The main substance of the 
Act is to regulate planning and land use. This supports the finding in Yacoob J’s 
minority judgment.155 The Act negates the municipal planning function. For this 
reason Yacoob J found that the regulation of the subdivision of agricultural land 
should not continue to be regulated on a national level. 
 
The court in Kotzé v Minister van Landbou156 found that Subdivision Act concerns 
agricultural policy that relates to the control of agricultural land. If local government 
was to regulate this it would result in varying policies and regulations. This would 
make it impossible for the Minister to regulate agricultural policy and this would have 
a negative impact on issues of agricultural reform and access.157 Subdivision in a 
scheme of agricultural preservation does not serve the same purpose as with urban 
planning and development.158 It is clear from the Draft Sustainable Utilisation of 
Agricultural Resources Bill of 2003 that national government intends to control 
agricultural subdivision.159 The policy discussion in chapter two also provided 
justifications for the use of subdivision as a means of agricultural preservation,160 this 
included that the size of the land was the one factor that could be regulated in an 
industry that has many variables that could determine success or failure in a farming 
enterprise. The Act uses a regulation that is usually associated with planning, but its 
focus remains agricultural preservation. This would fall within the areas of agriculture 
and the environment and here national government has a concurrent competency. 
The majority in Wary Holdings decided that the Subdivision Act continues to apply to 
                                            
154
  Van Wyk J “Is subdivision of agricultural land part of municipal planning?” (2009) 24 SAPR/PL 
545-562 555-560. 
155
  Van Wyk J “Is subdivision of agricultural land part of municipal planning?” (2009) 24 SAPR/PL 
545-562 at 560. 
156
  2003 (1) SA 445 (T). 
157
  Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 (1) SA 445 (T) 456A-I. See also 2 3 1 above. 
158
  See 3 2 3 1 above. 
159
  See 2 4 above. 
160
  See 2 2 2 above. 
140 
 
the subdivision of agricultural land.161 The practice of agricultural subdivision 
continues to be regulated on a national level, and this requires an application to be 
made to the national Minister of Agriculture for subdivision. 
 
5 5  Conclusion 
The further constitutional implications of the Subdivision Act were tested in this 
chapter. The Act as a remnant of apartheid land-use regulation could not be 
assumed to have a neutral effect in our current dispensation. It was accepted that 
the illegitimate aim, namely the preservation of agricultural land for white use and 
occupation, could be separated from the legitimate purpose of the Act. However, the 
Act remains the same text that was used to serve the apartheid aim and it was 
therefore necessary to test the legitimate regulation where it could have 
unconstitutional implications. The rights directly affected by the Act’s continued 
application were considered. Here the right to equality and the right to just 
administrative action were discussed.  
 
In terms of the equality standard, where the legitimate purpose of the Act had the 
effect of maintaining white ownership, of agricultural land acquired during apartheid, 
needed to be tested for indirect unfair discrimination. The fact that geography and 
race were inextricably linked, and that most of the prime agricultural in the Republic 
is still white owned with the restriction on the free disposal of agricultural by the 
Subdivision Act meant that a prima facie case for indirect discrimination could be 
made. The judgment in Walker served as evidence for this finding. Because race is a 
listed ground in section 9 there was a rebuttable presumption that the discrimination 
was unfair. It was necessary to apply the unfairness test in Harksen in this regard. 
The test indicated that although the Act had the indirect effect of maintaining white 
ownership of, and preventing black access to agricultural land, the presumption of 
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unfairness could be rebutted because the Act is excluded by land reform legislation 
intended to overcome the imbalance in land redistribution.  
 
The administrative nature of the powers the Minister of Agriculture has in terms of 
the Subdivision Act had to be proved to be constitutionally compliant. It was first 
necessary to determine whether the conduct was in fact administrative action in 
terms of PAJA. This was confirmed, which meant that the Minister’s conduct could 
be reviewed in terms of section 6 of PAJA. Where the Minister’s powers were used 
to maintain agricultural land for white ownership and occupation was now subject to 
judicial review. The necessary ministerial consent in terms of the Subdivision Act 
may only serve the legitimate purpose of the Act because it could be tested against 
PAJA and the Constitution. 
 
The section on conflict of rights considered the interplay of rights promoted by the 
preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes and those that are 
restricted by this purpose. The right to an environment which is not harmful to one’s 
health and wellbeing and the of access to sufficient food were explained as 
examples of rights promoted by this purpose and the land reform goals and right to 
access adequate housing as rights and interests restricted by this purpose. From 
case law it was clear that when adjudicating conflicting of rights that creating a 
hierarchy of rights would not resolve the conflict. Instead, an appropriate balance 
needs to be established between the rights. The aim is to balance and reconcile the 
opposed rights in a justifiable way, taking in account all the relevant interests and 
factors involved. The Subdivision Act preserves agricultural land for agricultural 
purposes, which is important for realising the right to a safe and healthy environment 
and the right to food. Where the Act prevents the realisation of land reform goals it 
has been specifically excluded. The Act balances the conflict with the right to 
housing and the preservation of agricultural land by preventing uncontrolled urban 
sprawl. The Subdivision Act provides balance between the conflicting rights. Where 
the Act’s effect is in favour of realising certain rights over others it can be excluded 
as seen in certain land reform legislation.  
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The final point dealt with the issue of competencies and whether agricultural 
subdivision should be regulated on a municipal level, as found in the minority 
decision of the Wary Holdings case, or whether it should remain a national 
competency. The minority found that the regulation of subdivision under the 
Subdivision Act forms part of planning which is exclusive to provincial and municipal 
competencies. For this reason the national Minister’s oversight was found to be in 
conflict with the Constitution. In was in conflict because the Minister’s powers negate 
municipal planning and because it trespasses into the sphere of exclusive provincial 
competence of provincial planning. The majority in Wary Holdings case found that 
the Subdivision Act continues to apply to the subdivision of agricultural land and that 
this practice will continue to be regulated on a national level. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6 1 Introduction 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (“Subdivision Act”)1 serves a legitimate 
purpose that is still valid in post-apartheid law, namely the preservation of 
agricultural land for agricultural purposes. In the chapter on the analysis of the Act 
the history and context of the Act was examined. This history and context in which 
the Act was crafted showed that the Subdivision Act was also used for an illegitimate 
goal during apartheid, namely the preservation of productive farms for white 
ownership and occupation. In the following chapter it was necessary to argue that 
the legitimate purpose and illegitimate aim of the Act could be identified and 
separated. In the same chapter it was argued that if the legitimate purpose of the Act 
could not be separated from the illegitimate aim it would have to be repealed. This 
chapter concluded that the legitimate purpose of the Act could in fact be separated 
from the illegitimate aim. This revealed the functional and legitimate purpose of the 
Act, namely the preservation of scarce and valuable agricultural land for agricultural 
purposes. 
 
However, in the constitutional dispensation this legitimate purpose of the Act could 
not be assumed to be neutral. The history of the Act and the extent of the regulation 
it entails made testing the Act in terms of the Constitution necessary. The limitation 
on the common law right of an agricultural land owner to subdivide and dispose of 
his land was tested against section 25 of the Constitution. The further constitutional 
implications of the Act were also considered. This was necessary because the Act 
has the effect of limiting the right to access agricultural land and it was argued could 
also maintain the position where prime agricultural land is held by white farmers. It 
was necessary to apply the equality standard here. The powers of the Minister of 
Agriculture in terms of the Act also needed to be tested for constitutional 
consonance. The Minister’s powers were used to preserve agricultural land for white 
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occupation, but were also necessary for the legitimate operation of the Act, to 
prevent uneconomic farming units. The Minister’s powers in terms of the Act were 
used to serve both the legitimate purpose and illegitimate aim of the Act. It was 
necessary to determine whether these powers could be tested in terms of the 
Constitution. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act2 was used to test these 
powers. It was found that these powers were administrative and the decision process 
was an administrative action which could be reviewed by the courts. The 
preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes serves to realise certain 
rights in the Bill of Rights, namely the right to an environment which is not harmful to 
one’s health and wellbeing and the right of access to sufficient food, but it also 
restricts other rights and interests, namely the land reform goal of access and the 
right of access to adequate housing. A conflict between these rights in the Bill of 
Rights was identified. It was necessary to interpret these rights and interests and 
apply the courts’ approach to conflicting rights. Finally, the constitutional analysis 
considered the competency of national government to regulate the practice of 
agricultural subdivisions. 
 
The research aims and hypotheses have been tested in the substantive chapters 
above. A historical and a comparative survey and policy, statutory, and constitutional 
analyses allowed a conclusion to be drawn about the applicability of the Subdivision 
Act in a constitutional dispensation. The chapters indicate that where the Act is used 
for its purpose of preventing the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land in the 
national interest it is a legitimate and constitutionally sound regulation. The Act’s 
regulation of the ownership entitlement of disposal is compliant in terms of the 
section 25(1) right to property. The Act makes provision for expropriation in certain 
instances and it was shown to comply with the constitutional standard in section 
25(2) and (3). The Act was argued to be section 9 compliant even though it has the 
effect of maintaining white ownership of agricultural holdings and is an obstacle to 
black access to agricultural land. In certain instances where the Act is an obstacle to 
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land reform goals it has been excluded through legislation. The Minister’s power to 
decide on subdivision applications are administrative actions under the PAJA and 
can be subject to judicial review which would fulfil the requirements of the section 33 
right to just administrative action. The rights and interests that are in conflict with the 
purpose of the Act,3 to protect scarce and valuable agricultural land, and those 
rights4 promoted by this purpose can be justifiably balanced and optimised, giving 
due consideration to government policy. The competency of national government to 
regulate agricultural subdivision was found to be contentious, but it can be argued to 
be compliant in terms of schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act5 was promulgated, but has not 
been brought into operation. The reasons for the repeal have been identified. They 
include that it is not appropriate for government to dictate the size of agricultural 
land; that it should be left up to agricultural land-users, the agricultural sector and the 
market to determine and that other mechanisms are in place to protect valuable 
agricultural land. The Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 
2003 is the only document that can provide clarity on the future of agricultural 
subdivisions. Since 2003 it has not been presented to Parliament, but it was revisited 
in 2007 after the National Land Summit. There have been no further indications of 
what the legislature intends to do in the future. However, the Bill does indicate that a 
similar approach to agricultural subdivisions as in the Subdivision Act will be 
adopted. The regulation would effectively operate in the same manner, but under a 
different legislative text. Each of the substantive chapters will now be considered. 
 
                                            
3
  The land reform goals in secs 25(5)-(9) and the socio-economic right to housing in sec 26 
were identified as rights that are in conflict with the purpose of preserving agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes. 
4
  The right to a safe and healthy environment in sec 24 and the right to food in sec 27(1)(b) 
were discussed as rights promoted by the purpose of preserving agricultural land for agricultural 
purposes. 
5
  64 of 1998. 
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6 2 Overview of chapters 
6 2 1 Analysis of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 
The analysis of the Subdivision Act was divided into an overview of the historical 
development of the Act, an interpretation of the Act’s provisions and a description of 
the current status of the Act. The overview of the historical development of the Act 
focussed on agricultural landholding before the promulgation of the Act, the policy 
reasons for tabling the subdivision regulation and the final promulgation of the 
Subdivision Act. From this discussion it became clear that the Subdivision Act had a 
legitimate purpose and an illegitimate aim. The Act’s history, context and the policy 
reasons for its enactment showed that the Act was necessary for the preservation of 
agricultural land. However, the historical context also showed that the Act was not 
free from political efforts to promote white interests at the cost of restricted and 
limited black African interests. The history of the Act showed its creation in an 
apartheid context where agricultural policy was racialised. The focus was preserving 
prime agricultural land for the white minority. The policy analysis also identified the 
dual purpose of the Act. The concern for creating uneconomic farming units was in 
fact a concern for the wellbeing of the white farmer. The Act was tabled because the 
creation of a white peasant farming community was a state concern.  
 
The extent of the statutory limitation introduced by the Act was examined by 
analysing the primary sections of the Act and the courts’ interpretation of those 
sections. It was clear from the discussion that the statutory limitation on the right to 
subdivide has numerous implications. In achieving the purpose of the Act the 
legislature has extended the Act’s application to restrict certain actions relating to the 
use agricultural land. The restriction has an effect on the right to alienate through 
sale and succession and also to register long-term leases and certain servitudes. 
This limitation was important when testing the section 25 constitutional compliance of 
the Subdivision Act. The Act’s history and purpose, also identified in this chapter, 
was relevant when testing for general constitutional compliance. 
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The current status of the Act was also considered. This showed that the Repeal Act 
which has been promulgated, but not yet put into operation, has created some 
uncertainty. The uncertainty about the Repeal Act has resulted in cases like 
Thanolda Estates (Pty) Ltd v Bouleigh 145 (Pty) Ltd6 where Wunsh J erroneously 
decided that the Subdivision Act had been repealed and did not apply it to the case. 
The reasons provided by the legislature for the repeal was that it is not appropriate 
for government to interfere in the determination of the size of agricultural land and 
that the position should be regulated by the agricultural sector, land users and the 
market. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Bill stated that appropriate 
zoning mechanisms were in place to regulate and protect valuable and scarce 
agricultural land. The Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 
2003 contradicts the reasons provided for the repeal of the Act. The Bill shows that 
national government has every intention of continuing to control and regulate 
agricultural subdivision. The provisions contained in the Bill are identical to the 
provisions in the Subdivision Act. The operation of the Subdivision Act has also been 
expressly excluded from certain legislation because of its incompatibility with land 
reform mechanisms. This exclusion was relevant when considering the general 
constitutional compliance of the Act. The majority in the Wary Holdings decision7 
confirmed that the Subdivision Act, in its present form, continues to apply to all 
agricultural subdivisions in the Republic. The Minister’s consent is still required for 
certain actions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land. 
 
The historical analysis showed that the Subdivision Act had an illegitimate goal as 
well as a legitimate purpose. The history of agricultural land holding and the policy 
documents identified the apartheid aim which protected agricultural land for white 
occupation. The Act was not just a neutral land-use regulation; it served an apartheid 
political agenda. The policy analysis also indicated that the promulgation of the Act 
was necessary to contend with the rate of uneconomic subdivisions in the Republic. 
This section concluded that the Act was necessary to preserve agricultural land, but 
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  [2001] 1 All SA 141 (W). 
7
  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
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was also used to promote an apartheid agenda. The historical and policy analysis 
confirmed that the Act had both a legitimate purpose, the protection of agricultural 
land from uneconomic subdivision, and an illegitimate aim, the preservation of 
agricultural land for whites. 
 
The analysis of the provisions of the Act showed the extent of the legislative 
limitation when it came to agricultural subdivisions. The land affected by the 
regulation is all agricultural land in the Republic and this is not affected by the new 
local government structure. The Constitutional Court confirmed this position. The Act 
prevents most of the actions that could result in the subdivision of agricultural land 
and criminalises certain actions when the Act has been contravened. The majority of 
the cases decided under the Act showed that the Act’s ministerial consent 
requirement has been used to escape contracts for the sale of a portion of 
agricultural land. Contracting parties have used the Act and the formality 
requirements for the sale of a portion of agricultural land to exit these contracts. The 
statutory analysis identified the extent of the Act’s operation. The Act prevents most 
of the actions that could result in the subdivision of agricultural land into uneconomic 
units. 
 
The Repeal Act of 1998 and the Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural 
Resources Bill of 2003 does not clear up the position for future regulation of 
agricultural subdivisions. The reasons for the repeal are that it is inappropriate for 
government to dictate the size of agricultural land and it should be left to the 
agricultural sector and market to determine. The draft Bill adopts the same regulation 
as contained in the Subdivision Act. There is still uncertainty to that extent, but the 
final analysis indicates that the Subdivision Act will continue to apply until the 
legislature finalises the repeal and promulgates new legislation. 
 
149 
 
6 2 2 Identifying and separating the legitimate purpose from the illegitimate aim 
The discussion on the legitimate purpose and illegitimate aim of the Subdivision Act 
showed that the regulation of the right to subdivide could still be legitimate in post-
apartheid land law. The fact that the Act was promulgated during apartheid did not 
outweigh the regulatory function it serves in our current dispensation. The 
Subdivision Act is a mechanism which preserves and protects agricultural land. This 
is important in many farming societies. The purpose of the Act is to prevent the 
uneconomic subdivision of prime agricultural land and its illegitimate aim, which 
preserved agricultural land for white ownership and occupation, does not affect this 
purpose. The national interest the Act serves is no longer a white interest. The 
legitimate purpose was further confirmed by examining subdivision regulations over 
agricultural land in the United States of America, specifically the states of Oregon 
and Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of British Columbia, Canada. 
 
The legislative framework that created the Act used planning and regulatory laws to 
separate the races. The racial discrimination and grossly unequal distribution of land 
was affected through a body of apartheid land law. All the land occupied and used 
was subject to these laws and regulations. Most of these laws are not facially 
discriminatory and have continued to apply in the new legal order. The Subdivision 
Act is one of these legislative texts; it is not facially discriminatory, but its inherent 
apartheid political agenda could not be overlooked. The chapter indicated that the 
national interest served by the Subdivision Act is no longer a white apartheid 
interest. The legitimate purpose of the Act, which is to prevent agricultural 
degradation, is in a national interest that does give undue benefits to a white 
minority. The finding in the chapter was that the illegitimate goal could be identified 
and separated from the necessary and legitimate regulatory purpose. Had this not 
been the case, the Act would have been found to be invalid and it would have to be 
abolished. Although the Act could be argued to serve a legitimate purpose it still 
required testing for constitutional consonance. 
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The comparative discussion on the policies and regulations relating to the 
preservation of agricultural land in the United States of America, specifically the 
states of Oregon and Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of British 
Columbia, Canada indicated that agricultural land is a finite resource that needs to 
be preserved and protected. These jurisdictions have, in certain instances, used 
subdivision and zoning regulations to effectively preserve prime agricultural land. 
They show that a subdivision regulation, for purposes of agricultural preservation, is 
a legitimate land-use regulation over agricultural land. The comparative sources also 
identified the dangers of failing to enforce subdivision regulations. This was the case 
in the American state of Hawaii where prime agricultural land was being subdivided 
for the purposes of housing development. 
 
This chapter concluded that it was possible for the Subdivision Act to serve its 
legitimate purpose free from its illegitimate apartheid aim, namely the preservation of 
prime agricultural land for white ownership and occupation. 
 
6 2 3 Section 25 compliance 
The chapter determining the Subdivision Act’s compliance in terms of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution considered the constitutionality of the limitations imposed by the 
Act on the exercise of ownership rights. The impugned provisions of the Act were 
tested against the criteria developed in the First National Bank of SA Limited t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB”)8 
decision. It was concluded that the effect the Act has on the ownership entitlement of 
disposal is constitutionally permissible. 
 
The chapter identified the entitlement of disposal as an interest in property for the 
purposes of section 25. This conclusion was based on the fact that the limitations 
posed by the Act affect the owner’s capacity to sell, lease, register servitudes and 
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bequeath property. These entitlements form part of the standard incident of the right 
to capital. It was accepted that the right to capital, which includes the right to 
alienate, forms part of the standard incidents of ownership in South African law. The 
Constitutional Court in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and 
Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights 
Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and 
Others (Kwazulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as amici curiae) 
(“Mkontwana”)9 found that the right to capital is an interest in property for the 
purposes of section 25. On this basis it was concluded that the right of subdivision 
and disposal, as regulated under the Act, constituted an interest in property for the 
purposes of section 25. 
 
The limitation on the right of disposal by the Subdivision Act is a deprivation for the 
purposes of section 25. This was based on Roux’s argument that a wide meaning 
should be given to deprivations. This meant that most interferences with the use and 
enjoyment of property would constitute a deprivation of property. However, the 
Constitutional Court in Mkontwana required that the interference be a “substantial 
interference”.10 This would be a limitation that went beyond that of normal 
restrictions. It was concluded that the Subdivision Act fulfils the “substantial 
interference” requirement developed by the court in Mkontwana. The limitation on 
the rights of agricultural land owners to dispose of their land under the Act is a 
deprivation for the purposes of section 25. 
 
The deprivation was tested for compliance in terms of the section 25(1). This 
examined the requirements that the deprivation must be in terms of a law of general 
application and that the deprivation should not be arbitrary. The Subdivision Act was 
found to be law of general application. The arbitrariness test examined both 
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 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
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  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng, and Others (Kwazulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi 
Municipality as amici curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 33. 
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procedural arbitrariness and substantive arbitrariness because the court in FNB 
found that a deprivation is arbitrary if the law does not provide sufficient reason for it. 
The Act was tested for both substantive arbitrariness and procedural arbitrariness. 
 
The Act was found to be procedurally fair based on the flexible-circumstance based 
test developed in the Mkontwana decision. The Subdivision Act limits the right to 
subdivide subject to the application process set out in section 4. The Act does not 
completely prohibit subdivision. It makes the act of subdivision subject to the 
application process and this serves as a procedural safeguard. The decision taken 
by the Minister could not be challenged in terms of procedural fairness under section 
25. An attack on the basis of procedural fairness applied to the Subdivision Act and 
as contained in section 25(1) would fail. 
 
The substantive arbitrariness test was based on the factors provided by the court in 
FNB. The variable interplay of relationships was applied to the deprivation on the 
right of disposal. The factors would indicate whether a mere rational relationship 
between means and ends was required or whether a more burdensome 
proportionate relationship was required. There was a nexus between the application 
process, required in terms of the Act, to subdivide and the prevention of uneconomic 
farming units. The purpose of the deprivation was found to preserve agricultural land 
by preventing it from being divided into uneconomic units. The purpose of the 
deprivation affected the owner of the land, but only limited the right of disposal, 
which is one of the core ownership entitlements. The deprivation did not embrace all 
the incidents of ownership; it only affected the right of disposal and was done in a 
manner that did not completely exclude the right to dispose of the property. It was 
concluded that only a rational relationship was required to prove that there was a 
sufficient reason for the deprivation under the Subdivision Act. The Act’s purpose of 
preventing the degradation of agricultural land serves a sufficient reason for the 
deprivation. The limitation on the right of agricultural land owners to dispose of their 
property in terms of the Subdivision Act is not in conflict with section 25(1). 
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The expropriation provision in the Act was tested against section 25(2) and (3). In 
terms of section 25(2) the Act satisfies the requirements of law of general application 
and it is in the public interest. The compensation requirement needed further 
consideration. The Subdivision Act makes provision for expropriation and the 
Expropriation Act11 is to be used to calculate compensation. The market value of the 
land is to serve as compensation. It was necessary to decide whether market value 
satisfies the constitutional norm of just and equitable compensation. It was argued 
that it would satisfy this norm. Although market value is only one of the factors 
identified in the section 25(3) requirements for just and equitable compensation the 
Constitutional Court found that market value is enough to satisfy the constitutional 
norm. An expropriation in terms of the Subdivision Act would comply with the 
constitutional requirements in sections 25(2) and (3). 
 
6 2 4 General constitutional compliance 
The necessary and legitimate purpose of the Subdivision Act, namely the 
preservation and protection of agricultural land from uneconomic subdivision, was 
divorced from its pre-constitutional apartheid aim, the preservation of prime 
agricultural land for white ownership and occupation. To identify and separate the 
legitimate purpose from the illegitimate aim was necessary to save the Act from 
unconstitutionality. However, the consequences of the legitimate purpose of the Act, 
when this purpose had existed side-by-side with the illegitimate aim, required further 
constitutional scrutiny. The legitimate purpose was tested in terms of other rights in 
the Bill of Rights. The further constitutional implications of the Act were also 
considered and tested for in this section. 
 
Where it was clear that the Act’s legitimate purpose could maintain white ownership 
in the current dispensation required an examination of this effect against the equality 
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provision in the Constitution. The foundation for this contention was that apartheid 
race based land allocation and the limitation on disposal of agricultural land by the 
Act had the effect of maintaining land allocated to whites during this period. The fact 
that most of the prime agricultural land in the Republic is still white owned supports 
this view. This coupled with the limiting effect the Subdivision Act has on black 
access to this land served as a prima facie case for discrimination based on race. 
The presumption of unfair discrimination in terms of section 9(5) of the Constitution 
required the application of the unfairness test as developed in Harksen v Lane NO 
and Others (“Harksen”).12 After considering these factors, identified below, the 
conclusion was that the presumption of unfair discrimination was rebutted.  
 
The first factor examined the historic, social and economic context of the Act and its 
practical operation. The history of the Act showed that it was created in an apartheid 
context where agricultural policy was racialised. The apartheid aim was to preserve 
agricultural land for the white minority. The practical operation of the legitimate 
purpose of the Act, saved from this illegitimate aim, still has the effect of preventing 
black access to prime agricultural land. This purpose also allows white farmers to 
continue occupying prime agricultural land because of the effect the Act has on 
disposal of the subject land. 
 
The second factor considered the position of the affected group or person in society 
and whether this group had suffered from a pattern of disadvantage in the past. Here 
it was necessary to consider the position of black South Africans in relation to 
agricultural land holding because of the limitation the Act poses to black access. A 
vast majority of black South Africans still suffer landlessness and the statistics on 
this point indicated that only six percent of agricultural land has been returned to 
those that were dispossessed of this land during apartheid. The Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform stated that the 2014 goal of redistributing thirty 
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percent of all agricultural land to blacks would be impossible. This shows that the 
process of rectifying the apartheid past is complex and requires time. 
 
The third factor considered the nature of the provision and its purpose. Here it was 
stated that if the purpose of the provision was to achieve an important societal goal 
and if the discrimination was not aimed at impairing the dignity of the group affected 
that it might not be unfair. The Subdivision Act’s purpose is the preservation of 
agricultural land. This purpose is in the national interest. The legitimate purpose of 
the Act was not to impair the dignity of black South Africans. This legitimate purpose 
was shown to be in the public interest and from an earlier chapter the comparative 
sources indicated that subdivision regulations were necessary when preserving 
prime agricultural land. 
 
The fourth factor examined the rights and interests that were impaired by the Act. It 
was concluded that the operation of the Act could have an effect on black access to 
agricultural land. In certain cases where the Act limited the right of access it was 
excluded in legislation.13 In these cases the effect of the Subdivision Act is an 
obstacle to realising land reform goals, as explained above, and the legislature has 
taken steps to neutralise this effect. In other instances where the Act continues to be 
an obstacle to black access a similar approach could be followed. The legislature 
could exclude the operation of the Act as in the legislation identified. Based on these 
factors it was concluded that the indirect effect of the Act did not constitute unfair 
discrimination.  
 
The administrative nature of the powers the Minister of Agriculture has in terms of 
the Subdivision Act was also tested. It was submitted that the Minister’s 
administrative powers to decide on applications for subdivision existed at a time 
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  Development and Facilitation Act 67 of 1995, secs 33(2)(j)(vi) and 51(2)(d)(ii); Land Reform 
Labour Tenants Act 3 of 1996, sec 40; Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, sec 8(8); 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act  62 of 1997, sec 4(7); Land Restitution and Reform Laws 
Amendment Act 63 of 1997, sec 42B(1); Provision of Land Assistance Act 26 of 1998, sec 10(3). 
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where administrative powers were abused to serve an apartheid political agenda. 
Because these powers are necessary in achieving the legitimate purpose of the Act 
they had to be tested against the constitutional standard. In this regard the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”)14 was central to the discussion. 
Testing the Minister’s powers in terms of the Subdivision Act against PAJA indicated 
that the Minister’s powers were administrative in nature. The process of considering 
an application for subdivision is an administrative act. Because the decision process 
is an administrative action it needs to comply with the requirements for just 
administrative action in the Constitution and PAJA. An administrative action taken 
under the Subdivision Act could be subject to judicial review under PAJA. If the Act is 
used for any purpose or aim that is not the legitimate purpose of the Act it can be 
reviewed. This ensures that a decision taken under the Act complies with the section 
33 right to just administrative action.  
 
The section on conflict of rights considered the interplay of rights promoted by the 
preservation of agricultural land for agricultural purposes and those that are 
restricted by this purpose. The socio-economic public purpose of the Subdivision 
Act, namely the preservation of prime agricultural land, serves to promote and 
protect rights in the Bill of Rights. This purpose also restricts certain rights and 
interests protected under the Constitution. This section considered the right to an 
environment which is not harmful to one’s health and wellbeing, socio-economic right 
of access to sufficient food, the land reform goals and the right of access to housing. 
The Act, when effectively implemented, could promote the right to a healthy and safe 
environment. The Act serves to prevent agricultural degradation, to promote the 
conservation of agricultural land and to secure the development and use of 
agricultural land which is economically and socially justifiable. Preserving productive 
agricultural land and ensuring the proper management and use of the resource can 
further ensure that the right to food is realised. These rights are promoted by the 
legitimate purpose of the Act. However, by preserving agricultural land for 
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agricultural purposes and dictating minimum erf sizes, the Act also has the effect of 
preventing the effective implementation of land reform goals and could be an 
obstacle to the realisation of the socio-economic right to housing. There is a conflict 
between these rights, the rights promoted by the effective implementation of the 
legitimate purpose of the Act and the rights restricted by this purpose. The conflict 
will not be resolved, but requires a balancing of the rights and the interests involved. 
The aim is to balance and reconcile the opposed rights in a justifiable way, taking 
into account all the relevant interests and factors involved. This view was derived 
from case law dealing with conflicting constitutional rights. It was concluded that the 
Subdivision Act provides this balance. The Act preserves agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes, and where the Act’s effect prevents the realisation of land 
reform goals in certain cases, it has been excluded. Here it was argued that where 
the purpose of preserving agricultural land does not correlate with government policy 
relating to land reform or housing reform that legislation would have to be adopted to 
exclude the operation of the Act to realise these reforms. Government policy would 
have to dictate how these conflicting rights and interests would be optimised. From 
case law is was also clear that if this balance is not struck the courts can and must 
intervene. 
 
The issue raised in the minority decision in Wary Holdings was also discussed. 
Yacoob J, for the minority, found that the national regulation of agricultural 
subdivision was in conflict with the Constitution. The decision was that the Act was 
concerned with the functional area of planning, and that the Minister’s authority was 
in conflict with the Constitution. There is a conflict because the authority negates 
municipal planning and it trespasses on to the sphere of the exclusive provincial 
competence of provincial planning. It was contended that the Subdivision Act’s 
primary concern is agricultural preservation and not planning, as Yacoob J decided. 
The purpose of the Subdivision Act is the preservation of agricultural land by 
preventing the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. In terms of the 
Constitution, agriculture, the environment and soil conservation are functional areas 
under the concurrent national and provincial legislative competence. For this reason 
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an argument that the national Minister continues overseeing this functional area of 
agriculture can be made. The Act’s legitimate purpose is to preserve agricultural land 
and it uses the planning tool, the subdivision regulation, to achieve it. 
 
6 3 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has shown that the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
serves a legitimate purpose that is still valid in post-apartheid law. This purpose is 
the prevention of the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land. The fact that the 
Act was also used for an illegitimate aim during the apartheid era was identified. This 
aim was the preservation of productive farmlands for whites. It was argued that the 
legitimate purpose could be separated from the illegitimate apartheid goal and that a 
functional purpose for the regulation would remain. Had this not been the case the 
Act would have been unconstitutional.  
 
Although the regulatory purpose was found to be legitimate the effect it had on 
ownership entitlements required testing in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. 
The restricting effect the Subdivision Act has on ownership entitlements was found to 
be section 25 compliant. A general compliance test was used to determine the Act’s 
validity in terms of other rights in the Bill of Rights. The general compliance test 
identified the further constitutional implications of the Act and concluded that the Act 
was constitutionally sound. 
 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act is a valid and constitutionally sound 
regulation. It is a legitimate regulation over the common law right of agricultural land 
owners to subdivide their land. There is still uncertainty because of the inoperative 
Repeal Act. It is not clear what the legislature intends to use to replace the 
Subdivision Act. It is clear that the regulation is necessary to preserve agricultural 
land. The proposed Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill of 
2003 would indicate that the legislature intends for this regulation to continue being 
regulated at a national level. The Bill contains identical subdivision provisions as in 
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the Subdivision Act. This allows one to question the need for the Repeal Act in the 
first place. The reason mooted by the legislature for the repeal is that it is 
inappropriate for government to dictate the size of agricultural units and that this 
should be left to the land users, the agricultural sector and market to determine. This 
reason does not correspond with the identical provisions contained in the draft Bill. It 
would be safe to speculate that the Repeal Act in fact exists to repeal the 
Subdivision Act because of the history and context in which it was crafted. The 
Repeal Act seems to be no more than a symbolic end to an apartheid land-use 
instrument. The legislature, it seems, wants to create a new instrument that would 
essentially do the same thing, but this instrument would be free from an apartheid 
history and context. 
 
The draft Bill would be nothing more than the Subdivision Act with a new name, 
promulgated under the new order. This would not change the effect the Act has on 
ownership entitlements or the limitation on access to agricultural holdings. In effect it 
would not change the system currently in place. The effect will be similar and it is 
clear that the regulation cannot be used for illegitimate purposes because it would be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. What is certain, for now, is that the Subdivision Act 
continues to apply in its current form. This was confirmed in the Wary Holdings 
decision.15 The Minister’s consent is still required for certain actions relating to the 
subdivision of agricultural land and from the discussion above it is now clear that the 
Act can apply free from an illegitimate apartheid goal and it can be argued to be 
constitutionally compliant. 
                                            
15
  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
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